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iAbstract
Online public participation platforms have resuscitated the debate globally about whether the 
Internet can be used to improve the reach of public participation and the quality of comments 
received during these processes or not. This thesis highlights that this debate is a ruse. Our 
focus should not be on the mode of participation adopted to engage with interested and 
affected parties but rather on the manner in which that mode (whether online platforms or 
more traditional methods) is implemented. 
Currently in South Africa there is not a standard set of guidelines to assist persons 
undertaking these modes of participation to ensure that they are adequate or acceptable.  This 
thesis seeks to create such a framework. As all actions in South Africa must comply with the 
Constitution, it is the starting point for developing this baseline. 
The Constitution drafters introduced participatory democracy into the South African legal 
framework. In doing so, they intended that certain principles associated with this notion filter 
into the legal system. This thesis identifies these principles, drawn from the works of 
democratic theorists, Constitutional-era South African case law, legislation, practice and 
administrative process, and proposes a participatory framework ('the Constitutional 
Framework for Public Participation' or 'CFPP') which, if followed, will ensure that 
policymaking and administrative participatory processes comply with the Constitutional 
conception of participatory democracy. 
In addition, as online participation is most likely to become a prominent tool in engaging 
interested and affected parties, this thesis considers whether there are any principles relating
specifically to online participation which should be included in the CFPP. Following an 
assessment of online public participation processes, additional principles have been identified
but these principles apply equally to offline modes of participation as to online participation. 
Having incorporated these additional principles into the CFPP, they are applied to the public 
participation process required in terms of Environmental Impact Assessment ('EIA') to assess 
whether these processes are being conducted in a Constitutional manner. The findings reveal
that the regulations governing the EIA public participation processes fall short of the CFPP. 
Although the regulations are inadequate, examples of actual EIA public participation 
processes are examined to determine whether, notwithstanding the inadequate regulations, the 
implemented public participation process meet the requirements of the CFPP. This also yields
ii
a negative outcome, highlighting that public participation processes are not being conducted 
in a manner required by the Constitution. 
This thesis suggests that the CFPP can be consulted to assist lawyers, administrators, 
legislatures, persons responsible for public participation processes, government and others in 
designing and implementing constitutionally acceptable public participation processes. It is 
acknowledged that the CFPP will need to be the subject of empirical investigation by
subsequent researchers to assess its effectiveness in achieving this objective. 
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1Chapter 1
Introduction: the impact of online media in the context of public 
participation 
1.1 Introduction
The introduction of the Internet in the early 1990's was expected to revolutionise political
participation.1 As information became more easily available online, it was anticipated that
more people would engage in participatory processes.2 Unfortunately, this did not come to
fruition.3 Since then, the world has undergone a 'communication revolution'4 in that online
media (such as Facebook,5 Twitter6 and Whatsapp) have fundamentally revised the way we
communicate with one another.7 Online interactions are no longer a unidirectional flow of
information from the government to the citizenry.8 Instead, interested and affected parties
('IAPs') use these platforms to receive, share and create information in real time making them
appear to be suitable tools for participation.9 The introduction of this new form of online
media has revitalized the debate globally and more specifically in South Africa around online
participation as it provides 'enormous potential…for greater efficiency, cost reduction,
quality of public services, convenience, innovation and learning.'10
These apparent benefits are being 'explored by governments around the world…to
improve the quality and responsiveness of public services, expand the reach and accessibility
of both services and public infrastructure, and allow citizens to experience faster and more
                                               
1 Stephen M Johnson ‘The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation in Access to 
Government Information Through the Internet’ (1990) 50 Administrative Law Review 277 at 279.
2 South African Parliament ‘A People’s Government. The People’s Voice. A Review of Public Participation in 
the Law and Policy-Making Process in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=285 accessed on 4 September 2014.
3 SW Shulman 'The Internet Still Might (But Probably Won't) Change Everything' (2005) Vol 1 No 1 I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy.
4 Eric Qualman ‘Socialnomics’ available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FZ0z5Fm-Ng accessed on 18 
February 2014.
5 Facebook available at http://www.facebook.com last accessed on 30 January 2017.
6 Twitter available at http://www.twitter.com last accessed on 30 January 2017. 
7 Raj Agnihotri, Rebecca Dingus, Michael Y. Hu and Michael T Krush 'Social Media: Influencing Customer 
Satisfaction in B2B Sales' (2015) Industrial Marketing Management at 1.
8 Bruno Schinvinski and Dariusz Dabrowski 'The Effect of Social Media Communication on Consumer 
Perceptions of Brands' (2016) Journal of Marketing Communications at 3.
9 Agnihotri et al op cit note 7. 
10 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 'Responsive and Accountable Public Governance 
2015 World Public Sector Report' at 42 available at 
workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN95253.pdf last accessed on 19 January 2017. 
2transparent forms of access to government services'.11 There is a dearth of published research
adding to this debate in South Africa.12 This thesis contributes to the debate by proposing a
set of principles aimed at enhancing the efficacy of public participation. These principles
have been incorporated into a framework which, I propose, can be used to ensure that any
policy-making or administrative participation process will meet the objectives of
participatory Democracy contemplated by the South African Constitution.13 This framework
is referred to as the Constitutional Framework for Public Participation ('CFPP') which is set
out in detail in Chapter 6.
The principles making up the CFPP have been drawn from various sources. As a first
step the works of democratic participatory theorists are evaluated in Chapter 2 to identify the
principles that are common to democratic participatory theory and which the Constitution
seeks to incorporate into the South African legal framework. These principles are referred to
as a 'substantive principles'.
In Chapter 3 and 4 the existing participatory mechanisms (i.e. voting, the creation of
legislation, local government involvement and administrative processes) are considered in
light of the substantive principles to determine if these mechanisms meet the Constitutional
standard. Through this process, a number of additional principles ('the procedural principles')
are identified. These procedural principles provide guidance on how participatory processes
must be structured to give effect to the substantive principles.
As online participation is likely to increase in the future, Chapter 5 considers the
experience gained from RegulationRoom (an online public participation platform adopted in
the United States to develop federal regulations) to determine if there are any additional
procedural principles that are specific to online participation that must be included in the
CFPP which is set out in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the CFPP is practically applied to the
public participation processes conducted in terms of the Environmental Impact Assessment
                                               
11 Ibid.
12 Ifeoluwapo Fashoro and Lynette Barnard 'Social Computing as an E-Participation Tool in South Africa: An 
Exploratory Study' (2016) CONF-IRM 2016 Proceedings Paper 9 available at 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/confirm2016/19 last accessed on 19 January 2017, Roxanne Piderit and Nqabomzi Jojozi 
'Improving Citizen Participation Through Information Access in e-Government: Technology, Organization and 
Environmental Factors for South Africa' Electronic Government and Electronic Participation HJ Scholl, O 
Glassey and MFWHA Janssen (Eds) (2016), Laban Bagui and Andy Bytheway 'Exploring E-Participation in the 
City of Cape Town' (2013) Vol 9 No 4 The Journal of Community Informatics; Hamilton Mphindi 'Digital 
Divide and e-governance in South Africa' available at http://www.ais.up.ac.za/digi/docs/mphidi_paper.pdf last 
accessed on 19 January 2017.
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
3('EIA') to determine whether these public participation processes meet the normative goals in
the CFPP. Before setting out the outcomes of this comparison, an overview is provided of the
principles underpinning the CFPP.
1.2 Participatory Democratic Theory
In 1996, the South African Parliament adopted the final Constitution and, in doing so,
ushered in a supreme law aimed at establishing inter alia 'a society based on democratic
values'.14 This value system applies not only to the actions of government institutions but
'permeate[s] all social relations, and inform[s] all South Africans' dealings with each other
whether as private citizens inter se or as civil servants appointed to serve the public
interest.'15 It is the relationship with the citizens that is considered to be a 'defining
characteristic'16 of democracy.
In spite of this common theme, there is not one theory or definition of democracy in
the Constitution. This is evident when reviewing the text of the Constitution where the word
'democracy' is prefaced by the words 'representative',17 'participatory';18 'constitutional'19 and
'multi-party'.20 Each of these forms of democracy governs the relationship between the
government and its citizens in some manner: representative democracy concerns the
appointment of government representatives through voting; constitutional democracy
balances the relationship between the protection of fundamental human rights and majority
will (which are not always aligned); multi-party democracy endorses having multiple
political parties being able to compete in elections for votes and participatory democracy
promotes increased citizen participation in governance between elections. 'Given that the
various forms of democracy in political theory are either ideal types or deliberately partial
accounts of what this terms means, it is not surprising that the final Constitution should have
hedged its bets in this way – to have chosen as its blueprint just one of the existing 'models' of
democracy would have been artificial and unnecessary.'21
                                               
14 Ibid at the Preamble. 
15 Theunis Roux 'Democracy' in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd Ed, revised service 
(2014). at 10 - 23. 
16 Iain Currie and Johan De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th Ed (2016) at 14.
17Constitution op cit note 14 at S57(1)(b), s70(1)(b) and s116(1)(b).
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid at Ch9.
20 Ibid at s1(d), s199(8) and s236. 
21 Roux op cit note 15 at 10 - 2. 
4The South African Constitution does not select one democratic theory in favour of
another. Instead it seeks to incorporate all of these theories and the principles underpinning
them into the South African legal system. For present purposes, I have focused on
participatory democracy and the principles underlying increased participation as
substantiation.
The principles arising from participatory democratic theory are explained and
discussed in Chapter 2. In summary, participatory democratic theory has three objectives:
firstly, IAP's must be informed to enable them to perform reasonable and responsible
action.22 This is achieved through collaboration in which IAP's express, defend and debate
their views with other participants in order to develop a common solution.23 Where
necessary, problem-solving mechanisms will need to be implemented to resolve impasse
between the parties.24 In doing so, any discrepancy between the IAPs' private interests and
the public interest will be diminished. I refer to this as Principle 1: The Educative Effect.
The next principle, Principle 2: The Principle of Control requires that IAP's must
exercise a degree of control over their own destiny and so they must feel that they have a
genuine opportunity to influence the outcome of any public participation process.25 IAP's
who exercise such control and believe that their voices are heard (and responded to) are more
likely to accept the final decision, even if it does not accord with their own private interests as
they believe the process followed to have been fair. This acceptance of the outcome or the
participatory process is referred to as Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate.  
These principles (along with Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity) are referred to as
the 'substantive principles'. The substantive principles focus on the IAP's subjective
assessment of the public participation process. In particular they focus on whether IAP's
concerns have been ventilated and debated; that their opportunity to participate is real rather
than illusionary and that the final decision is fair even if it does not accord with their private
interest. These principles are supported by the 'procedural principles' which relate to the
                                               
22 Carol Pateman Participation and Democratic Political Theory (1970) at 24.
23 J Muso, C Weare and T Bryer ‘Toward “Strong Democracy” in Global Cities? Social Capital Building, 
Theory-Driven Reform, and the Los Angeles Neighborhood Council Experience’ (2011) Public Administration 
Review at 107.
24 R Fisher & J Ury Getting to Yes – Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (1981) a 91; Gyu-Chan Lim, 
Seung-Bo Park, Won-Jin Lee and Jae-Dong Lee ‘Content Requirements for Collaborative Learning Based on 
the Concept of Role-Playing’ (2014) Vol 47 (Culture and Contents Technology) Advanced Science and 
Technology Letters at 159.
25 Pateman op cit note 22 at 26.
5structure, format and operation of the public participation process.26 This distinction between
substantive and procedural principles has been adopted for the sake of convenience to draw a
distinction between those categories of principles that focus on the subjective state of mind of
the IAP's compared with the more objective procedural principles. The importance and
prominence of each of the substantive and procedural principles will swell and diminish in
each public participation process and, depending on the facts of each case one principle is
likely to trump another principle.
The procedural principles which I identify and develop below have been drawn from
participatory processes conducted since the introduction of the Constitution in South Africa. I
have referred to the substantive principles and procedural principles as 'the democratic
participatory principles'.
1.3 Constitutional Public Participation 
During apartheid the substantive principles were not enforced. In fact, extreme legislative27
and administrative measures were implemented28 (and in some instances endorsed by the
judiciary)29 to ensure that predominantly black30 IAP's were excluded from participating in
government and decisions which affected their day-to-day lives.31 It is unsurprising that
citizen participation has not only been encouraged but enforced in the constitutional era.
Chapters 3 and 4 consider the legislative, administrative and judicial treatment of
public participation since the inception of the Constitution by considering the primary forms
of engagement: voting, public participation in the creation of legislation, public participation
in local government and public participation in administrative decision-making. Aside from
Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity (which essentially requires that IAP's feel that they are
                                               
26 See Chapter 3 and 4 below. 
27 Two examples of legislative measures used to prevent persons from participating in government are the 
Separate Representation of Voters Act 12 of 1936 which removed black South African voters from the voters 
roll and the Senate Act 53 of 1955 which allowed the government to re-constitute the Senate so as to have a 
sufficient majority to pass the Separate Representation of Voters Act which removed coloured voters from the 
voters roll. 
28 For example, The Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 (later the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982) 
along with the Unlawful Organisations Act 34 of 1960 and the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 outlawed 
organisations that the administrator believed may overthrow the government, prevented individuals from 
participating in such organisations and even banning gatherings and publications so as to prevent the sharing of 
information and collaboration.  
29 Ndlwana v Hofmeyr NO 1937 AD 229; Collins v Minister of the Interior and Another 1957 (1) SA 552 (AD); 
South African Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice 1966 (3) SA 572 (AD).
30 Black persons were defined as any person classified as 'non-European' including black Africans, Asians, 
Indians and any person considered to be 'black' by the administrators based on their characteristics.
31 These legislative and administrative measures are briefly discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
6part of their community and believe that, by participating, their views 'count'),32 the principles
discussed in this chapter are procedural in nature.
While the substantive principles discussed above 'sketch the contours of a peculiarly
South African form of democracy…the legislature and the judiciary…fill in the details'33 of
the form that participatory processes should take to give effect to these principles. The first of
the procedural principles is Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity.34 This principle requires
that the person conducting the public participation process ('the proponent') must take all
reasonable measures to remove obstacles which prevent IAP's from participating.35 In certain
instances IAP's may lawfully be excluded from participating but this should only be in
exceptional circumstances and only where the exclusion is specified in the empowering
legislation or linked to a legitimate government purpose or objective.36
In order to remove obstacles to participation, the proponent must have a clear
understanding of which IAP's may wish to participate in the process (Principle 8: The
Identity of the IAP's).37 This includes IAP's which would ordinarily participate in the process
such as business, industry and those individuals that are well-resourced (these IAP's are
referred to as 'insiders'),38 as well as parties who traditionally would not participate in public
participation processes because of a lack of resources, knowledge or skill ('outsiders').39 In
order to solicit information from these divergent types of IAP's, the proponent may need to
adopt various modes of participation (Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity).40 Failure to
do so may result in the substantive principles not being achieved as certain IAP's may have
not been accorded an opportunity to be heard or their views have not been taken into
consideration. Context is critical in selecting a mode of participation as a poor understanding
of the circumstances in which a decision is taken is unlikely to further the democratic
participatory principles (Principle 11: The Principle of Context).41 This is particularly so with
                                               
32 August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at [17].
33 Roux op cit note 15 at 10 - 2. 
34 August supra note 32.
35 New National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1999 (3) SA 
191 (CC).
36 Ibid at [19] – [23]. 
37 Moutse Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (11) 
BCLR 1158 (CC).
38 Dmitry Epstein, Josiah Heidt and Cynthia R Farina ‘The Value of Words: Narrative as Evidence in 
Policymaking’ (2014) Cornell Law Faculty Publication Paper 1243 at 3.
39 Ibid.
40 Competition Commission ‘Banking Inquiry Report Chapter 1’ available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/1-Enquiry-Process_non-confidential1.pdf accessed on 13 March 2016 at page 17.
41 See section 4.3 Administrative action affecting the public below.
7respect to online media. Implementing a public participation process using online media in a
rural area where the majority of the IAP's did not have access to technology defeats the
democratic participatory principles.
The mode of participation selected is merely a means to an end in that the mode
should allow IAP's to participate and, in doing so, to give effect to the democratic
participatory principles. Therefore, the proponent needs to re-evaluate the mode of
participation and change or supplement the existing mode to achieve the substantive
principles.42 This is referred to as Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility. The raison d'être
of this principle is to dissuade proponents from selecting a mode of participation and
doggedly persisting with that mode of participation while not achieving the substantive
principles.
The identity of the IAP's and the mode(s) of participation selected for participation
must be incorporated into a public participation strategy ('PPS')43 (Principle 10: Public
Participation Strategy) that is negotiated with the IAP's. The views of the IAP's must be
taken into consideration when designing and implementing the PPS. However, the proponent
does not need to defer to the views of the IAP's in all instances (Principle 7: The Deference
Principle).44 In fact, it will be impossible for the proponent to do so as the IAP's may have
conflicting views on the PPS. However, the proponent needs to keep an open mind when
considering the various views.
The PPS sets out the step-by-step process that will be followed from initial
notification of the process until completion. This thesis suggests that, at each step, the
proponent must indicate the nature and extent of the IAP's participation. That is, whether the
IAP's are notified of an event ('inform'),45 whether they will be entitled to submit comments
or representations ('consult')46 or whether they will be actively involved in the decision-
making process ('involve').47 After the strategy has been agreed with the IAP's, it cannot be
amended without the IAP's input. Public inquiries conducted in terms of the Competition
                                               
42 See section 3.6.2 The National Policy Framework below.
43 Department Provincial and Local Government ‘National Policy Framework for Public Participation’ (2007) 
available at https://pmg.org.za/policy-document/35/ last accessed on 12 April 2016 at 6.
44 Poverty Alleviation Network and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2010 (6) 
BCLR 520 (CC).
45 Framework op cit note 43 at 45 – 46.
46 Ibid at 47.
47 Ibid at 48.
8Act48 provide some useful insights into the structure and form that these public participation
strategies can take, based on what is practical and feasible in the circumstances (Principle 12:
The Principle of Reasonableness).
In implementing the mode(s) of participation, both technical and social issues
(Principle 14: The Principle of Integration)49 need to be raised, debated and (if necessary)
resolved. This form of participation needs to continue for the life of the undertaking
(Principle 15: The Principle of Continuity).50 On-going participation, however, has the
potential to be counter-productive and can be used by objectors to draw out the participatory
process to prevent decisions being taken. This is contrary to Principle 16: The Principle of
Efficiency51 which requires that good quality decisions must be made as quickly as possible.
Principle 6: The Finality in Decision-Making ensures that this does not happen. Where the
proponent is satisfied that the IAP's have participated in the process and is confident that
there will be no further value or benefit in additional participation, he or she may permit a
less engaging form of participation.52 For example, the proponent may merely notify IAP's of
a decision, rather than engaging in further consultation. In this way, the various principles
need to be weighed against one another within the structure of the CFPP.
In order to determine whether there has been adequate participation, the process needs
to be monitored and evaluated on an on-going basis to ensure that the participatory
democratic principles are being achieved (Principle 17: The Principle of Monitoring and
Evaluation).53 Where the substantive principles are not being achieved, the PPS may need to
be adapted to bring the public participation process in line with the substantive principles.54
Given the recent resurgence in online participation, it is worth considering whether
there are any principles specific to online participation that should be identified before
incorporating the principles expressed above into the CFPP.
                                               
48 89 of 1998. 
49 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry ‘Generic Public Participation Guidelines - September 2001’ 
accessible at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Other/GPPG/guide.pdf accessed on 15 April 2016 at page 15.
50 Ibid 16.
51 Ibid 20.
52 Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (5) SA 
171 (CC).
53 Generic Public Participation Guidelines op cit note 49 at 21.
54 Section 6.6 Auditing the Public Participation S.
91.4 Online Public Participation
Online media are increasingly being used as tools for participatory decision-making.55 As
expressed here, little has been written in South Africa regarding online participatory
mechanisms and nothing appears to have been written in respect of online participation and
democracy in South Africa. Although there are many international examples of online
participation projects and initiatives,56 they are based on different methodologies and
circumstances,57 making it difficult to make general observations about these projects.
Furthermore, some of the platforms that are considered to be participatory do not meet the
democratic participatory principles as they are merely a source of information and do not also
provide opportunities for IAP's to collaborate in constructing knowledge or exercise control
over decisions or laws that may affect them – which are critical components of Principle 1:
The Educative Effect and Principle 2: The Principle of Control.
To determine whether there are principles which must be incorporated into the CFPP
specific to online participation, requires consideration of online participatory processes which
promote the conception of participatory democracy envisaged in the Constitution.
RegulationRoom,58 an online rulemaking platform created by the Cornell eRulemaking
Initiative ('CeRI') in conjunction with the United States Department of Transport is one such
example.
                                               
55 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 'United Nations E-Government Survey 2016' 
available at https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Reports/UN-E-Government-Survey-2016 last 
accessed on 15 February 2017.
56 Oded Nov, Mor Naaman and Chen Ye 'Analysis of Participation in an Online Photo-Sharing Community: A 
Multidimensional Perspective' (2009) Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology;
June Ahn, Brian S Butler, Alisha Alam and Sarah A Webster 'Learner Participation and Engagement in Open 
Online Courses: Insights from the Peer 2 Peer University' (2013) Vol 9, No 2 MERLOT Journal of Online 
Learning and Teaching; Joseph Kahne, Nam-Jin Lee, Jessica Timpany Feezell 'Digital Media Literacy 
Education and Online Civic and Political Participation' (2012) International Journal of Communication; Dareb 
C Brabham 'Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process for Planning Projects' (2009) Vol8(3) Planning 
Theory; Jeff Biggar ‘Crowdsourcing for the Environment: The Case of Bright Planet’ (2010) Journal of Media 
and Communication; L Lei and B Hilton ‘A Spatially Intelligent Public Participation System for the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Process' (2013) ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information; Rodrigo 
Sandoval-Almazan and J Ramon Gil-Garcia 'Are Government Internet Portals Evolving Towards More 
Interaction, Participation, and Collaboration? Revisiting the Rhetoric of E-government among Municipalities' 
(2012) Vol 29, Supplement 1 Government Information Quarterly.  
57 The examples cited above are a few of many. Although engaging with participants in some manner or form 
the various platforms used make it difficult to compare one public participation process against another. For 
example, in some instances participants use online platforms to merely provide information while others use 
online media so as to create a two-way dialogue between the participants. Furthermore, some online tools are 
designed specifically for the public participation process, while others use more well-known social media 
technology which means that they may have different design features which may influence the outcome of the 
public participation process. These different forms of participation are also adopted in a variety of circumstances 
from education to healthcare to environmental impact assessments which may influence the kind of interaction. 
Furthermore, cultural impacts may also interfere in public participation processes in that students may not want 
to engage with other students but only with the teacher or men may not want to engage with women.
58 RegulationRoom available at http://regulationroom.org/ las accessed on 31 January 2017. 
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CeRI has administered a number of online rulemaking participatory processes using
RegulationRoom to engage actively IAP's in a dialogue around proposed rules. The
methodologies for each of these processes has been similar, with modifications made along
the way based on the lessons they have learned in implementing RegulationRoom. These
processes and the lessons learned have been extensively documented and are discussed in
detail in Chapter 5. Interestingly, the procedural principles that can be drawn from these
investigations are equally applicable to offline participatory processes, highlighting that it is
the manner in which the public participation process is conducted ('the method') not the kind
of participation process that is adopted ('the modes of participation') which is relevant when
conducting a public participation process.59
The first principle is Principle 18: The Narrative Principle which recognises that
insiders and outsiders to a public participation process communicate their views differently.60
While insiders tend to submit well-reasoned and supported written comments, outsiders tend
to express themselves in the narrative through stories and personal experience.61 CeRI noted
that, although this form of comment was unfamiliar to the administrators, it provided
valuable 'situated knowledge' which influenced the decision-making process in that it raised
issues of conflict between the proposed decision and the IAP's, associated negative
consequences of the proposed decision or unintended impact.62 This form of public
participation needs to be encouraged and administrators and regulators also need to develop
the necessary skills to isolate valuable information from it.
To assist IAP's (and particularly outsiders) to contribute towards the public
participation process, the IAP's need to receive and understand all relevant information.
Principle 19: The Issue Posts Principle suggests that information should be broken down into
important themes which can guide IAP's through this information (particularly where it is
voluminous or technical). These important themes (or issue posts) must be simply written to
ensure that participants can understand the critical issues and the associated impacts even if
they are not familiar with the jargon or technical information.63 This will allow IAP's to
understand the key issues and participate without needing to read through hundreds of pages
                                               
59 Kathryn S Quick and John M Bryson 'Public Participation' in Handbook on theories of Governance (2016) 
Christopher Ansell and  Jacob Torfing (Eds) at 163 – 164. 
60 Epstein et al op cit note 38 at 10 – 11.
61 Ibid.
62 Section 5.5 Broader participation: recognising the value of situated knowledge expressed in the narrative
below.
63 Cynthia Farina, Mary Newhart and Cheryl Blake ‘The Problem with Words: Plain Language and Public 
Participation in Rulemaking’ Cornell Law School Research Paper No 15-08 at 6 – 13.
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of technical information.64 The issues posts, however, should cross reference this more
technical information so that more sophisticated users can refer to the primary sources.65
Online tools can be used to cross-reference effectively or hyperlink these underlying
documents with the issue posts but this is not a sine qua non for public participation.  
Although issue posts assist IAP's in understanding the critical concerns of a public
participation process, this does not guarantee broader or better participation. Principle 20:
The Principle of Moderation, therefore, suggests that moderators can help to encourage
debate, clarify misconceptions or misinterpretations and direct IAP's to relevant information
that may address their concerns.66 CeRI found that facilitated moderation solicited additional
comments 60 – 70% of the time.67 In online participation the role of moderator is more
important as IAP anonymity tends to heighten antagonistic interactions as IAP's feel less
inhibited to express themselves than in face-to-face interactions. This more honest and
aggressive interaction may precipitate more lively debate but this may deteriorate into IAP's
making personal attacks on other IAP's rather than discussing the issues at hand. This may
dissuade IAP's from participating further in the process.68 The moderator needs to strike a
balance between encouraging lively debate and stepping in to censor IAP's. This is a
particularly sensitive issue when the IAP's express views contrary to what the public
participation process seeks to achieve. Although the role of the moderator may be more
prominent in online interactions, the moderators' function is important to facilitate IAP
involvement in both online and offline forms of participation.69
1.5 The Constitutional Framework for Public Participation
The baseline for constitutionally acceptable public participation can be structured into a
framework which can be used as a litmus test when conducting public participation
processes, be it administrative action or creating legislation. The CFPP is set out in Chapter 6.
It may not seem substantially different from some codified administrative law public
                                               
64 Jackeline Solivan and Cynthia R Farina ‘Regulation Room - How the Internet Improves Public Participation 
in Rulemaking’ (2013) Proceedings at 59.
65 Cynthia Farina, Hoi Kong, Cheryl Blake, Mary Newhart, Nik Luka ‘Democratic Deliberation in the Wild: 
The McGill Online Design Studio and the RegulationRoom Project’ (2014) Fordham URBL.J. Vol XLI at 1531 -
2.
66 Ibid at 1556 – 1557.
67 Cynthia R Farina, Mary J Newhardt, Claire Cardie, Dan Cosley and the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative 
(CERI) ‘Rulemaking 2.0’ 65 U. Miami L. Review 395 (2010 - 2011) at 434.
68 Ibid at 451.
69 Joonsuk Park, Claire Cardie, Cynthia R Farina, Sally Klingel and Mary J Newhart ‘Facilitative Moderation 
for Online Participation in eRulemaking’ (2012) Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative Publications Paper 2 at 2.
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participation processes70 but there are two points which distinguish the CFPP from these
processes. Firstly, the CFPP is founded on the democratic participatory principles which
guide the interpretation and application of any administrative or policymaking public
participation process which (over time) will develop a precedent of public participation that is
constitutionally compliant and, secondly, the selected mode(s) of participation must be
continually compared to the democratic participatory principles to ensure that the process
meets these standards.
As set out above, the most important part of the CFPP is developing the PPS as this
sets out the process that the proponent and IAP's must follow in implementing and
participating in the public participation process. The PPS is informed by the identity of the
IAP's, the time available to conduct the public participation process, the reasonable costs of
implementing the process, the available resources to conduct the process, the nature of the
decision or activity following the public participation process and any other requirements in
the empowering legislation.
Having taken this information into account, the PPS must be designed and negotiated
with IAP's (if the group is small) or published for comment in respect of larger groups. The
PPS must set out the phases of the public participation process and the proposed mode(s) of
participation, expressing the nature and extent of participation at each phase and the timeline
of the entire public participation process.
Once the PPS has been finalized, it must be published and implemented. The
proponent will need to implement the process in strict compliance with the PPS and act as a
moderator to facilitate comments, moderate conflicts and maintain interest in the process,
despite competing factors. To ensure that the implemented PPS meets the requirements of the
democratic participatory principles, an independent assessor will need to review the PPS and
engage with the IAP's to confirm whether the process meets the substantive principles. To the
extent that the assessor feels that the principles are not being achieved, he or she will direct
the proponent to amend the PPS to ensure that the process moves closer to fulfilling the
substantive principles.
                                               
70 For example, when applying for a mining right in terms of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002 or an environmental authorisation in terms of the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998 (read with the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations) or the notice and 
comment proceedings contained in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
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As the CFPP is designed as a framework for all kinds of public participation
processes, it is general in nature and may be modified for every circumstance. As a test case,
this thesis compares the public participation processes adopted during the administrative law
process of EIA's to consider whether traditionally these processes meet the democratic
participatory principles.
1.6 Environmental Impact Assessment Public Participation Processes
EIA public participation processes are regulated by the EIA Regulations71 which include
peremptory language on how IAP's must be notified about proposed public participation
processes. The mode of participation and the manner in which the process is conducted is left
to the proponent, the Environmental Assessment Practitioner ('EAP'), to decide. While EAP's
must be able to exercise their discretion in selecting a process based on what is appropriate
under the circumstances, the EIA Regulations are notably deficient when compared to the
CFPP: There is no obligation to identify and approach 'outsiders' to the participatory process
or to develop a PPS. While the EIA Regulations require that the critical information must be
made available to IAP's, there is no obligation to ensure that this technical information can be
understood by the IAP's. Finally, there is no obligation to monitor the public participation
process to ensure that the substantive principles are being met.
These elements are not expressly stated in the EIA Regulations and investigations into
the EIA public participation processes reveal that EAP's default to notice and comment
proceedings and a public hearing in all instances.72 While notice and comment proceedings
followed by public hearings may be appropriate in certain circumstances, in the two test cases
discussed in Chapter 7, the deficiencies in the EIA Regulations impacted on the
implementation of the regulations. The chapter concludes with steps the EAP will need to
take to ensure that public participation processes meet the CFPP requirements.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief overview of the democratic participatory principles which must
be met in order to achieve a constitutionally acceptable participatory process. The CFPP
structures these principles into a step-by-step process which proponents can be guided by to
focus on which principles are relevant at each phase of a participatory process. These
principles have been drawn from the theories underlying participatory democracy and law.
These theories will be examined in the next chapter.
                                               
71 Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, 2014 GNR 982 GG 38282 of 4 December 2014.
72 Section 7.5 The Implemented Environmental Impact Assessment public participation processes below.
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Chapter 2 
Participatory Democratic Theory
2.1 Identifying the principles underlying participatory democratic theory 
By including participatory democracy in the Constitution, its drafters intended that the 
principles underlying this democratic feature should infiltrate the South African legal system. 
Determining what these principles may be requires an understanding of what 'participatory 
democracy' entails. However, as Dahl stated, 'there is no democratic theory – there are only 
democratic theories.'73 While there may be a number of democratic theories, they all exhibit 
principles which are common to the genus of participatory democratic theory. 
As will be explored in more detail in this chapter, the genus-defining principles are 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect, Principle 2: The Principle of Control and Principle 3: The 
Social Licence to Operate. These principles have been drawn mainly from the work of Carole 
Pateman, the chief proponent74 of participatory democratic theory.75 Although her work was 
first published in the 1970's, these normative principles have not been disputed by subsequent 
participatory theorists.76 As will be seen below, these theorists differ from Pateman only in 
the manner in which these normative principles can be incorporated into and applied to a 
modern democratic state and not in respect of the principles themselves.77 The remainder of 
this chapter investigates each of these principles in more detail to determine what each of 
them seeks to introduce into the legal system. The next chapter explores how these principles 
were denied during apartheid and enhanced during the constitutional era.
2.2 The normative principles of participatory democratic theory
Participatory democracy is often associated with direct democracy (the classical democratic 
theory) and, as such, seems like a suitable starting point for an assessment of the principles 
underlying participatory democracy. 'Direct democracy may be defined as a system of 
government in which major decisions are taken by the members of the political community 
                                               
73 Robert A Dahl Preface to Democratic Theory (1956) at 1. 
74 Roux op cit note 15 at 10 - 14. 
75 Pateman op cit note 22.
76 CB Macpherson The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1979) or Benjamin Barber Strong Democracy 
Participatory Politics for a New Age (1984).
77 Michael E Morrell 'Citizens' Evaluations of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory Meets 
Empirical Science' (1999) Vol 52, No 2 Political Research Quarterly at 293.
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themselves, without mediation by elected representatives.'78 In Athenian times when this 
form of democracy was practised, women and slaves were not considered to be 'citizens' able 
to participate in this decision-making process and it would not be considered 'democratic' by 
today's standards. This theory, however, represents a system of governance where there must 
be maximum participation by all those persons that were eligible to participate in all 
decisions.
This Classical notion of democracy (and the central role that participation plays) was 
rejected by contemporary theorists such as Joseph Schumpeter on the basis that maximum 
participation of all citizens was based on ‘empirically unrealistic foundations’.79 Similarly, 
Berelson80 stated that, in order to have maximum participation (and the successful 
implementation of the classical theory of democracy), all participants must be interested in 
political decisions and participate in such decisions.81 The primary (and limited) function of 
participation according to these theorists is to vote for representatives who are responsive to 
the needs of the electorate by virtue of the fact that they may be removed from office at the 
next election should they fail to act according to the general will.82 In this theory, maximum 
participation is not required in voting for such representatives. In fact, these theorists claimed 
that maximum participation could lead to instability of the political system.83 According to 
them, all that is required is that sufficient people participate to ensure that the democratic 
methods (i.e. the appointment of leaders) can function84 and that there is a healthy degree of 
authoritarianism in order for the democratic method to work efficiently.85
In the 1960's and 1970's, following growing dissatisfaction that the 'existing 
institutions of representative democracy [were] inadequate as channels for effective political 
expression'86 many 'student, women's, civil rights and peace movements'87 called for alternate
forms of engagement which could function alongside representative democracy. It is out of 
this conflict that democratic participatory theory was born. In her influential work 
Participation and Democratic Political Theory88 Pateman rejects the criticisms of the 
                                               
78 Roux op cit note 15 at 10 - 4.
79 Pateman op cite note 22 at 4.
80 Bernard R Berelson, Paul F Lazarsfelv and William N McPhee Voting (1954) at 307.
81 Ibid.
82 Dahl op cit noted 13 at 133 - 4.
83 Ibid Chapter 3.
84 Pateman op cit note 22 at 14.
85 Harry Eckstein A Theory of Stable Democracy (1961) at 20.
86 Frank Cunningham Theories of Democracy(2002) at 141.
87 Ibid.
88 Pateman op cit note 22. 
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Classical theory of democracy discussed above, claiming that the contemporary theorists 
have misinterpreted them.89
Drawing on the theories of Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and GHD Cole,
Pateman proffers her participatory democratic theory (which includes the democratization of 
non-political spheres such as the workplace). In doing this she sets out the inherent benefits 
of participatory democratic theory:
 Firstly, by actively participating in participatory processes, IAP's are educated so
that they come to understand the common good and to align their own private 
interests with that common interest;90
 Secondly, it allows participants to exercise a degree of control over their destiny 
in that they believe that by participating they can influence the outcome of any 
decision that may affect them91 and
 Thirdly, it results in decisions which are either acceptable to the IAP's or that were 
reached in a manner that is suitable to IAP's.92
I refer to these three principles below as Principle 1: The Educative Effect, Principle 2: The 
Principle of Control and Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate, respectively. 
The theories of other participatory democratic theorists such as Macpherson93 and 
Barber94 iterate these objectives. Macpherson states that, in order for a political system to
achieve participatory democracy, there needs to be 'a change in people's 
consciousness…from seeing themselves and acting as…consumers to seeing themselves and 
acting as exerters and enjoyers of the exertion and development of their own capacities.'95 In 
this way, in order to develop their consciousness of a common interest, the participants need 
to participate actively in participatory processes and, in so doing, they will enjoy the benefits 
(i.e. control over their destinies) associated. This is congruent with what has been stated in
the first two principles above. Provided that the ultimate decisions accord with this common 
interest, the IAP's will find the decision to be acceptable. This is in line with Principle 3: The 
Social Licence to Operate. 
                                               
89 Ibid at 103.
90 Section 2.3 Principle 1: The Educative Effect below.
91 Section 2.4 Principle 2: The Principle of Control below.
92 Section 2.5 Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate below.
93 Macpherson op cit note 76.
94 Barber op cit note 76.
95 Macpherson op cit note 76 at 99. 
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Similarly, Barber's theory of participatory democracy (or what he calls 'Strong 
Democracy') iterates the principles set out above. He describes Strong Democracy as 'politics 
in the participatory mode where conflict is resolved in the absence of an independent ground 
through a participatory process of ongoing [Principle 1: The Educative Effect], proximate 
self-legislation [Principle 2: The Principle of Control] and the creation of a political 
community capable of transforming dependent, private individuals into free citizens and 
partial and private interests into public goods [Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate].'96
These theories only differ from Pateman in the manner in which participatory democracy can 
be incorporated into the modern state.97
'By the 1980's the attention of most political theorists turned in other directions, 
interest in democratic theory waned and, in particular, participatory democratic theory 
became unfashionable.'98 By the 1990's it was argued that deliberative democracy had taken 
its place.99 Whether this is true or not is immaterial to the present enquiry as the principles of 
deliberative democracy are, for all intents and purposes, the same as those discussed above. 
The main distinction between deliberative and participatory democracy is the distinction 
between the 'modes' and 'sectors' of political participation. Hilmer concisely sets out this 
distinction:
'The difference between 'modes' and 'sectors' of political participation is a useful distinction to make at 
this point. Democratic theorists often refer to a physical location at which participation occurs, what 
might be labelled the sector of participation. This is not to be confused with forms of political action, 
which might be labelled the mode of participation. For example, a sector includes social, civil, and 
economic realms: the household, classroom, neighbourhood, associations, or as in Pateman's study, the 
workplace; and also governmental realms: local and regional seats of political power and bureaucratic 
administration; whereas the mode might include deliberation, cooperative ownership and management, 
collective decision-making, administration, and so on. Thus while some participatory democratic 
theorists focus on traditionally non-political sectors as a potential site for participatory democracy, the 
deliberation, collective decision-making, and voting that takes place in that sector are distinguished as 
modes of participation. While participatory democratic theorists may not devote equal time to both 
sectors and modes of participation, it is important to note that each are assumed to be important facets 
of participatory democratic theory.'100
Deliberative democrats focus on a particular mode of participation (i.e deliberation) in 
support of their theory. The principles that should be achieved through deliberation, however, 
are similar (if not the same) as those of participatory democracy. The seminal theorist in this 
                                               
96 Barber op cit note 76 at 132.
97 Macpherson op cit note 76 at 94.
98 Carole Pateman 'Participatory Democracy Revisited' (2012) Vol 10 No 1 Perspectives of Politics at 7.
99 Jeffrey D. Hilmer 'The State of Participatory Democratic Theory' (2010) Vol 32, No 1 New Political Science 
at 51.
100 Ibid at 46.
18
field, Jürgen Habermas, has been interpreted as stating that deliberative democracy 'revolves 
around the transformation rather than simply the aggregation of preferences'.101 As mentioned 
above (and explored in more detail below), Principle 1: The Educative Effect is predicated on 
the changing of individuals' interest through discussion and debate and not merely the sum of 
preferences. This form of debate, according to Gutmann and Thompson should continue until 
'mutually acceptable decisions'102 are reached.103 Although not specified as a requirement of 
deliberative democracy, by reaching outcomes that are acceptable to all parties, the IAP's are 
likely to achieve Principle 2: The Principle of Control in that they will have exercised control 
over their own destiny.
In addition to this form of deliberation, Gutmann and Thompson suggest that the other 
principles of deliberative democracy are 'publicity' and 'accountability'. Publicity requires that 
the reasons for any decisions are made public and accountability requires that decision-
makers be held responsible for the decisions that they have made.104 These components form 
part of Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate in that holding decision-makers to account 
for incorrect decisions or decisions that do not reflect the common interest ensures that 
acceptable decisions are made or, at least, ensures that the process followed in reaching that 
decision is fair. The similarity between the key factors underlying participatory and 
deliberative democracy is most evident when considering an example. 
Hartz-Karp published A Case Study in Deliberative Democracy: Dialogue with the 
City105 which reported on the outcomes of a deliberative forum aimed at engaging the people 
of Perth, Australia, with planning and infrastructure development in the city. In developing 
this forum, the Minister of Planning and Infrastructure adopted the definition of deliberative 
democracy prescribed by the Deliberative Democracy Consortium that iterates the principle 
set out above:
'Deliberation is an approach to decision-making in which citizens consider relevant facts from multiple 
points of view, converse with one another to think critically about options before them and enlarge 
their perspectives, opinions and understandings.
                                               
101 J Elster (ed) Deliberative Democracy (1998) at 1. 
102 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson Democracy & Disagreement (1996) at 1.
103 Gutmann and Thompson indicate that this form of deliberation only occurs in respect of deliberative 
disagreements which are defined as disagreements between parties in respect of matters that are worthy of 
mutual respect. Where one argument is not worthy of respect (i.e. a view endorsing racism) there is no duty, 
they argue, to deliberate. 
104 Gutmann & Thompson op cit note 102 at 8. 
105 Janette Hartz-Karp 'A Case Study in Deliberative Democracy: Dialogue with the City' (2005) Vol 1, Issue 1 
Article 6 Journal of Public Deliberation.
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Deliberative democracy strengthens citizens' voices in government by including people of all 
races, classes, ages and geographies in deliberations that directly affect public decisions. As a result, 
citizens influence – and can see the result of their influence on – the policy and resource decisions that 
impact their daily lives and their future'.106 [emphasis added]
With this understanding of democracy, the Minister went on to state:
'We need to reinforce that we are a democracy, the problems confronting government are the problems 
of the community and we have to work together to solve them. We need to make democracy richer, 
providing opportunities for everyone to participate creatively and critically in community affairs, 
connecting individuals, building trust, respect and confidence in our democratic processes and in the 
future.'107 [emphasis added]
Having conducted a number of consultative and deliberative processes in the past, the 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure developed Dialogue with the City, a deliberative 
process aimed at engaging citizens on planning an infrastructure development in Perth to 
make it 'the world's most livable city by 2030'.108 This process was judged against the criteria 
of inclusivity, deliberation and influence.109 Inclusivity assessed whether a diversity of views 
contributed to the debate and whether the participants who held these diverse views were 
afforded an opportunity to participate. This reflects Principle 1: The Educative Effect. Also in 
line with this principle, deliberation requires 'open dialogue, access to information, space to 
understand and reframe issues, respect and movement towards consensus'.110 The movement 
towards consensus also hints at Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate which requires 
that IAP's agree on the outcome of the process. Whether this was achieved through the 
deliberative process will be discussed briefly below. Finally, by influencing the decision-
making process the IAP's exercise control over the planning and infrastructure of the city and, 
as a result, effect control over their own destinies (Principle 2: The Principle of Control).  
In implementing the Dialogue with the City programme IAP's were initially sent 
surveys to 
'determine the issues of prime concern to the community and to ascertain their values and views of 
future development of the city.
To help inform the public, comprehensive issues papers were published on the web, and an 
interactive web site enabled browsers to access information, input ideas and exchange views. To make 
this information more accessible to the broader community, the daily newspaper provided full-page 
feature articles, each feature story based on one of the issues papers. The aim was to interest people in 
the issues, help them understand the complexities and varying viewpoints and encourage debate as well 
as participation at the large, interactive forum'.111
                                               
106 Ibid at 1 quoting the Deliberative Democracy Consortium (2003), researcher and Practitioner Conference, 
Maryland USA. 
107 Ibid at 1 quoting the Minister of Planning and Infrastructure, Alannah MacTiernan. 
108 Ibid at 3.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid at 2. 
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The interactive forum was developed in a manner which ensured that the representatives 
included the citizens' diverse viewpoints. In doing so, it became apparent that certain 
members of the population were underrepresented.112 Steps were taken to ensure that these 
participants were informed and heard and would be able to participate in the interactive 
forum.113
Having identified the participants that would be involved in the deliberative process, a 
'variety of strategies were developed to encourage open dialogue, respect, access to 
information, and space to understand and reframe issues, and movement toward consensus. 
One of the most important of these was to encourage open and free discussion through small-
group dialogue between diverse participants'.114 To ensure that this was achieved, IAP's were 
purposely grouped together with those who held differing views.115 The groups' collective 
desires for the future as well as their likes and dislikes regarding planning and infrastructure 
in Perth were recorded and common themes were shared with the larger group.116 Following 
this, each smaller group of IAP's was invited to participate in a 'hands-on planning game' 
aimed at compelling the IAP's to find trade-offs and negotiate solutions.117 'The purpose of 
the planning game was to move participants from the theoretical realm of scenarios to 
practical allocation of the housing, industry, commerce, etc. that would be required in such a 
context. Trade-offs and a search for alternatives would be necessary'118 in developing an 
acceptable plan of the city. These plans were shared with the larger group to identify common 
themes and, ultimately, to reach consensus on the planning lay out.
Following the deliberative forum, 
'[q]ualitative analysis of participant feedback forms pointed to their high satisfaction with the 
deliberative process…[F]orty two percent (42%) said they changed their views as a result of the 
dialogue, while many more admitted to broadening their views. Over ninety nine percent (99.5%) of 
participants thought that the deliberations went okay or great. Most importantly, ninety seven percent 
(97%) indicated they would like to participate in such an event again'.119
Participation, however, did not end there. During the implementation phase of the project, a 
team of representatives which participated in the Dialogue with the City was appointed to 
monitor the implementation of the project to ensure that it complied with the agreed map. It 
                                               
112 Ibid at 4.
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid at 5. 
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid at 6.
119 Ibid at 7.
21
was their responsibility to ensure that the 'constituent groups could '"live with" the 
proposal'.120
While deliberative democracy considers only one kind of mode of participation, the 
above example indicates that it has the potential to give effect to the democratic participatory 
principles espoused by Pateman. The nature and extent of these principles will now be 
considered as they will inform the baseline objectives of participation in the CFPP. 
2.3 Principle 1: The Educative Effect
Rousseau’s theory is based on the individual’s role in the political decision-making process. 
That is, the function of participation is not only the process of voting for representatives (i.e. 
the institutional arrangement) but also the psychological development of the individual and 
the relationship between this development and the institutional arrangement.121 To achieve 
this psychological development, the institutional arrangement (or participatory process) must 
be educative so that the individual is able to perform ‘responsible, individual social and 
political action.’122 Although Rousseau does not explain how this educative process should be 
conducted, he indicates that it is one where the ‘individual is educated to distinguish between 
his own impulses and desires [and]…learns to be a public as well as a private citizen…[and] 
through this educative process the individual will eventually come to feel little or no conflict 
between the demands of the public and private spheres’.123 The first participatory democratic 
principle considers whether the participatory process educates the individual in distinguishing 
between his personal interest and the common interest and (in so doing) eliminates polarized 
views.
To determine how best to implement this principle in practice, it is necessary to 
understand how individuals learn ‘responsible individual social and political action.’ A 
literature review on education in colleges reveals that students struggle to reach their 
academic potential in ‘traditional classroom learning’ where a teacher lectures or merely 
transfers a fixed amount of information to students124 - a process similar to the EIA public 
participation process where the EAP presents the EIA report. The same results were 
identified in the business environment where an estimated $210 billion spent on traditional 
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lecture-based staff development resulted in a behavioural change in less than 10% of 
employees.125 The reason advanced for such a poor performance by students and employees 
alike is that the recipients of information are merely 'spectators'126 in the process.127 In fact, 
participants are likely to remember only 20% of the information they receive passively.128 By 
participating actively, however, participants will remember 70% of what they say and 90% of 
what they do.129 Remembering information is only part of the educative effect: in order to 
apply this information to other circumstances, information must not only be recalled but also 
comprehended. 
Comprehension is more effectively achieved (according to the Taxonomy of 
Learning) through collaborative learning mechanisms.130 Smit argues that collaborative 
learning applies in any situation where group interaction occurs or is advocated.131 This 
assessment, however, is not strictly correct as individuals learn not ‘because they are two, but 
because they perform some activities [that…generate] extra activities (explanation, 
disagreement, mutual regulation,…) which trigger extra cognitive mechanisms (knowledge, 
elicitation, internalisation, reduced cognitive load,…).’132 The 'extra activities' which trigger 
the cognitive development required for the educative effect are: (1) the participants must 
collectively construct knowledge; and (2) where impasse is reached, participants must enter 
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into group problem-solving mechanisms to create solutions.133 These two components will be 
explored below. 
2.3.1 Constructing Knowledge
According to the constructivist theory, knowledge is a function of ‘individual perceptions and 
experiences’134 which are ‘situation-bound or context-dependent’.135 The subjective nature of 
individual knowledge (that is, the private interest) means that, when collaboration occurs, the 
participants are exposed to different perspectives136 which are often based on ‘incompatible 
values, agendas and strategies.’137 Differing views compel higher-order thinking by 
participants, moving them ‘beyond their existing levels of understanding through a range of 
cognitive activities, such as elaborating, explaining ideas and concepts, questioning, 
argumentation, resolving conceptual discrepancies and metacognitive regulation of the 
learning process.’138
This remains true even when the information under discussion is technical in nature. 
In circumstances where decisions are informed by technical information, authors have argued 
that technical experts (or 'elites') should work with administrators in reaching decisions to the 
exclusion of lay persons.139 As there is seldom 'one scientific answer', the elites would (in 
debating a solution) trigger the extra cognitive development required by the educative 
effect.140 There would be no such development for lay persons as they would be excluded
from the process. This is contrary to Principle 1: The Educative Effect, in that:
 these persons would not learn how to perform responsible individual social action and 
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 it is based on the assumption that only technical skill and knowledge is important in 
decision-making.
Although lay persons do not have the knowledge to engage with the elites on a 
technical level, they have local knowledge and experience which may be relevant to the 
decision-making process as these persons ‘are in the best position to make the final choice 
about….alternatives and trade-offs based on individuals’ needs and preferences’.141  
Therefore, the construction of knowledge requires that all parties engage with one another to 
express, defend and explain their respective views and, in doing so, trigger the extra cognitive 
development that democratic public participation seeks to achieve.142 Where these entities are 
unable to reach consensus on an outcome, collaborative learning requires that the parties 
enter into extra cognitive development through problem-solving mechanisms. 
2.3.2 Problem-Solving Mechanisms
Collaborative problem-solving does not mean that participants must develop a completely 
new solution. 
‘Constructing improvements rather than solutions requires parties to understand situations in terms of 
their complexity. This understanding can be fostered by activities that require systems thinking, rather 
than linear, single-issue perspectives. [Collaborative learning] achieves systemic learning by 
encouraging participants to focus on their concerns and interests related to the situation, thus freeing 
them from the more rigid task of taking positions or making demands. Suggestions for improvements 
grounded in these concerns are ultimately debated to determine if they represent both "technically 
desirable and culturally feasible" change’.143
Within the context of EIA, the EAP plays an essential role. It is his or her responsibility to 
moderate the public participation process to ensure that an appropriate solution is achieved. 
Various techniques can be used when solving problems, depending on the nature of the 
relationship between the parties, the nature of the disagreement and the ultimate goals that the 
parties wish to achieve. These techniques require that the EAP understands the human 
element in any form of 'negotiation'. That is, he or she needs to understand how the 
participants view the proposed activity (i.e. their pre-conceived ideas about the developer, the 
activity, the impact, the administrator) as well as the emotional impact that the proposed 
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project will have. In all instances the key to collaborative problem-solving is to communicate 
continuously with IAP's.144
By understanding the participants in the process, the EAP can better understand each 
participant's interests in the negotiation and assist parties to avoid deadlocks over positions.145
For example, parties may be at loggerheads regarding the position of a proposed substation. 
The developer may argue that the site is the only feasible site in the area for the construction 
of the substation while the community argue that they have concerns regarding their 
children’s safety as the proposed substation will border the park where their children play and 
so do not want the substation built. It is the EAP’s responsibility to assist the parties in 
recognizing that both options are possible - the substation can be built with appropriate 
security. 
This example perhaps over-simplifies the complexity associated with the resolution of 
issues during the EIA process but it highlights that (on occasion) participants can get locked 
into the positions for and against a project or activity on principle without understanding the 
interests that the other party is trying to protect. In certain circumstances resolving interests 
cannot be easily achieved. For example, two parties may have competing and mutually 
exclusive interests in the use of a property. In this situation, neither party will be willing to 
compromise and undertake their activity on an alternate property. A traditional method of 
resolving competing interests is to 'split the difference', that is, to divide the property in half 
or refuse both applications. This suggestion is not acceptable in all instances. The EAP needs 
to assist the parties in realizing that splitting the difference is not the only option. 
In these circumstances it may be necessary to create new options to break the 
stalemate. To ensure a fair process and outcome, the parties can agree on the rules or 
principles governing this interactive process. In addition, exercises such as role-playing may 
be a successful tool in assisting participants in considering different views, exploring 
alternatives and seeking creative solutions.146 The independence of the mediator or EAP is 
critical in this process as only when all the parties believe that their views are being dealt 
with fairly and equitably will they accept the problem-solving techniques suggested by the 
EAP and allow themselves to be persuaded by the views expressed by other participants. 
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Collaborative problem-solving has been effectively implemented in the participatory 
budgeting process. Participatory budgeting originated in Port Alegre in Brazil and has since 
been rolled out in various other municipalities in Brazil, South America and the world. In this 
process, municipalities divest a portion of their decision-making powers in respect of the 
allocation and spending of municipal funds to the community.147 As will be explored below, 
this divestiture of decision-making power is also a requirement for purposes of democratic 
participatory theory (Principle 2: The Principle of Control). Within the context of 
collaborative learning, however, public involvement in participatory budgeting is an example 
of where the educative effect is achieved:
‘Through taking part in public discourse, individual participants learned to transform their personal 
needs into public interests…Discussions in the public sphere also served to broaden appreciation of 
the needs of others, thus building solidarity, as Roselaine, one of the participants, describes:
Even I only thought of my own street when I first took part in participatory budgeting. But then 
I met other people and communities and learned of much greater problems. What I thought was 
a huge problem was nothing compared with the situations of some of the others. The question of 
having no place to live, sleeping under a piece of cloth, or open sewage close to where the 
children run and play. I forgot about my street, so that even today it still hasn’t been paved’.148
This is not the sole example of where collaborative learning has shifted the focus of the 
participants. Cabannes’ findings on participatory budgeting in 25 countries throughout Latin 
America and Europe indicates that involving citizens in participatory budgeting has led to a 
change in the tax-paying habits of those citizens.149 Through this process, the population is 
aware of the extent and limits of municipal budgets. In Puerto Asis, the participatory 
budgeting advisors indicated that the public’s knowledge of the 'common good' was not only 
developed but also 
‘[t]he community, on learning what the municipality’s budgetary and financial situation is, becomes 
aware of its budgetary restrictions. Then, when there are not enough resources for the implementation 
of its projects, the community decides to collaborate with personnel, financial resources or materials, 
aiming not only at increasing the resources available to them, but enlarging the infrastructure initially 
approved’150
in the budget. 
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In summary, the educative effect enunciated by Rousseau can be refined as follows: 
does the public participation process result in collaborative learning? That is, does it facilitate 
interaction between participants, experts and authorities in the expression of differing views 
leading to debate and discussion and culminating in a change of behaviour, position or 
amicable solution? If this question can be answered affirmatively, then the process meets 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect.151 Research152 has shown that these objectives can be 
achieved equally in online collaborative learning and face-to-face interactions.153
Closely related to the requirement to learn is that the participants must have sufficient 
control over the administrative process and the ultimate decision to ensure that an amicable 
solution is developed. This will be explored in the second democratic participatory principle: 
Principle 2: The Principle of Control. 
2.4 Principle 2: The Principle of Control
A key component in the theory of participatory democracy is the notion of freedom within 
the constraints of society. According to Rousseau’s theory, a person is free where he is 
obedient to laws that he has prescribed for himself. Based on this understanding, an 
‘individual’s actual sense, as well as his sense of freedom is increased through participation 
in decision making because it gives him a very real degree of control over the course of his 
life and the structure of his environment’154 in that, if he participates, he will shape laws in a 
way that are more acceptable to him. 
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The second principle is Principle 2: The Principle of Control which requires that 
participation affords citizens a greater sense of control by granting them sufficient power to 
influence the final outcome of any decision or law (i.e. political efficacy). ‘Both the 
opportunity to participate, as well as the act of participation in policy decisions, can be 
expected to promote more positive views about the efficacy of individual political action’.155
However, the opportunity to participate (on its own) is insufficient to ensure efficacious 
participation: ‘Much depends on how people take up and make use of what is on offer, as 
well as on supportive processes that can help build capacity, nurture voice and enable people 
to empower themselves’.156 Any public participation process must also encourage and 
facilitate the development of political efficacy. 
As Rousseau’s theory was developed in a non-industrialized city state,157 Pateman 
looks at the participatory democratic theory of Mill and Cole which applied Rousseau's
participatory principles on a larger scale. Both Mill and Cole indicate that individuals will 
only develop political efficacy on a national scale if they have been educated on how to 
participate.158 This ‘social training’ occurs in spheres other than the national political 
environment, such as the workplace, where individuals can effectively participate. Whether 
an individual’s sense of 'freedom' is achieved in this local non-political sphere depends on 
whether (and how) that sphere’s authority structure permits participation in the decision-
making process. Where citizens are afforded such an opportunity, the empirical evidence 
reveals a positive correlation between participation and political efficacy.159
Currently industry is structured in a hierarchical way (superiors-subordinates), 
meaning that workers have been ‘trained in subservience’160 rather than in exercising control 
over the course of their lives. Similarly, in EIA and other public participation processes, 
EAP's and IAP's have been trained in positioning, opposition, distrust of the regulator and 
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hostility and so lack the belief that they can change or modify the proposed activity or its 
impacts. Cole suggests that 
‘[o]nly if the individual could become self-governing in the workplace, only if industry was organized 
on a participatory basis, could this training for servility be turned into training for democracy and the 
individual gain the familiarity with the democratic procedures, and develop the necessary "democratic 
character" for an effective system of large-scale democracy’.161
If self-governance is a requirement to develop political efficacy, it is necessary to 
consider what degree of control is required in order to optimize this sense of efficacy. 
According to Arnstein there is a distinction between ‘the empty ritual of participation and 
having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the processes.162 To illustrate this, 
Arnstein developed eight types of participation ranging from non-participation to citizen 
power:
‘The bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) Manipulation and (2) Therapy. These two rungs describe 
levels of 'non-participation' that have been contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation. 
Their real objective is not to enable people to participate in planning or conducting programs, but to 
enable power holders to 'educate' or 'cure' the participants. Rungs 3 and 4 progress to levels of 
'tokenism' that allows the have-nots to hear and to have a voice: (3) Informing and (4) Consultation. 
When they are preferred by power holders as the total extent of participation, citizens may indeed hear 
and be heard. But under these conditions they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded 
by the powerful. When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through, no 
'muscle', hence no assurance of changing the status quo. Rung (5) Placation is simply a higher level of 
tokenism because the ground rules allow have-nots to advise, but retain for the power holder the 
continued rights to decide. Further up the ladder are levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of 
decision-making clout. Citizens can enter into a (6) Partnership that enables them to negotiate and 
engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders. At the topmost rungs (7) Delegated Power and (8) 
Citizen Control, have-nots citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial 
power’.163
Based on the understanding that the authority structure should facilitate the development of 
political efficacy and that participants should have a degree of control over the outcome of 
any decision, more attention should be given to partnership, delegated power and citizen 
control.
Citizen control (according to Arnstein) is the pinnacle of public participation. In terms 
of this, the public is ‘demanding the degree of power (or control) which guarantees that 
participants or residents can govern a program or institution, be in full charge of policy and 
managerial aspects, and be able to negotiate the conditions under which "outsiders" may 
change them’.164 The traditional example that is volunteered for citizen control is the 
neighbourhood corporation which has direct access to the funds required to make decisions 
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and execute these decisions. This form of participation is not practical for purposes of the 
modern democracy where the ultimate decision-maker is (directly or indirectly) elected as a 
representative and is not the public.165 This form of public control, however, is not required 
for purposes of developing the desired efficacy. Having considered various examples of 
participatory processes within industry, Pateman concludes that full participation and 
consensus are not required to achieve political efficacy: partial participation (or even pseudo 
participation) will suffice.
In this context, 'full participation' is defined as that process in which the participants 
not only have the opportunity to influence decisions but also have the power to make 
decisions. 'Partial participation' refers to those situations in which individuals can influence 
decisions but do not have the power to make the final decision and 'pseudo participation'
arises in situations where the final decision has been made and participants do not participate 
in making a decision but the manner in which the participation process is conducted creates a 
'feeling' of participation.166 An example of such participation is where the participants 
question the decision-maker on a decision that has already been taken. 
What is evident from these categories is that parties must participate in decision-
making and this does not include situations where a participant merely attends a meeting or is 
provided with information to undertake an activity. ‘Participation requires the granting of 
actual influence over the content of the decisions to groups affected by those decisions. This 
definition implies that merely listening to public views at hearings is insufficient’.167 This is 
(rightly) excluded from the definition of participation as this form of non-participation does 
not develop a citizen’s democratic character. However, it is exactly this form of 'participation'
that is largely relied upon by EAP's conducting public meetings during the EIA process.
While Pateman argues that the smallest amount of participation (pseudo participation) 
may result in political efficacy, she cautions that this may be short-lived as participants 
become disheartened in situations of pseudo participation as they eventually realize that they,
in fact, do not have the ability (in these circumstances) to influence the decision. The lower 
levels of Arnstein’s ladder and the topmost level seem inappropriate for developing suitable 
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control that is congruent with democratic theory. The only forms of participation that may fit 
within the democratic model, it seems, are partnership and delegated authority. 
Delegated power arises where the public exercise a dominant decision-making 
authority in respect of a particular decision and the success or failure of the decision can be 
attributed to the public. A variation of this model is where the citizens have a veto power over 
decisions which cannot be resolved through negotiation. Tritter argues this ‘approach 
conceptualises user involvement activity as a contest between two parties wrestling for 
control over a finite amount of power. This adversarial model seems to exclude opportunities 
for collaboration and shared decision-making’.168 Such an interpretation is contrary to the 
democratic theory in that collaboration (as discussed above) is an essential component of 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect. Where citizens know that they can exercise a veto power, 
there is no incentive to compromise, collaborate or problem-solve. As a result, delegated 
power encourages the party which holds the veto power to adopt a position and dig in his or 
her heels while the other party is compromised in order to avoid the veto. This is contrary to 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect. 
Partnership, on the other hand, focuses on the redistribution of power through 
negotiation (collaboration) between the citizens and authorities. Partnerships generally arise 
(although this is not always the case) from prior hostile interactions between citizens and 
authorities in which citizens threaten to oppose any action by the authorities if they are not 
afforded a more active role in the decision-making process. In creating a partnership, the 
parties must collaborate to develop rules governing power-sharing, planning and decision-
making.169 Once these rules have been generally agreed, they cannot be changed unilaterally
by either party. Although the ultimate decision-making power may still vest with the 
authorities, partnerships based on negotiation and collaboration can provide participants with 
enough power ‘to negotiate any eleventh-hour objections.’170
As a minimum, the rules governing power-sharing, planning and decision-making 
must include
‘Such techniques as running meetings without agendas or presiding officers (or at worst, rating 
presiding officers); allowing officers minimal decision-making powers away from the general 
meetings; running meetings by consensus or sense-of-the meeting decision-making; refusing to limit 
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discussion or debate; letting as many executive-administrative decisions flow from the whole body as 
possible, without delegation of responsibility to agents or committees; and encouraging the body to 
act immediately on decisions taken, that is, dropping the artificial division between meeting and non-
meeting so that in the extreme the meeting is a community and the community is virtually a constant 
meeting’.171
Cornwall states that community-initiated engagement is more responsive than the 
legislated process, irrespective of how participatory that process may be.172 Groups which are 
created on the initiative of a number of people have a different character from those processes 
which are generated at the behest of the legislation. These characteristics include equality 
between the participants in that there is not an authority figure and associated power 
struggles. These platforms may also not be dominated by IAP's with particular viewpoints. 
‘Most commonly, they consist of people who come together because they have something in common, 
rather than because they represent different stakeholders or different points of view. These kinds of 
spaces can be essential for groups with little power or voice in society, as sites in which they can gain 
confidence and skills, develop their arguments and gain from the solidarity and support that being part 
of a group can offer’.173
If the parties can develop the rules of the public participation process in line with 
these ideals, then, irrespective of any personal relationship or distrust between the parties, the 
participants will trust the process and should be satisfied that any decision generated from 
that process is fair - irrespective of outcome.174 A fair procedure on its own, however, has 
been found wanting. The recent litigation between the Opposition for Urban Tolling Alliance 
('OUTA') and The South African National Roads Agency Limited ('SANRAL') is an example 
of this.175 Despite complying with the legislative requirements to implement toll fees, the 
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decision by SANRAL and the Minister of Transport to toll was met with public opposition. 
This dispute is a prime example of where legislative compliance was insufficient to placate 
the community. While this example did not allow the participants to determine the rules of 
consultation, it does illustrate that process alone is insufficient where IAP's do not believe 
that their participation can influence the outcome of a public participation process. Principle 
2: The Principle of Control can therefore be restated to say that IAP's must be afforded 
sufficient power to influence the outcome of any law or decision that affects them and shape 
their destiny. This does not mean that there must be a delegation of authority and 
responsibility to the IAP's as such an approach would be impractical in an industrialised 
society. IAP's must however have input into the manner in which the public participation 
process is conducted so that they feel (by participating in that process) that they have the 
opportunity to influence the outcome of the process. Principle 2: The Principle of Control (or 
the notion of control) when used in this thesis must therefore be understood to refer to the 
opportunity to influence a decision or outcome. 
Moote et al, however, indicate that political efficacy requires not only that 
participants have a sense or belief that they could potentially influence the decision but, 
through the public participation process, must, in fact, support the final conclusion as this 
will expedite the implementation of the decision and reduce or eliminate the appeals against 
it.176 This degree of support for a decision is discussed in more detail below with respect to 
Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate.
                                                                                                                                                 
published the proposed toll tariffs in accordance with The South African National Roads Agency Limited and 
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2.5 Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate
It is generally accepted that decisions based on comments received during a public 
participation process are expected to be better informed, more effective and more robust.177
While this statement seems logical and correct, it has not been scrutinized in light of the 
requirements of participatory democratic theory. As citizen control is not required to meet 
participatory democratic theory, administrators are still empowered to make decisions taking 
into account various competing interests not only based on the comments received during the 
public participation process but also on macro and micro economic, political and other 
factors. Although the educative effect is expected to align private and public interests, this is 
a normative goal and realistically it can be anticipated that the chasm between competing 
views may be lessened but it is doubtful that it will be completely eliminated. Despite this, it 
is still possible that participants may accept a decision even if consensus is not achieved. The 
tipping point of what is an acceptable decision and what is not will depend on how 
'acceptance' is defined. 
Those participants that subscribe to the 'process goals' of participation will deem 
decisions acceptable where the correct procedures are followed and requirements in terms of 
law have been complied with in reaching that decision. Acceptable decisions in terms of 
'outcome objectives', on the other hand, mean that at the end of the participatory process the 
parties achieve outcomes which they sought leading into the public participation process. 
That is, the IAP's agree with the final decision made following a participation process. There 
are a number of examples of mass public objection to infrastructure development, such as the 
proposed pebble bed nuclear reactor;178 the City of Cape Town against SANRAL and the 
proposed upgrades to the N1/N2 Toll Highways;179 various companies and communities 
opposed to the N2 Wild Coast Toll Road;180 and the Casa Maris Eco Estate at the foot of the 
Hottentots Holland Mountains outside the province’s urban edge development policy.181 The 
fracking debate in the Karoo is likely to follow a similar trajectory as the Treasure Karoo 
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Action Group has already been very active in opposition authorisation to undertake 
exploration activities for fracking the Karoo.182 This need to obtain not only the public’s 
acceptance of a project or law or decision but, in fact, its approval is becoming increasingly 
prevalent. 
The World Bank has referred to this approval as ‘free, prior and informed consent of 
local communities and stakeholders’183 but, in fact, it goes much further in that the 
participants’ consent need not only be obtained but will also need to be maintained for the life 
of the activity.184 Jim Cooney referred to this broader notion of consent as ‘the social licence 
to operate’185 with particular reference to the mining industry but it has since become a term 
used outside of mining.
In EY’s Business Risks Facing Mining and Metals 2014-2015186 ('the Report') the 
social licence to operate was identified as the third biggest business risk to the mining 
industry. The Report notes that ‘[a]n organization cannot rest on its laurels, nor assume that 
acceptance provided by the community and its stakeholders will always be maintained.’187
This requires that participatory tools and engagement with the community is conducted on an 
on-going basis throughout the life of the project and a failure to obtain and maintain the 
social licence to operate can have numerous consequences:
‘Protests, negative media coverage, violence, sabotage and other direct attacks on the business and its 
employees are all signs that a company is not an accepted part of the community. We have seen in the 
aftermath of the tragic Turkish mining accident, where 282 lives were lost, how questions over mine 
                                               
182 IOL News ‘Marchers protest against Fracking’ (19 October 2013) available at
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/marchers-protest-against-fracking-1.1594445 accessed on
30 November 2014; Engineering News ‘Action Group want moratorium on Karoo Fracking applications’ (5
April 2011) available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/action-group-wants-moritorium-on-
karoo-fracking-applications-2011-04-05 accessed on 30 November 2014; Moneyweb ‘Treasure the Karoo pulls
apart Shell’s Environmental Plans’ (5 April 2011) available at http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-special-
investigations/treasure-the-karoo-pulls-apart-shells-environmenta?sn=2009+Detail accessed on 30 November
2014; The Greentimes ‘Calls to halt Karoo Fracking’ (26 September 2011) available at
http://thegreentimes.co.za/calls-to-halt-karoo-fracking/ accessed on 30 November 2014.
183 World Bank ‘Striking a Better Balance: The World Bank and Extractive Industries’ (2003) available at
http:www.wds.worldbank.org/extrenal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/09/21/000160016_2004092
1111523/Renfered/PDF/300010GLB.pdf accessed on 9 December 2014.
184 Rory Pike ‘The Relevance of Social Licence to Operate for Mining Companies’ Schroders Social Licence to
Operate July 2012.
185 Miningfacts.org ‘What is the Social Licence to Operate’ available at
http://www.miningfacts.org/Communities/What-is-the-social-licence-to-operate/ accessed on 11 December
2014; Jason Prno and D Scott Slocombe ‘Exploring the origins of “social license to operate” in the mining
sector: Perspectives from governance and sustainability theories’ (2012) 37 Resources Policy at 346.  
186 EY ‘Business Risks Facing Mining and Metals 2014-2015 available at
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Business-risks-facing-mining-and-metals-
2014<2015/$FILE/EY-Business-risks-facing-mining-and-metals-2014-2015.pdf> accessed on 30 November
2014.
187 Ibid at 16.
36
safety and consequent community outrage quickly damaged the reputation of the host governments, 
mine operators and more broadly the sector in Turkey. Recently too, the community and 
environmental activists blocked trains accessing the Maules Creek coal project in New South Wales, 
Australia, attempting to stop development because of alleged threats to the local bushland and 
allegations of corruption in the approval process’.188
Examples of developers failing to obtain the social licence to operate before or during an 
activity are plentiful.189
These examples highlight quite clearly where a person undertaking an activity has 
failed to obtain the social licence to operate. However, as this is not a physical licence, it is 
unclear how or when this person has been granted the licence. This is further complicated by 
the fact that the stakeholders may have differing expectations of what constitutes a 
'successful' outcome.190 What is clear is that the person seeking the licence cannot interpret 
silence as consent to undertake the activity. ‘[I]nterpreting tacit consensus as "social licence" 
can inadvertently lead companies to miscalculate the contingencies upon which points of 
agreement are made and underestimate their overall relative importance to particular 
groups’.191 The failure to dissent against a decision or project can be for various reasons, for 
example, where the community has disengaged from the process because they believe the 
decision to be a fait accompli or the community is mobilizing their attack on the process. 
Sometimes cultural beliefs of the community involved do not support the expression of 
disagreement. 
One example192 of where cultural beliefs may inhibit participation is evident in an 
online collaborative learning investigation conducted by Lu and Churchill at a Chinese 
university where (owing to limited available face-to-face time) an online networking 
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relationship was required.193 The students were required to use the online network to 
complete various assignments. In particular, the students were encouraged to use blogs as a 
platform for recording ideas, processing information and ultimately learning as other students 
could critique their peers' work. As part of the group assignment, the students were required 
to collaborate by developing a wiki as this encouraged higher thinking.194 Upon the 
completion of the assignments, the students were interviewed about the experience and the 
information contained on the online network (i.e. the blogs, wikis etc) was analysed. The 
exercise revealed that the students did not value the comments by their peers as they tended 
to be superficial (as a result of lack of knowledge and experience) when compared against 
their teacher.195 Although the wikis were expected to aid collaboration in that students would 
be reviewing, contributing and editing each other's work, in practice this was not the case as 
the students tended to work individually, synthesise their comments and then merely publish 
them on the wiki page. There tended to be more collaboration when the teacher or authority 
figure was involved in the process. It was noted that cultural beliefs may have influenced the 
outcome of the study as some of the learners subscribe to the Confucian-Heritage Culture 
which promotes working alone, depending on teachers and avoiding conflicts – all beliefs 
that are not congruent with collaborative learning.196
Cultural impacts on public participation processes are not specific to Asian 
communities. South Africa has a pluralistic legal system which recognizes customary law 
(and the social practices that comprise it) as an integral part of South African law which 
stands on an equal footing with other laws in South Africa.197 Therefore, it is critical that, 
when engaging with traditional communities, cognisance is taken of customary laws and 
practices. Failing to do so may render the public participation process ineffective. For 
example, in some communities decisions can only be made at a community meeting where 
traditional leaders and community members are present to discuss and debate the relevant 
issues and decide what is best for that community. Only decisions made in this way will bind 
the community. Therefore, in these communities if members are engaged on an individual 
level, their personal preference or opinion would not be treated with the same level of 
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authority or support as the community decision. These practices and customs are specific to 
each community.198     
These examples highlights the importance of understanding the relevant community 
that is affected by a decision and the manner in which their custom or culture will grant the 
social licence to operate.199 It is, therefore, imperative that some degree of confirmation is 
obtained from the community. 
As the social licence to operate contemplates a situation where parties are able to 
negotiate, the person seeking the licence ('the proponent') should provide an opportunity for 
parties to express their expectations and ensure that these are incorporated into the social 
licence to operate.200 That is, the proponent is required to go beyond mere legal compliance 
and ‘implies genuine and concerted efforts on the part of the [proponent] to engage in 
community building, operate in environmentally responsible manner and to generally 
integrate community concerns into its operations.’201 Through this process, the proponent
should be able to obtain confirmation of the licence. This does not mean that the proponent,
in fact, needs to meet the expectation or obtain the community’s approval of the proposed 
activity. 
According to Boutilier and Thomson, the social licence to operate comprises four 
levels. These levels are inversely related to political risk. The lowest level of the social 
licence to operate is where the community has withdrawn or withheld the licence to operate. 
In this level, the proponent is likely to suffer significant opposition from the community in 
respect of any of its applications for licences or financing; it will bring claims for damages or 
compensation and report non-compliances to authorities. This is the situation in respect of the 
examples cited above where the social licence to operate has not been secured. However, if 
the activity202 breaches what is referred to as the 'legitimacy boundary', the community will 
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have accepted the activity. This does not mean that the community approves of the activity
but they will accept it (which for the purposes of democratic theory and sustainable 
development seems to be sufficient). Crossing this threshold is not a bright line but rather a 
continuum.203
In terms of this, the minimum requirement is that the activity must have economic 
legitimacy - that is, the activity must (in the mind of the IAP's) offer a benefit. If this is not 
present, the social licence to operate will not be granted. Its presence alone, however, is not 
necessarily sufficient to grant the licence. The social license to operate is more likely to be 
granted where the activity has socio-political legitimacy and / or interactional trust. Socio-
political legitimacy is secured where there is a ‘perception that the [proponent] has
contributed to the well-being of the region, respects the local way of life, meets expectations 
about its role in society and acts according to stakeholders’ views of fairness.’204 Interactional 
trust, on the other hand, is where the stakeholders perceive that the proponent listens and 
responds to their concerns, engages in communication with the communities and ‘exhibits 
reciprocity in its interactions.’205
While socio-political legitimacy and interactional trust are based on the subjective 
perceptions of the community, what is evident is that the social licence to operate falls short 
of their consent or approval, making it almost (if not completely) impossible to determine 
whether the social licence to operate has been granted as there is no objective evidence to 
indicate that it has been obtained. This makes sense given that the social licence to operate is 
not a defined or static concept but rather one that transforms depending on the circumstances 
and (depending on its transformation) may be supported by the community - or not. As a 
result, the only manner in which to judge whether a community has granted the social licence 
is to review the manner in which the community interacts with the proponent, particularly in 
stressful situations (for example, where a company suffers a hazardous chemical spill).
The community’s response to these activities is generally indicative of whether the 
social licence to operate has been granted based on whether they trust the proponent to 
remove the harm and make good on any damage caused. Cunningham et al iterate the 
importance of having reputation capital or trust:
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‘One pulp mill environmental manager reflected the same idea - that building reputation capital is a 
good economic investment - when he told us, in the context of a discussion of local community 
environmental activities, "You have to develop the relationship in times of peace…[because]…when 
there are spills, tank failure, dioxin issues, it gets tough". It was in these circumstances, he argued, that 
the trust and social capital that had been built up earlier became crucially important. A manager at 
another mill talked about the pitfalls of failing to build reputation capital: "It works against you when 
things are behind the community’s back. If you have a good relationship with the public, then the 
goodwill will be there, and when there is trouble you will get the benefit of the doubt. You will have a 
positive bank account."’206
Once the proponent has proved that it is credible, the activity or undertaking will be approved 
by the community. If (over time) trust develops between the proponent and the community, 
then that approval can morph into 'psychological identification'.207 Ultimately, for purposes of 
democratic theory, a company should seek to obtain 'psychological identification' as this 
means that the educative effect has been achieved. The movement up the hierarchy of 
Boutilier and Thomson’s model depends on the nature of the relationship and trust between 
the parties as it is through this relationship that the parties can engage in meaningful dialogue 
that is capable of resulting in mutually beneficial outcomes. ‘Development of such 
relationships potentially creates a platform for balanced negotiations and co-creation of 
outcomes, where a [proponent's] actions and behaviours are aligned to community 
expectations and aspirations.’208 The requirements of earning this trust have been identified 
as ‘maintaining a positive corporate reputation; understanding local culture, language and 
history; educating local stakeholders about the project [or activity]; and communication 
among stakeholders’.209 It is never merely a question of more participation but rather a 
question of the type of participation required that will develop this degree of trust. 
A successful example of the social licence to operate (and one which relies in part on 
social media) is laying the fibre optic high-speed internet line in Parkhurst, Johannesburg by 
Vumatel. Following an open bid in which proposals were submitted and presentations 
conducted by Vumatel and eleven others,210 the Parkhurst Village Residents and Business 
Owners Association passed a resolution at its Annual General Meeting on 13 May 2014 
appointing Vumatel as the preferred bidder to provide the suburb of Parkhurst with high-
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speed internet capabilities.211 Vumatel was selected based on an ‘excellent technical proposal, 
a solid business plan that showed the project as financially viable and fully funded, a 
comprehensive community communications plan, and commercial terms that were very 
favourable to the residents.’212
Prior to the commencement of construction, Vumatel ran a non-binding online survey 
in terms of which residents could pledge their support and commitment to the project. Once a 
minimum threshold of 30% of the residents had given their support to the project, the first 
fibre optic cables would be laid.213 Construction commenced on 25 August 2014 according to 
a pre-determined and interactive schedule in terms of which residents could insert their 
address and the map would indicate in which phase of construction the residents’ house fell. 
Each phase included proposed dates of construction and the planned dates of delivery (i.e. 
each phase would go live upon its completion). The construction involved the laying of the 
fibre optic cables and attaching a small box on the outside wall of each house (irrespective of 
whether the owner or occupier intended to obtain a contract and make use of the internet 
service). The municipality did not permit Vumatel to dig a narrow trench in the street and, as 
a result, Vumatel was compelled to dig the trench along each property’s verge, exacerbating 
the potential for conflict between Vumatel and the residents. However, they undertook to 
replace each property’s verge in the same state as or better than they found it.
During the implementation phase, residents were generally informed of the on-going 
activities via the Parkhurst Village Residents and Business Owners Association’s website, 
social media and through direct interactions with the owners and occupiers who would be 
affected by the construction works. Laying the fibre optic cable was conducted in phases and 
prior to each phase the residents in that area were notified. 
Once the cables were laid, residents were provided with information regarding where 
the router would be installed on an external wall to their property - not merely by describing 
where it would be placed but with a photo of each house and an indication of where it would 
be placed. This notification also provided details on how to apply to link into the network. 
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The application could be submitted in hard copy or electronically. Applicants were then 
informed of additional conditions that they should be aware of to ensure that their premises 
were ready for the contractors to install the fibre optic cable into their household. Although a 
few complaints found their way onto the I Love Parkhurst Facebook page,214 the complaints 
were notably few given the number of home owners and residents who were affected. In fact, 
there have also been a number of very positive responses about Vumatel’s responses to 
queries, actions on complaints and ultimate service delivery (fast internet). There is no doubt 
that the legitimacy threshold has been crossed in that the community sees the economic 
benefit of the project as well as accepts the process that was followed in authorizing the 
work. In addition, with the on-going communication (including personal communication 
regarding each property), as well as the responses to complaints and queries, not only has the 
project crossed the legitimacy threshold but it has, in fact, developed so that the community 
identifies with the project and its outcomes - the ultimate form of acceptance.
2.6 Conclusion
Having considered the democratic theories espoused by the preeminent theorists in this field, 
three characteristics (or principles) have been identified:
• Principle 1: The Educative Effect;
• Principle 2: The Principle of Control and
• Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate. 
The next chapter considers how these principles were denied during apartheid and illustrates
how they have been incorporated into and expanded upon in South African law during the 
constitutional era. In doing so, a number of additional principles will be introduced and these
will be incorporated into the CFPP set out in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3
Participation in pre-democratic and democratic South Africa
3.1 Applying the substantive participatory principles to the South African 
context 
Chapter 2 set out the substantive principles of democratic participatory theory which form the 
basis of constitutionally acceptable participatory processes. Further understanding of how these 
principles apply in the constitutional dispensation is drawn from 'historical and cultural 
experiences,'215 legislation and judicial decisions. The pre-democratic history is the epitome of 
what participation is not. This low-water mark of public participation in South Africa is briefly 
explored in the next section. From this point, it is unsurprising that in the constitutional era the 
right and opportunity to participate have been generously encouraged and developed by the 
legislatures, administration and the courts. 
As will become apparent in the sections that follow, the substantive principles mentioned 
in Chapter 2 guide participants in participatory processes required when voting, creating
legislation, engaging with local government and participating in administrative processes.216 In 
the process, further (mostly procedural) principles have emerged. These procedural principles
along with the substantive principles all form part of the CFPP that will be discussed in Chapter 
6 as the baseline for all participatory processes.  
Part A: Participation in pre-democratic South Africa
3.2 Historical and cultural 'participation' during apartheid in South Africa
During apartheid, the democratic participatory principles were renounced in an attempt to quell 
opposition to the white minority government. Any collaboration which promoted views contrary 
to the separateness agenda was banned or outlawed and many persons who attempted to exercise 
control over their own destiny were banished. The people affected by these laws turned to the 
courts hoping that justice would prevail. Unfortunately, the judiciary did not always come to 
                                               
215 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC).
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undertake investigations and public hearings are part of their mandates.
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their assistance. The inconsistent application of the law prevented many people from being 
allowed to participate in government and society where they clearly should have been permitted 
to do so. As a brief illustration of this, the 'participation' during apartheid will be reviewed using 
the substantive principles outlined in Chapter 2. 
3.2.1 Principle 1: The Educative Effect during apartheid
Principle 1: The Educative Effect requires that participants construct knowledge and solve 
problems together in order to decrease the polarity of views and ultimately move towards a 
common goal. In order for the educative effect to function, there needs to be a variety of views 
and the opportunity for these views to be aired and debated.217
Using the sovereign power of parliament to 'make or unmake any law whatever; and 
further, that no person or body…as having the right to override or set aside the legislation'218 the 
apartheid government excluded any person (particularly black219 South Africans) who expressed
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Native Land Act 27 of 1913 set aside tracts of land that were used to occupy African people. These areas were 
extended by the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 coupled with extensive powers to expropriate black 
owned land and forced relocation of black persons to these 'reserves'. These forced relocations inevitably deprived 
individuals of their possessions and property but also removed them from their places of employment, denying them 
the opportunity to participate in economic exploits (Muriel Horrell Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (1968) 
121 at 124 - 137). The Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 required that Africans venturing into a 
'white area' required permission to do so. This was extended to women in terms of the Bantu (Abolition of Passes 
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able own land within 'controlled area' (Group Areas Act 36 of 1966; Elizabeth Landis ‘South African Apartheid 
Legislation I: Fundamental Structure’ The Yale Law Review (1961) Vol 71 No 1 at 22 - 23); not being able to 
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Africa: A Study of Apartheid Law and Its Enforcement’ Touro Journal of Transitional Law (1991) Vol 2 No 1 at 28
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inter-racial marriage and sex were prohibited (Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949; Immorality Act 23 of 
1957).
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views which sought to bring about political change, by removing black220 and coloured221
persons from the voting roll, prohibiting organizations222 which furthered the objects of 
'communism,'223 banishing individuals224 from collaborating in these organizations225 and stifling
free speech.226 These are only a few examples of where Principle 1: The Educative Effect was 
denied during apartheid in an attempt to suffocate the expression of collaboration among persons 
who opposed the government and who sought democratic change. For as long as these laws 
existed, the majority of the population would never be free as they would never feel that they 
exercised any control over their destiny. 
3.2.2 Principle 2: The Principle of Control during apartheid
Principle 2: The Principle of Control requires that IAP's must feel that they have an opportunity 
to influence their own destiny by being involved in developing laws which apply to them or 
participating in decisions that affect them.227 In this way Principle 2: The Principle of Control
can be compared with the common law principle of audi alteram partem (which is also known as 
natural justice) which requires that an authority has the duty to hear both sides before making a 
decision which affects those parties. 
                                               
220 The Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936 and Ndlwana v Hofmeyr supra note 29. 
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224 Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956; Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.
225 Public Safety Act op cit note 28.
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cit note 224.
227 Section 2.4 Principle 2: The Principle of Control above. Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The New Constitutional 
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As has been seen above, parliamentary sovereignty was used to remove black voters from 
the roll, denying them the opportunity to influence laws that applied to them. This power was 
also used by parliament to expressly exclude IAPs' rights to be heard in administrative 
proceedings,228 denying them of any opportunity to influence decisions that affected their lives.
The courts (in some instances) also denied IAP's this opportunity to control229 their 
destiny. In situations where the right to be heard prior to a decision being taken was not obvious, 
(i.e legislation was silent as to audi alteram partem), the courts adopted conflicting stances. In 
some cases, the court adopted the approach set out in R v Ngwevela230 that audi alteram partem 
was presumed to apply unless expressly excluded, in this way endorsing Principle 2: The 
Principle of Control. In other cases, IAP's were denied the opportunity to be heard on the basis 
that there was no express inclusion of the audi alteram partem principle in the empowering 
statute.231 While the matter was finally resolved in 1988 in Attorney-General, Eastern Cape v 
Blom232 in favour of the Ngwevela approach there was nothing preventing parliament from 
expressly excluding IAP's rights to participate in legislation.233
Even where the legislation expressly or implicitly afforded IAP's a hearing, it only 
existed in respect of a certain category of decisions and not all administrative decisions. Unlike 
in the constitutional era where all decisions are subject to procedural fairness, prior to 1994, only 
those decisions which affected the property, liberty, existing rights or (after 1989) the legitimate 
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expectation of an individual attracted the principles of procedural fairness.234 Decisions of this 
nature were referred to as 'quasi-judicial' decisions as opposed to legislative or 'purely 
administrative' decisions which did not attract audi alteram partem notwithstanding that these 
decisions may significantly affect the rights of individuals.235 This categorization was referred to 
as the classification of functions doctrine.
Despite judicial warnings that the 'classification of functions doctrine…is [nothing] more 
than a convenient classification into a source of legal rules',236 the courts and administrators 
continued to apply natural justice only to 'quasi-judicial' decisions. In justification for this 
approach, the courts indicated that to rely on natural justice ‘outside its proper limits’237 would 
lessen its value as administrators would be over-burdened and only pay lip service to the 
requirement. This narrow construction of the audi alteram partem principle was used to good 
effect during the apartheid era in denying parties an opportunity to participate in decisions that 
clearly affected them but were not quasi-judicial in nature, preventing them from exercising any 
control over their destiny.238
Denial of the right to participate went further. Even in respect of 'quasi-judicial' 
decisions, IAP's were only entitled to be heard where they held an antecedent right.239 Persons 
that only had a spes could not demand to be heard prior to an administrative decision being 
made.240 This arbitrary distinction between existing rights and privileges meant that natural 
justice was denied in numerous instances where the outcome of the administrator’s decision 
would had a significant impact on the affected persons. As Baxter points out, there is a 
distinction between a person succeeding in his or her application and the process followed 
leading up to that decision. He adds that ‘to talk in terms of 'existing rights' in some contexts 
adds nothing to the question in issue: namely, should the body or official concerned act fairly or 
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in according with the principles of natural justice?’241 This was, in Baxter’s view, particularly 
relevant given the fact that ‘so many of our daily necessities derive from state handouts’.242
Notwithstanding this clearly more suitable approach, the judiciary clung to the 'existing 
rights' doctrine in refusing affected parties an opportunity to be heard where those individuals 
did not hold pre-existing rights.243 The court, however, refused to extend the application of the 
existing rights doctrine and prevented parties from exercising any control over their own destiny. 
It was only in 1989 that the classification of functions and existing rights doctrines were 
abandoned in favour of a general principle of fairness in respect of decisions that have an adverse 
effect. In the case of Administrator, Transvaal v Traub244 the Appellate Division held that the 
‘classification as quasi-judicial adds nothing to the process of reasoning: the Court could just as 
well eliminate this step and proceed straight to the question as to whether the decision does 
prejudicially affect the individual concerned.’245
Therefore, even before the constitutional era, the court in South African Roads Board v 
Johannesburg City Council246 recognised that notwithstanding the fact that a toll road declaration 
would have affected the public at large (and was therefore 'legislative' in nature), it would also 
impact on particular individuals or groups of individuals and so the rules of natural justice would 
apply.247 It is noteworthy that as the Johannesburg City Council in this instance was going to 
suffer particular prejudice, it was entitled to a hearing. Despite dispensing with the classification 
of functions doctrine, the rules of natural justice still only applied to parties that suffered a 
'particular prejudice' and was not available to the public at large. 
This existing rights doctrine was also extended to include situations where an affected 
person held a legitimate expectation. Therefore a person suffered a particular prejudice where, 
although he or she did not hold an existing prior right, he or she had an expectation that a right, 
permit, licence or other form of authorization would be granted. A person was deemed to hold 
such an expectation where there was an express promise or the existence of a longstanding 
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practice of a particular process being followed. This reasoning had been applied in a number of 
high courts248 in the late 1980’s but it was only in the Appellate Division case of Administrator, 
Transvaal v Traub249 that the principle was formally adopted. This extension of the law, 
however, had come too late in that up until this time the existing rights doctrine had prevailed, 
leaving parties without recourse to participation in decisions that affect them and so they had no 
control over these decisions. As parties felt that they had little influence over the outcome of 
these decisions, it is unlikely that they would accept the outcome of these processes (Principle 3: 
The Social Licence). 
3.2.3 Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate during apartheid
Principle 3: The Social Licence is based on the premise that (at the very least) the IAP's are
satisfied with the public participation process being followed. If they are satisfied with the
process (i.e. they believe it to be fair) they may be satisfied with the outcome, even if it is
contrary to their own personal beliefs or objectives. If the social licence is not secured (i.e. the
IAP's do not trust the process) they are unlikely to accept the outcome and evidence suggests that
they will take action to show their dissatisfaction, such as demonstrating or sabotage.
There is no doubt, based at least on the above accounts, that the apartheid government
failed to obtain the social licence from the majority of the population who saw and experienced
government developing and using laws to exclude them from participating in government and
society. There are numerous examples that can be cited to illustrate this fact, including the
marches against the pass laws,250 economic boycott campaigns against companies sympathising
with the apartheid Government,251 marches against the housing shortages and the education crisis
in Sebokeng in 1990252 and even the taking up of arms in the anti-apartheid movement.253 In
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these situations there was such a degree of distrust between the people and the government that
neither the process nor the outcome was acceptable to or accepted by most of the population.
It is unsurprising based on the injustices of apartheid that the Constitution emphasises the
need for public participation.254 The question that needs to be considered is how the substantive
principles identified in Chapter 2 can be incorporated into an industrialised constitutional society
like South Africa. The remainder of this chapter investigates public participation in the
constitutional era. As will become apparent, the substantive principles have been included in the
practice of public participation and, through this process, a number of additional (mostly
procedural) principles have emerged. These principles have been drawn from the participatory
processes conducted during this era, namely the right to vote, the creation of legislation,
participation in local government and administrative processes.
Part B: Participation in democratic South Africa
3.3 Participating through Voting: Political Parties
The Constitution entrenches the right to vote through free, fair255 ‘regular elections and a 
multiparty system of democratic government’.256 By its very nature, voting is done secretly and 
does not allow for the sharing of ideas and collaboration required by Principle 1: The Educative 
Effect. It does, however, fulfil a very important function in that it ‘has historically been important 
both for the acquisition of rights of full effective citizenship by all South Africans regardless of 
race, and for the accomplishment of an all-embracing nationhood. The universality of the 
franchise is important not only for nationhood and democracy. The vote of each and every 
citizen is a badge of dignity and personhood. Quite literally it says that everybody counts.’257
Voting (and by association participating) endorses a participant’s sense of value and 
dignity (Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity) but merely casting a ballot is unlikely (on its own) 
to achieve the democratic participatory principles expressed above as it does not result in an 
assimilation of government objectives and individual requirements. To determine whether voting 
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can give effect to the democratic participatory principles, it must be seen within its broader 
context as a final expression of a voter’s will following his or her active involvement in political 
processes (i.e. political parties) leading up to the election.258
‘Although there is considerable disagreement in the various strands of democratic theory on the precise 
role political parties should perform in order to make democracy work, as a general proposition, political 
parties are important for the proper functioning of democracy. Ideally parties will act as vehicles to 
articulate group aims, nurture political leadership, develop and promote policy alternatives, and present 
voters with coherent electoral alternatives.’259
In fulfilling these obligations, political parties are afforded ultimate discretion regarding how 
participation should be conducted to ensure that it is appropriate for their members, subject to the 
proviso that ‘political parties may not adopt constitutions that are inconsistent with s19 of the 
Constitution’260 and, therefore, the democratic participatory principles.261 A brief review of the 
constitutions of the two largest political parties in South Africa currently active, the African 
National Congress ('ANC') and the Democratic Alliance ('DA'), does not introduce new 
democratic participatory principles but demonstrates how that the substantive principles 
espoused in Chapter 2 have been incorporated in practice by political parties in South Africa.
3.3.1 African National Congress
The ANC’s Constitution262 lists the empowering of all people to take part in the administration 
of the country among its aims and objectives.263 It also establishes the management structures of 
the party: this is controlled by the National Conference which is hosted once every five years and 
is responsible for determining policies and programmes of the ANC. In between these intervals 
the National Executive Committee ('NEC') acts as the implementing agency of the ANC. Similar 
structures exist at a provincial and regional level.264 At a local level there is a Branch Biennial 
General Meeting which elects a Branch Executive Committee. ‘Branches may be grouped 
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together in zones and may be subdivided, for the purpose of co-ordination, into smaller units 
such as street communities, voting districts and zones which may be grouped into sub-regions. 
Any sub-branch so established will have the same voting powers as a branch.’265
Prior to the National Conference, the NEC (via a Conference Preparatory Committee) 
must circulate information relating to the conference, ‘determine the precise procedure for the 
selection of delegates and indicate how the membership can then ensure that their concerns are 
on the agenda.’266 Once on the agenda, the ‘Conference shall determine its own procedures in 
accordance with the democratic [participatory] principles’267 so as to create and amend policy268
and elect representatives of the NEC. It must be noted, however, that not all members are able to 
attend and vote at the National Conference. The National Conference is made up of elected 
delegates from the various branches (in proportion to their paid-up membership),269 proportional 
representation of delegates from the provinces,270 the members of the NEC271 and members from 
the Provincial Executive Committees, and the ANC Veterans, Women and Youth Leagues (as 
determined by the NEC).272 The voting procedure for the selection of these members to the NEC 
at the National Conference is set out in some detail in the Constitution but there is no direction 
on how other participatory procedures should be implemented within the party except in 
accordance with 'democratic participatory principles'.273 Similar wording is contained in the 
Constitution in respect of the Provincial Conference,274 Provincial Executive Committee,275
Regional Conference,276 the Regional Executive Committee277 and the Branches.278
Based on the above, the ANC’s Constitution requires (as a bare minimum) that the 
participatory procedures at each of these levels of the party must be conducted in accordance 
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with the democratic participatory principles. In relation to Principle 1: The Educative Effect, it 
contains some encouraging wording. As with most participatory processes, the political party 
must make information available. A brief review of the ANC’s website illustrates that the party
does this. Declarations, leaflets, policy documents, press statements, reports, rules are all readily 
available.279 Supplying information, on its own, is not a particularly noteworthy undertaking. (As 
will be seen in the section below dealing with public inquiries, merely supplying information 
may not be sufficient to meet the participatory requirements). However, if read in conjunction 
with Rule 5 (Rights and Duties of Members), supplying information is a gateway to achieving 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect. 
Rule 5.1 lists the rights of members. This rule grants every member the right to 
participate actively in the formulation of policies, to share information and to submit proposals 
or statements to the Branch, Region, Province and NEC through the appropriate structures.280
While members are entitled to these participatory processes, they are also ‘obliged’ to participate 
in their respective branches and take the requisite steps to comprehend and explain ANC 
policies, aims and programmes to other members so they can better understand not only the 
policy, programmes and activities better but also the socio-economic, political and cultural issues 
in the country. This places a significant burden on all members of the ANC who may not have 
the knowledge or experience themselves (or worse, they may express the incorrect view). As no 
specific person(s) are responsible for this obligation, it may be aspirational. 
There is no evidence to suggest that this form of education and training occurs in 
practice.281 However, to the extent that it does not occur, members are able to enforce this 
codified version of Principle 1: The Educative Effect through the ANC Constitution. A better 
understanding of the policy, programmes, activities and the socio-economic, political and 
cultural issues of the country, however, does not guarantee that the members will develop a 
stronger sense of control282 over the policy making processes of the ANC or be satisfied with the 
outcome of these processes.283 To the extent that the member’s views are not congruent with 
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those of the party, he or she should consider looking to another political party in which to 
express those views. 
Constitutions of other parties do not contain similar codified versions of the democratic 
participatory principles but do afford their members democratic political participation. 
3.3.2. Democratic Alliance 
Like the ANC Constitution, the DA Constitution sets out in detail the structure and composition 
of the party which is similar (in general terms) to the ANC. In addition, it lists a number of
freedoms and principles which underlie the DA Constitution. These principles and freedoms 
accord generally with the notion of participatory democracy, such as the accountability of 
government, ‘government must reflect the will of the people’284 or that government must ensure 
the ‘devolution of power to locate government as close as possible to the people.’285 However, 
aside from these generic expressions, the DA Constitution does not contain any clauses that seek 
to give effect to the democratic participatory principles. In fact, they seem to promote a lesser 
form of control more closely aligned with the bottom rungs on Arnstein’s ladder of participation. 
For example, section 3.8 of the DA Constitution states:
‘3.8.1 The basic organisational units of the Party are the branches. The Party will strive to establish and 
maintain a branch or branches for every local government ward in South Africa.
3.8.2 Branches are established to manage and direct the affairs of the Party, to communicate the principles 
and policy of the Party to the public, to mobilize the public in support of the program of action of the 
Party, to participate in the process of democratic selection of candidates for the Party and to serve as the 
vehicle for the articulation of interests of members of the Party and voters in their area of jurisdiction.’ 
[Emphasis added]
The branches seem to be merely mouth-pieces for the upper echelons of the Party. The fact that 
branches merely 'communicate' policy to their members implies a one-way form of 
communication. Although it states that the branches are also the ‘vehicle for the articulation of 
the members' interests,’ it does not appear to provide for any form of collaboration between the 
members and the representatives of the party. This one-way engagement would explain why the 
branch is responsible for 'mobilizing' support for a programme or policy as the members would 
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not have been involved in creating or developing such programme or policy. Mobilisation may
not be required if they had been involved from the outset. 
Without empirical evidence of the manner in which the various DA branches operate, 
these criticisms may be unfounded and the selection of words used in this section may be 
unfortunate. Wording more closely aligned to the participatory democratic principles could be 
incorporated into the DA Constitution. Notwithstanding criticism of the fact that the ANC 
Constitution places responsibility on the members to communicate and explain policies, 
programmes. to other members, that approach appears to be more closely aligned to the 
democratic participatory principles than the approach contained in the DA Constitution. 
Although the DA Constitution does not expressly cater for the democratic participatory 
principles, the DA’s Policy on Governance (dated December 2013) requires active participation 
by the citizens and recognises that this can be achieved in a number of ways, including the 
adoption of social media and online platforms. It states that to 
‘promote accountability and cooperation between the government and the people of South Africa the DA 
would…[inter alia] aim to make as many government services as possible available online to facilitate 
interaction with government through online platforms; [and]…Use both traditional and social media to 
foster participation by the public and civil society in the decisions and processes of government - e.g. 
through comment on policy green papers and bills, input at portfolio committee meetings and input into 
the Integrated Development Plan on local government levels.’286
In this way the DA recognises that participation should not and cannot be limited to the more 
traditional forms of participation.
The role of political parties within the participatory process are often overlooked in that 
they are overshadowed (in some ways) by the election process. Political parties, however, 
provide a vital function in the participatory electoral process. 
3.4 Participating by Voting
Following their participation in political parties, participants vote for their respective 
representatives in government. Voting gives effect to the democratic participatory principles in 
that participants are educated on how to vote and select government. Provided that this process is 
viewed as fair and legitimate, the citizens are likely to accept the chosen government (Principle 
3: The Social Licence). 
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Rules or laws that inhibit the democratic participatory principles are unconstitutional 
unless such restriction is reasonable.287 There does not, for example, appear to be much objection 
to denying children the right to vote until they are 18 years old. While it may be argued that this 
age is random, given that some persons have the mental capability to vote well before this age 
(and arguably, there are persons over this age who may lack the ability): for the sake of 
practicality, the age threshold is considered reasonable.288 Section 36289 of the Constitution 
permits the limitation of rights (including the right to vote and arguably the democratic 
participatory principles) contained in the Bill of Rights.290 Notwithstanding this power, the cases 
have favoured an approach which enhances participation rather than exclusion. 
In August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others291 the Constitutional Court 
('CC') had to consider whether prisoners had forfeited their right to vote. The applicants in this 
case included convicted prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial, incarcerated and unable to register 
in the voting district in which each was ‘ordinarily resident’.292 In considering the Electoral 
Commission’s duties and responsibilities in terms of the Electoral Act, the court held that there is 
an ‘affirmative obligation on the Commission to take reasonable steps to ensure that eligible
voters are registered.’293 Short of any direction from Parliament to the contrary, the 
Commission’s mandate was to provide all eligible voters with a reasonable opportunity to 
register and not to determine which members of the population were or should be eligible. The 
CC held that in failing to provide all prisoners with an opportunity to register, the Commission 
failed to meet its legislative and constitutional mandate. 
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This case highlights that participation must be broadly interpreted to be inclusive rather 
than exclusive (Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity). This does not mean that full 
participation is required. The person responsible for conducting the process needs only to take 
reasonable steps to facilitate participation. The reasonableness of the selected mode of 
participation is considered in more detail in the next section.294 Suffice to state that the selected 
mode of participation should not impose unreasonable obstacles which prevent those that wish to 
participate from doing so. That is, an unreasonable obstacle is one when, having taken all 
reasonable steps to participate, a participant is denied from doing so.
The reasonableness of obstacles to the participation process was considered in an 
application brought at the same time as the August case by the New National Party of South 
Africa against the government in respect of the documentary requirements that eligible voters 
were required to produce in order to register to vote.295 The New National Party indicated that 
these requirements denied individuals the right to vote. 
The majority judgment dismissed the application holding that Parliament must provide 
requirements aimed at giving effect to the right to vote. Provided that these requirements give 
effect to a legitimate government purpose (i.e. the mechanism is not capricious and arbitrary) and 
they do not deprive persons from being able to exercise their constitutional right, the mechanism 
is reasonable. In this case, the introduction of bar-coded identity documents as a means of 
identification was (in the CC’s view) connected to a legitimate government purpose in that it 
enabled the right to vote. Permitting voters to use a variety of identity documents in order to vote 
would have made the voting process difficult, inefficient and increased the risk of fraud. The 
obligation to obtain a bar coded identity document did not create an unreasonable obstacle to 
voting in that it was linked to a legitimate government purpose.296
The reasonableness of restrictions on the right to vote was also considered in the cases of 
Richter v Minister of Home Affairs and Other297 and Minister of Home Affairs v National 
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Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders (NICRO).298 In the first case,
Richter challenged section 33 of the Electoral Act regarding the special votes for South African 
citizens who were registered as voters but who would be outside the country on the date of the 
election. As set out above, voters must vote (subject to certain exceptions) within the voting 
district within which they are registered. One exception is where a voter is eligible for a special 
vote. Persons that would temporarily be absent from the Republic on the polling date were 
entitled to apply for a special vote which (if approved) allows that person to vote before 
proceeding overseas. 
The Electoral Act did not provide for citizens (like Richter) who were registered to vote 
but resident overseas. In order to give effect to their right to vote, they would need to return to 
South Africa to vote or, following the proclamation of the voting date by the President, apply for 
a special vote and (upon its approval) exercise their vote before returning to their country of 
residence. This, the court held, placed an unreasonable burden on Richter (and other similar 
applicants) and the limitation on their right to vote could not be linked to a legitimate 
government purpose, particularly since government officials traveling abroad were not required 
to return to South Africa to vote but could do so at Consulates and Embassies abroad. 
Similarly, in the NICRO case the CC considered an amendment to the Electoral Act 
which had the effect of depriving persons serving sentences for crimes for which a fine could not 
be paid from voting during the period of their incarceration. In support of this contention, the 
Director General of Home Affairs expressed concern that to do so would be an administrative 
and financial burden on the Department.299 Given the limited available resources, the Department 
indicated that these resources would be allocated to persons who could not attend voting stations 
due to illness, disability, pregnancy etc. When it came to prisoners, not all prisoners were denied 
the opportunity to vote. Detainees serving sentences for crimes in which an alternate fine could 
have been paid were considered to be different category of detainee from those who had been 
convicted of an offense for which an alternate fine was not available. This latter group were 
denied the opportunity to vote300 because they were the authors of their own misfortune and so,
the limited resources available to the state should be funneled to individuals who have complied 
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with the law but who cannot attend polling stations and allowing prisoners to vote would send 
the wrong message to the community that the ‘government is soft on crime.’301
The CC dismissed these reasons for denying the prisoners the opportunity to vote. 
Resources had been allocated for setting up mobile polling stations for those prisoners who were 
serving sentences instead of paying a fine. No evidence was provided to indicate that the 
extension of these stations to the prisoners guilty of crimes for which there was no alternate fine 
was untenable.302
With respect to the second reason, the court concluded that a ‘fear that the public may 
misunderstand the government’s true attitude to crime and criminals provides no basis for 
depriving prisoners of fundamental rights that they retain despite their incarceration.’303 There 
was no legitimate reason for singling out this category of persons and denying them the right to 
vote. 
These cases illustrate the courts' reluctance to exclude parties from participatory 
processes. ‘In light of our history where denial of the right to vote was used to entrench white 
supremacy and to marginalise the great majority of people in our country, it is for us a precious 
right which must be vigilantly respected and protected.’304 Similarly persons conducting 
participatory processes should adopt an inclusive rather than exclusive approach to participation 
and must not exclude a specific group or category of participants from participating unless the 
empowering legislation specifically permits such exclusion or where it is linked to a legitimate 
government purpose (Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity). 
3.5 Participating in creating legislation
The legislative authority of government is granted to Parliament, the provincial legislatures and 
municipal councils. These bodies must create legislation within the scope of their respective 
competencies.305 Parliament is comprised of the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces ('NCOP')306 and is responsible for creating laws within its national competence. The 
                                               
301 Ibid [46].
302 Ibid [49].
303 Ibid [56].
304 Ibid [47].
305 Constitution op cit note 13 at Schedules 4 and 5.
306 Ibid s42(1).
60
National Assembly is elected as representatives of the electorate (representative democracy) and 
must ensure ‘government by the people’ by choosing the President, providing a national forum 
for the public consideration of issues, passing legislation and by scrutinizing and overseeing 
executive action’.307
The NCOP’s function is to ensure that provincial issues are aired at the national level by 
‘participating in the national legislature and by providing a national forum for the public 
consideration of issues affecting the provinces.’308 In giving effect to their respective obligations, 
the National Assembly and the NCOP must ‘conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its 
sittings and those of its committees, in public, but reasonable measures may be taken’ to regulate 
access to the National Assembly or the NCOP and to search for or prevent access to or removal 
from the National Assembly or NCOP.309 In doing so, the National Assembly and NCOP must 
‘facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes.’310 [Emphasis added].
Based on the principles above, it would be expected that parties affected by proposed 
legislation and provided with an opportunity to collaborate in developing the proposed 
legislation would have a sense of control over and develop trust in the process in that, even if 
their views are not those of the majority, they will accept the final legislative product as they 
trust the procedure followed in reaching that conclusion. 
3.5.1 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and 
Others
The nature and extent of this duty to facilitate public involvement was first considered in the case 
of Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others.311 In 
considering this point, the CC held that the ‘duty to facilitate public involvement in the 
legislative process is an aspect of the right to political participation’312 which means that the 
State must not only provide citizens with an opportunity to vote and participate in political 
parties313 but must also act accountably, responsively and openly in all of its actions.314 In doing 
                                               
307 Ibid s42(3).
308 Ibid at s42(4).
309 Ibid s59 and s72.
310 Ibid s59(1)(a) and s72(1)(a).
311 Doctors for Life supra note 215.
312 Ibid at 1433.
313 Section 3.4 Participating by Voting above.
61
so the State needs to be in on-going consultation with the electorate,315 including during the 
development of legislation. The CC cannot prescribe how Parliament should give effect to this 
obligation as to do so would be contrary to the separation of powers316 but it can review the 
process to determine if it complies with the constitutional duty to ‘facilitate public 
involvement.’317
Before considering whether the process followed met this standard, it is necessary to 
understand the process that was actually followed. What is evident from the judgment is that:
‘Parliament has enacted four health statutes, namely, the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment 
Act 38 of 2004…the Sterilization Amendment Act 3 of 2005; the Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 
of 2004…and the Dental Technicians Amendment Act 24 of 2004. The constitutional challenges relate to 
these statutes, which I shall collectively call the health legislation. The applicant’s complaint is that during 
the legislative process leading to the enactment of these statutes, the NCOP and the provincial legislatures 
did not comply with their constitutional obligations to facilitate public involvement in their legislative 
processes as required by the provisions of sections 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a) of the Constitution, respectively. 
In terms of section 72(1)(a), the NCOP 'must…facilitate public involvement in [its] legislative and other 
processes…and [those of] its committees.' Section 118(1)(a) contains a similar provision relating to a 
provincial legislature. The applicant accepts that the National Assembly has fulfilled its constitutional 
obligation to facilitate public involvement in connection with the health legislation. This, the applicant 
says, was done by the National Assembly by inviting members of the public to make written submissions 
to the National Portfolio Committee on Health and also by holding public hearings on the legislation. That 
process, the applicant maintains, complied with section 59(1)(a) of the Constitution. The applicant alleges 
that the NCOP and the various provincial legislatures were likewise required to invite written submissions 
and hold public hearings on the health legislation. This is what the duty to facilitate public involvement 
requires of them, the applicant maintains…The respondents deny the charge by the applicant. They 
maintain that both the NCOP and the various provincial legislatures complied with the duty to facilitate 
public involvement in their legislative processes. They also take issue with the scope of the duty to 
facilitate public involvement as asserted by the applicant. While conceding that the duty to facilitate public 
involvement requires public participation in the law-making process, they contend that what is required is 
the opportunity to make either written or oral submissions at some point in the national legislative 
process.’318 [emphasis added].
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The CC noted that ‘[w]hatever procedures the provinces follow, to the extent that they are 
engaged in a legislative process in considering and conferring mandates on their delegations, 
they are required to comply with section 118(1)(a), which requires provincial legislatures to 
facilitate public involvement in their legislative processes and those of their committees.’319 The 
respondents made unsubstantiated claims that the NCOP had extensively advertised the bills and 
invited members of the public to participate. Some of the provincial legislatures held public 
hearings in respect of some of the bills. ‘This raises the question as to whether the duty of the 
NCOP to facilitate public involvement in its legislative process may be met through public 
hearings that are conducted by the provincial legislatures.’320
There are both practical and functional considerations which must be considered in 
answering this question, including the fact that some members of the NCOP also represent their 
respective provincial legislatures and, therefore, provincial interests at the provincial legislatures 
should be carried into the NCOP; to hold public meetings at the NCOP and in provincial 
legislatures would be a duplication of costs which (given scarce resources) seems unnecessary
and holding public hearings in each province, as opposed to the NCOP seat in Cape Town,
would make the hearings accessible to those affected by the proposed legislation.321 The Court 
recognised that in some instances the NCOP may also be required to host public hearings in 
respect of bills. 
‘Whether public hearings conducted by a provincial legislature are sufficient to satisfy the obligation of 
the NCOP under section 72(1)(a) ultimately depends on the facts and the nature of the process of 
facilitating public involvement that has occurred in the provinces, including the extent to which the NCOP 
delegations were involved in and have access to the information gathered during that process. Where the 
process involves consideration of a bill affecting the provinces, the ultimate question is whether the 
provincial interests on the legislation under consideration were taken into account in the national 
legislative process.’322
To assess whether the duty to facilitate public involvement has been met, the CC
developed a two-stage test congruent with Principle 2: The Principle of Control:
(1) were the participants afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate and
(2) were the participants able to take advantage of that opportunity?323
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In assessing whether these standards are achieved depends on the democratic participatory
principles. Whether the opportunity is reasonable depends on whether the mechanism adopted 
can give effect to the principles and the second phase questions whether the participants could 
benefit from these principles (i.e. have the principles been implemented). If both of these 
questions can be answered in the affirmative, then the legislature will have complied with its 
obligation under the Constitution. 
3.5.1.1 A reasonable opportunity to participate
The first leg of the investigation considers whether, under the circumstances, members of the 
public were afforded an acceptable chance to participate in the legislative process. The 
reasonableness of this process depends on the 
‘nature and importance of the legislation and the intensity of its impact on the public…Reasonableness 
also requires that appropriate account be paid to practicalities such as time and expense…Yet saving 
money and time in itself does not justify an inadequate opportunity for public involvement…The Court 
will have regard to what Parliament itself considered to be appropriate…in light of the legislation’s 
content, importance and urgency.’324
The first leg of the investigation reviews the mode of participation adopted by the legislature as 
part of the consultative process taking into account the grounds specified above. 
The parties in this case did not dispute whether the opportunity to participate (i.e. the 
notice and comment proceedings and public hearing) was inadequate or unconstitutional. The 
only issue in dispute was whether the reasonable opportunity to participate must occur at the 
provincial level or merely ‘at some point in the national legislative process.’ The CC recognised, 
however, that ‘[m]erely to allow public participation in the law-making process is…not enough. 
More is required.’325
3.5.1.2 Participants taking advantage of the opportunity to participate
The 'more' refers to the second leg of the reasonableness test and can find support from the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which obliges signatory States to implement 
measures aimed at not only providing its citizens with a right to participate in public affairs but 
also at providing an effective opportunity to give effect to the right. The African Charter326 goes 
further. It requires that signatory States ‘have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, 
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education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present Charter 
and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations are 
understood.’327 [Emphasis added]. This is the first time that the CC suggests that the democratic 
participatory principles should be implemented in the participatory process (albeit only Principle 
1: The Educative Effect is referenced). 
In order to ensure that the mode of participation adopted by the legislatures is effective, 
the CC states that
‘Parliament and the provincial legislatures must provide notice of and information about the legislation 
under consideration and the opportunities for participation that are available. To achieve this, it may be 
desirable to provide public education that builds capacity for such participation. Public involvement in the 
legislative process requiring access to information and the facilitation of learning and understanding in 
order to achieve meaningful involvement by ordinary citizens.’328
Although the CC was reluctant to specify the modes of participation which should be adopted in 
each instance, it highlighted that Parliament has in the past adopted methods which facilitate 
effective engagement. Referring to the Inter-Parliamentary Union on Parliamentary Involvement 
in International Affairs, the CC noted that effective participation can be achieved in ‘various 
ways, including through road shows, regional workshops, radio programs and publications aimed 
at educating and informing the public about ways to influence Parliament’.329 The CC found that 
participation must allow participants the opportunity to ‘influence legislative decisions. The 
requirements that participation must be facilitated where it is most meaningful has both symbolic 
and practical objectives: the persons concerned must be manifestly shown the respect due to 
them as concerned citizens, and the legislators must have the benefits of all inputs that will 
enable them to produce the best possible laws’330and, with that, exercise a degree of control over 
the laws which govern their lives.331
Based on the above, it appears that a reasonable opportunity to participate requires that 
the democratic participatory principles are not only notional but actually achieved.332 The CC
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evaluated the process followed by the provincial legislatures in respect of the health legislation to 
determine whether the processes met the reasonableness standard. Unfortunately, the 
circumstances surrounding this case did not turn on whether or not the participatory democratic 
principles were achieved but rather on the fact that the time periods afforded to IAP's to 
participate in public hearings were inadequate333 given the public interest in the legislation and 
the NCOP’s express instruction to the provincial legislatures to conduct public hearings in 
respect of the legislation.334  Where the legislation did not elicit any public interest when first 
published,335 the fact that the NCOP did not insist upon the provinces holding public hearings in 
respect of the Bill was not deemed unreasonable and not in breach of its duty to facilitate public 
participation. 
Since the Doctors for Life case, the CC has considered a number of cases concerning 
proposed constitutional amendments altering municipal boundaries. These cases have concerned 
challenges to the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act336 and the Cross-Boundary 
Municipalities Laws Repeal and Related Matters Act337 which abolished municipalities 
straddling two provinces and provided for the re-drawing of provincial boundaries so that certain 
municipalities that were originally in one province were transferred into the jurisdiction of 
another province.  Dissatisfied with this outcome, the applicants in these areas challenged the 
provincial legislatures’ failures to facilitate public involvement as in the Constitution. 
Raboshakga argues that the principles approach to public involvement reached by the CC in the 
Doctors for Life case has more recently been abandoned in favour of procedural compliance in 
these judgments.338
3.5.2 Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of RSA and Others (No 2)
In Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of RSA and Others (No 2),339 the respondents 
argued that the provincial legislature’s duty to facilitate public involvement in section 118(1)(a) 
of the Constitution only applied to provincial legislation and not to national legislation. As such, 
                                               
333 Doctors for Life supra note 215 at 1456.
334 Ibid at 1455 - 1462.
335 Such as the Dental Technicians Amendment Act 24 of 2004.
336 Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act, 2005.
337 8 of 2009.
338 Ngwako Raboshakga ‘Towards participatory democracy, or not: The reasonableness approach in public
involvement cases’ 2015 SAJHR 4 at 5.
339 2007 (6) SA 477 (CC).
66
the respondents argued, the provincial legislature was not under a duty to facilitate public 
involvement in respect of a constitutional amendment as this was national legislation. In 
rejecting this argument, the CC found that there is both a textual and a structural approach to 
interpreting the Constitution. Section 118(1)(a), therefore, cannot be interpreted in isolation 
without reference to the ‘basic principles which underlie our democracy and the other provisions 
of the Constitution’340 which require that the views of the provinces must be ventilated at a 
national level where the proposed legislation impacts directly on the provinces. On this basis,
provincial legislatures must participate in national law-making and must do so in accordance 
with the Constitutional requirements which include the duty to involve the public in the 
legislative process.341
This duty is not limited to the election of representatives in legislatures and empowering 
them to make all decisions on the public’s behalf. The duty requires continuous engagement 
between the legislature and the public which, in turn, 
‘provides vitality to the functioning of representative democracy. It encourages citizens of the country to 
be actively involved in public affairs, identify themselves with the institutions of government and to 
become familiar with the laws as they are made. It enhances civic dignity of those who participate by 
enabling their voices to be heard and taken account of. It promotes a spirit of democratic and pluralistic 
accommodation calculated to produce laws that are likely to be widely accepted and effective in practice. 
It strengthens the legitimacy of legislation in the eyes of the people.’342
The Court in this way invoked Principle 3: The Social Licence and Principle 4: The Principle of 
Dignity.343
De Vos argues that civic 
‘dignity permeates the South African Constitution…Underlying the constitutional focus on the value of 
dignity is the assumption that each human being has incalculable human worth, regardless of 
circumstances, and should be treated accordingly. This idea that dignity is inherent to every person 
regardless of circumstance, which leads to the conclusion that everyone has the same moral worth, suggests 
that individuals must be accorded an equal opportunity to take part in democratic decisions and should 
arguably be interpreted and applied in such a way that increases an individual's control over self-
determination and self-development.’344
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Creating a real participatory process in which individuals believes that their opinion is heard and 
valued enhances their sense of worth and the belief that they can control their own destiny.345
As in Doctors for Life, the CC did not prescribe what this 'real participatory process'
looks like as it depends on the facts of each case. However, it provided some guidance on the 
manner and form that such participation could take by stating that these mechanisms ‘may 
include providing transportation to and from hearings or hosting radio programmes in multiple 
languages on an important bill, and may go well beyond any formulaic requirement of notice or 
hearing.’346 The CC also cautioned the legislatures. Although the legislatures are the appropriate 
bodies for determining the manner in which the public should be engaged and are empowered to 
develop their own rules in this regard, the ultimate test should always be whether the legislature 
‘acted reasonably in the manner that it facilitated public involvement in the particular 
circumstances of a given case.’347 This implies that provincial legislatures will not necessarily 
have met their constitutional mandate by applying their standard rules of engagement. What it
requires in all instances is that the legislatures acted reasonably, that is, in the manner 
contemplated in the Doctors for Life case. 
In this case (like Doctors for Life), the CC was not required to consider whether the 
participatory process complied with the democratic participatory principles and rather dispensed 
with the matter on the basis that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature had failed to facilitate
any public engagement in respect of the proposed constitutional amendments.348
3.5.3 Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others
In the case of Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others,349 the CC was once again faced with considering whether a provincial 
legislature complied with its duty to facilitate public involvement regarding proposed 
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constitutional amendments altering municipal boundaries of the Merafong Municipality which 
straddled the Gauteng and North West provinces but would, following the amendment, fall 
solely within the jurisdiction of the North West Province.
Relying on Doctors for Life, the CC applied the reasonableness test in finding that the 
Gauteng Legislature complied with its constitutional mandate by conducting a public hearing and 
affording the public an opportunity to submit written submissions to the legislature. On the facts 
of this case, the majority’s conclusion is significantly narrower than the decision in Doctors for 
Life and (in the writer’s opinion) is incorrect in that the fulfillment of the constitutional 
obligation to 'facilitate public involvement' in the CC’s eyes falls well short of the participatory 
democratic principles discussed in Chapter 2. 
In order to demonstrate this supposition, it is necessary to touch on the facts of the 
Merafong case. The provincial legislatures from Gauteng and the North West provinces held a
joint public hearing regarding the proposed change to the demarcation of the provincial boundary 
which would impact the Merafong Municipality which extended across the two provinces but 
would (if the constitutional amendment was successful) include the entire Merafong 
Municipality within the North West Province. Thereafter, each provincial legislature would 
consider the outcome of the public hearing and adopt a written mandate regarding the proposed 
amendment that was to be presented to the NCOP.350 At the public hearing, the communities 
expressed strong opposition to the inclusion of the Gauteng portion of Merafong in the North 
West province.351 Based on this opposition, the Portfolio Committee of the Gauteng Legislature 
agreed to support the constitutional amendment on condition that the Merafong Municipality be 
incorporated into Gauteng and not the North West. This mandate was presented to the Select 
Committee at the NCOP. It was also highlighted that the provinces are only permitted in terms of 
the Constitution, either to accept or reject the proposed constitutional amendment relating to the 
changing of provincial boundaries and not to propose changes. In light of this, the mandate was 
defective in that it did not indicate whether it was in support or opposed to the proposed 
amendment relating to the Merafong Municipality. After this meeting the matter reverted to the 
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Gauteng Portfolio Committee which elected to support the amendment without condition. The 
Gauteng Legislature did not consult with the Merafong community prior to taking this decision. 
The constitutional amendment was subsequently approved by the NCOP.
The majority of the Court concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that the Gauteng 
Legislature did not consult with the community after the mandate was referred, it had complied 
with its constitutional responsibilities in terms of section 118(1)(a). The Court found that 
providing the opportunity to participate does not mean that the legislature is obliged to follow the 
views of the public where those are contrary to government policy. ‘The public participation in 
the legislative process, which the Constitution envisages, is supposed to supplement and enhance 
the democratic nature of general elections and majority rule, not to conflict or even overrule or 
veto them.’352 Following government policy does not mean that the legislature did not keep an 
open mind when considering the opinions of the public. The facts of this case show that the 
Gauteng Legislature did listen to the views of the public. The defect was (according to the CC) 
not with the public participation process conducted but rather with the mandate taken by the 
Portfolio Committee to the NCOP: ‘Consultation requires the free expression of views and the 
willingness to take those views into account. This did happen,’353 at least, originally in 
developing the Portfolio Committee’s mandate. 
In reaching this conclusion, the CC made various comments that seem directly opposed 
to the democratic participatory principles and the Doctors for Life case. The CC found that:
‘From the perspective of respectful dialogue and the accountability of political representatives, it might 
well have been desirable to report to the people of Merafong that it was impossible to adhere to the 
position taken by the Portfolio Committee in the negotiating mandate. To the extent that the community 
has given the impression that the Committee agreed with them and that an understandable exception was 
created that their views would prevail, it was possibly disrespectful not to return to inform them of 
subsequent events. The question, though, is whether the omission to consult again after the alteration of 
the Portfolio Committee’s negotiating mandate amounts to a failure to facilitate public involvement in the 
process of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature.
…In my view the failure to report back to the Merafong community does not rise to the level of 
unreasonableness which would result in the invalidity of the Twelfth Amendment which was otherwise 
properly passed by Parliament…’354 [emphasis added].
The court went on to state that:
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‘If they [the Gauteng Legislature] had gone back to Merafong to explain the situation to the people, a 
better understanding might have been fostered, but it is unlikely that the majority would have been 
sufficiently impressed by the explanation to change their strongly held views. If they agreed to the 
incorporation in the North West, the Bill would in any event have been passed. If they persisted in their 
original position, the Gauteng Provincial Legislature still would not have been bound by their view and 
would in all likelihood have proceeded to vote in favour of the passing of the Bill. The possibility of the 
Portfolio Committee being persuaded anew by views of which it was already fully aware is indeed small. 
In all probability little would have been achieved by another round of exchanging ideas, other than to 
inform and perhaps educate the community. Whereas speculation about the likely outcome of further 
consultation is not ultimately decisive, the fact is that the community had a proper opportunity to air their 
views. The previous decisions of this court, on which the applicants rely, do not require an ongoing 
dialogue. In fact, continuing discussion which does not result in a changed outcome could strengthen 
possible percepts that consultation was not meaningful.’355 [emphasis added].
Despite the strong statements made by the CC in Doctors for Life that participation is vital to 
giving effect to a citizen’s constitutional right to dignity, in this case the Legislature’s failure to 
conduct further participation was watered down to merely being 'disrespectful'. In addition, the 
CC unilaterally decided that ‘little would be achieved’ if the legislature had conducted additional 
consultation and that any participation which did occur would amount to 'non-participation'
(based on the Arnstein ladder of participation) as the affected citizens would merely be informed 
of the fact that the legislature had changed its position in respect of the Bill. In addition, the CC
mentioned that the Doctors for Life and Matatiele cases should not be interpreted as requiring
on-going consultation between legislatures and the public. This appears to be a significant step 
backwards from the position in the Doctors for Life case regarding the purposive interpretation 
of the Constitution to give effect to participatory democracy in the law-making process.  
This criticism finds support in the minority judgment of Sachs J who distances himself 
from the rest of the bench on the question of whether the Gauteng Legislature was obliged (in 
terms of section 118(1)(a)) to conduct further consultation with the Merafong community,
following the rejection of the negotiating mandate by the NCOP. He critically says that in 
‘some ways an interrupted dialogue, when expectations of candour and open-dealing have been established 
and certain unambiguous commitments have been made, can be more disruptive of a relationship than 
silence from the start might have been…[P]articipation by the public on a continuous basis provides 
vitality to the functioning of representative democracy. It encourages citizens of the country to be actively 
involved in public affairs, to identify themselves with the institutions of government and to become 
familiar with the laws as they are made…In the present matter the failure of the legislature to go back to 
the community and explain its abrupt about-turn violated…the civic dignity of the majority. It denied any 
spirit of accommodation and produced a total lack of legitimacy for the process and its outcomes in the 
eyes of the people. [(Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate)] And finally, it gave rise to a strong 
perception - reflected in the papers - that the legislative process has been a sham because an irreversible 
deal had already been struck at a political level outside the confines of the legislative process in terms of 
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which, come what may, Merafong was going to the North West. [Principle 2: The Principle of 
Control].’356
In Sachs J’s view, Principle 2: The Principle of Control and Principle 3: The Social Licence to 
Operate, as well as Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity were violated by the legislature in 
failing to conduct further consultation, and that allowing parties to present their side of the story 
‘is necessary to preserve human-dignity and self-respect’ even if the outcome seems to be a 
foregone conclusion. The ‘respect for the relationship between the legislature and the community 
required that there be more rather than less communication.’357 If Sachs J’s judgment is correct 
(which, on the face of it, it appears to be), then the majority’s finding that the provincial 
legislature dispensed with its constitutional mandate in section 118(1)(a) must be wrong. There 
may, however, be a more subtle interpretation of the majority’s decision which would be more 
constitutionally acceptable and which further refines the reasonableness test discussed in these 
cases and the application of the democratic participatory principles. 
This suggested interpretation of the majority’s judgment adds an additional principle: that 
of finality in the decision-making process (Principle 6: Finality in Decision-Making). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the principal criticisms lodged against participatory democracy 
(at least in its traditional conception) is that it has the potential to hamstring decision-making 
processes in that parties cannot reach consensus on a matter. Although it has been determined 
that participatory democracy does not require full participation (or 100 per cent consensus), there 
is a point at which the value of further participation is no longer beneficial and when 'talking'
must be converted into 'doing'. At this point in the participatory process, the participants should 
have expressed their respective views, developed solutions through collaborative learning efforts, 
feel that they have an opportunity to influence the decision-making  process and be satisfied that 
the outcome of the process benefits the common good even if that does not align with their 
personal objectives (what I refer to as 'constitutional participation').
Where additional participation does not further these principles, the optimal point has 
been exceeded and participation is downgraded from partnership or delegated power to forms of 
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'non-participation' such as therapy or manipulation,358 then perhaps constitutional participation 
can be abandoned to avoid endless consultation which prevents the implementation of decisions. 
This does not mean that engagement is abandoned in its entirety: it means that a lesser form of 
participation (i.e. less than constitutional participation) would be acceptable (what I refer to as 
'lesser participation'). This, however, does not mean that this lesser participation is any less 
important. In fact, as will be expressed below, lesser participation is critical to achieving the 
outcomes gained during constitutional participation where the optimal point has been breached 
(Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate). 
The Merafong case provides an example of the finality in the decision-making process 
principle and situations where lesser participation would not only be acceptable but necessary. In 
this case, it was not disputed that the provincial legislature had conducted public hearings and 
listened to the views of the community. Up until the negotiating mandate was rejected by the 
NCOP, the parties seem to have been in unison that constitutional participation had been 
achieved. Once the mandate had been rejected, the optimal point of participation was exceeded 
and any additional participation would not further the democratic participatory principles as, in 
spite of the outcome of any participatory process, the provincial legislature intended to follow 
government policy.359
Participation should not have ended there. The majority recognised that the community 
should have been informed of or educated about the legislature’s decision and that the failure to 
do so was 'disrespectful'. Had the provincial legislature taken the last step of informing the 
community of the outcome of the meeting with the NCOP, the community may not have felt that 
the participation process was a sham360 and would have had a better understanding of the 
outcome even though it was contrary to their desires as they would have had an understanding361
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of why a contrary decision was reached by the legislature and, consequently, may have been 
more accepting of the outcome.362
The failure to take that last step may have been the reason why the Merafong community 
launched court proceedings. The CC, however, was not convinced that the failure to execute this 
form of 'non-participation' diminished the community’s dignity or justified overturning the entire 
legislative process as (it is surmised) constitutional participation had been achieved prior to the 
provincial legislature’s decision and based on Principle 6: The Principle of Finality in Decision-
making.
3.5.4 Subsequent case law implementing the principle of participation
In the subsequent cases of Moutse Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others363 and Poverty Alleviation Network and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others,364 the CC was once again faced with the 'duty to facilitate 
public involvement' conundrum. The issue in dispute was the same as that in the Matatiele and 
Merafong cases in that constitutional amendments365 varied municipal and provincial boundaries 
with the effect that certain citizens who were previously resident in one province were now 
resident in another. It was common cause between the parties in both cases that the provincial 
legislature had conducted public participation processes but the adequacy of that participation 
was questioned by the applicants. 
In Poverty Alleviation Network, the applicants contend that the duty to facilitate public 
participation was invalid in that the Matatiele community had not been exclusively consulted as a 
‘discrete and identifiable group,’366 the legislature did not receive oral submissions from the 
community and had failed to consider the written summation that it had received. The applicants 
further argued that the participatory process must have a 'direct outcome' on the resultant 
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legislation.367 The Court rejected the applicants’ submission that the legislature had not taken its 
submissions into consideration. Based on the facts before the Court, it was evident that the
concerns raised by the applicants were considered. The legislature was not obliged to follow 
those decisions. All that is required is that it maintains an open mind when considering the 
submissions. That is, the legislature (or authority) does not need to defer to the IAP's.368
The CC also held that the applicants had misconstrued the reference to ‘a discrete and 
identifiable group’ mentioned in the Matatiele case. In that case, the CC held that the ‘more 
discrete and identifiable the potentially affected section of the population, and the more intense 
the possible effect on their interests, the more reasonable it would be to expect the Legislature to 
be astute to ensure that the potentially affected section of the population is given a reasonable 
opportunity to have a say.’369 [emphasis added]
This statement, the CC concluded, does not mean that the Matatiele community must be afforded 
a right to be heard at the exclusion of all other parties.370 All that this means is that the 
community must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in the process. 
Arguably the reference to a ‘discrete and identifiable group’ requires the person 
conducting the participatory process to identify group(s) of people which may be affected by the 
proposed legislation (including the missing groups) and - in so doing - select the mode(s) of 
participation that are suitable to allow all these groups an opportunity to participate meaningfully
in the legislative process. If the affected community is largely uneducated or cannot read and 
write, it is inappropriate for the legislature to receive only written submissions. This was not 
argued by the Poverty Alleviation Network. Nor could it be, as the Matatiele community was 
represented by the Poverty Alleviation Network and the legal counsel who submitted written 
comments on its behalf. The applicants argued that had they been afforded an opportunity to 
express their concerns orally, they would have been able to dispel the apparent perception that 
their only complaint was limited to service delivery concerns. This was rejected by the Court. As 
in the case of Common Law, parties are not entitled to an oral hearing unless fairness requires it. 
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The ‘discrete and identifiable group’ argument was also raised in the Moutse case but did 
not provide a different interpretation to what is mentioned above, other than to state that the 
classification of a group as 'discrete and identifiable' does not entitle the group to any special 
treatment in airing their concerns.371 All that is required is that the public participation process 
which was conducted was reasonable. What is reasonable depends on the facts of each case and,
in this case, the CC was of the view that the notice and comment proceedings and public 
inquiries were reasonable under the circumstances.372 What is reasonable, however, will depend 
on the identity and circumstances of the persons affected.373
Since these judgments, there has been another case, Land Access Movement of South 
Africa and Others v Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces and Others.374 This case 
also considered whether the NCOP had adequately dispensed with its constitutional duty to 
facilitate public participation when considering and passing the Restitution of Land Rights 
Amendment Act.375 It is not necessary to consider this case in detail as it merely reiterates the 
principles discussed above. However, one principle that is highlighted in this instance is 
Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity. The CC reinforces Doctors for Life by quoting 
'[p]ublic involvement…[is] of particular significance for members of groups that have been the victims of 
processes of historical silencing…It is constitutive of their dignity as citizens today that they not only have 
a chance to speak, but also enjoy the assurance they will be listened to. This would be of special relevance 
for those who may feel politically disadvantaged at present because they lack higher education, access to 
resources and strong political connections. Public involvement accordingly strengthens rather than 
undermines formal democracy, by responding to and negating some of its functional deficits.'376
In summary, the case law concerning the duty to facilitate public involvement at the 
national legislative level has introduced a number of additional principles that guide a facilitator 
in constructing a public participation process. Firstly, processes should focus on including 
participants, rather than on excluding them. That is, a reasonable person, acting reasonably must 
be able to participate in the process. Where parties are excluded from a process, the exclusion 
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must be linked to a legitimate purpose.377 Secondly, participation is an on-going activity. In order 
for such participation to be constitutionally compliant, it must comply with the constitutional 
democratic principles (i.e. the process must be educative, the parties must have a sense of control 
over the process). However, at some point in the process, further detailed consultation may not 
lead to additional benefits. In these instances, it may be acceptable to down-grade to a lower 
form of participation.378 Thirdly, consultation does not mean that the authority must always defer 
to or reach agreement with the public in a public participation process. All that is required is that 
the parties keep an open mind when considering submissions by the other party.379 Finally, this 
section highlights that the identity and circumstances of the parties to the participatory process is 
relevant to determining the appropriate mode of participation.380
3.6 Participating in local government 
Local government is the most accessible sphere of government. Section 152 of the Constitution 
obliges local government to ‘encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organizations in the matters of local government’381 and policy-making to ensure that the needs 
of the people are addressed.382
3.6.1 Legislation governing local government
These broad obligations are fleshed out in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act383
('MSA') and Local Government: Municipal Structures Act384 ('Structures Act'). The Structures 
Act allows for participation in local government by creating municipalities with sub-council or 
ward participatory systems and a leadership which is obliged to report on the manner in which 
the public have been involved in issues of local governance. The circumstances in which the 
public can participate is developed in the MSA. It states that 
‘there is a need to set out the core principles, mechanisms and processes that give meaning to developmental 
local government and to empower municipalities to move progressively towards social and economic 
upliftment of communities and the provision of basic services to all our people, and specifically the poor 
and the disadvantaged.’385
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Active engagement with the community is fundamental in achieving this objective.386 The MSA, 
as a result, grants members of the community the right:
(a) ‘Through mechanisms and in accordance with processes and procedures provided for in terms of this Act or 
other applicable legislation to-
(i)   contribute to the decision-making processes of the municipality; and
(ii)  submit written and oral recommendations, representations and complaints to the municipal council or 
       to another political structure or a political office bearer of the administration of the municipality; 
(b) To prompt responses to their written or oral communications, including complaints, to the municipal 
council or to another political structure or a political office bearer or the administration of the municipality, 
affecting their rights, property and reasonable expectations;
(c) To regular disclosure of the state of affairs of the municipality, including finances.’387
It also imposes a reciprocal duty on the municipal councils ‘to encourage the involvement
of the local community’388 and more specifically to consult the local community about service 
delivery389 by facilitating co-operation and communication between the municipal administration 
and the community and providing full and accurate information to the community regarding 
these services. Chapter 4 of the MSA sets out the processes in which communities must be 
involved and consulted, including the preparation, implementation and review of its integrated 
development plan ('IDP')390 and performance management systems,391 as well as monitoring its 
performance392 and preparing its budget.393 Participation in these processes 
‘provides for-
(a) the receipt, processing and consideration of petitions and complaints lodged by members of the 
local community;
(b) notification and public comment procedures, when appropriate;
(c) public meetings and hearings by the municipal councillor and other political structures and 
political office bearers of the municipality, when appropriate;
(d) consultative sessions with locally recognised community organizations and, where appropriate, 
traditional authorities; and
(e) report-back to the local community.’394
The notification contemplated above must include the matters in which community preparation is 
encouraged;395 the rights and duties of the community396 and ‘municipal governance, 
management and development.’397
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The MSA prescribes the manner and form in which the local community must be notified 
of public participation processes. This notification requirement is notable in that when ‘the 
municipality invites the local community to submit written comments or representations on any 
matter before the council, it must be stated in the invitation that any person who cannot write 
may come during office hours to a place where staff members of the municipality named in the 
invitation will assist that person to transcribe their comments or representations.’398 In addition, 
where
‘a municipality requires a form to be completed by a member of the local community, a staff member of the 
municipality must give reasonable assistance to persons who cannot read or write, to enable such person to 
understand and complete the form…If the form relates to the payment of money to the municipality or to the 
provision of any service, the assistance must include an explanation of its terms and conditions.’399
This supports the construction of knowledge in terms of Principle 1: The Educative Effect. In 
this way, the legislation requires not only the opportunity to participate but also assists 
participants in being able to take advantage of that opportunity.400
In addition, the MSA requires that taking advantage of this opportunity must contribute to 
‘building the capacity of - (i) the local community to enable it to participate in the affairs of the 
municipality; and (ii) councillors and staff to foster community participation.’401 This section 
represents a legislative recognition of Principle 1: The Educative Effect. 
Save for the functional requirements aimed at assisting persons who cannot read or write 
and the general obligation to give effect to the educative effect, the MSA is not prescriptive on 
how local government must implement 'public hearings', 'notice and comment' proceedings or 
'consultative sessions'. The Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance 
Management Regulations402 require a municipality to develop a forum that will 'enhance' public 
participation by including people in ‘(i) the drafting and implementation of the municipality’s
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development plan; and (ii) monitoring, measurement and review of the municipality’s 
performance in relation to the key performance indicators and performance targets set by the 
municipality.’403 The local community must be invited to serve on the forum which will:
(i) ‘discuss the process to be followed in drafting the [IDP];
(ii) consult on the content of the [IDP];
(iii) monitor the implementation of the [IDP]; 
(iv) discuss the development, implementation and review of the municipality’s performance management 
system; and
(v) monitor the municipality’s performance in relation to the key performance indicators and performance 
targets set by the municipality.’404
While this creates the forum for participation, it does nothing to ensure that the democratic
participatory principles are met and does not provide much guidance to municipalities or the 
forum on how to achieve these objectives. Guidance eventually came in the form of the National 
Policy Framework for Public Participation that was published by the Department: Provincial and 
Local Government in 2007 ('the Framework').
3.6.2 The National Policy Framework for Public Participation 
The Framework seeks to assist municipalities in developing the participatory procedures 
contemplated in the MSA in such a way that is ‘genuinely empowering and not token 
consultation or manipulation.’405 Genuinely empowering public participation can be defined 
(with reference to various government policies)406 as ‘an open, accountable process through 
which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence 
decision-making. It is further defined as a democratic process of engaging people, deciding, 
planning and playing an active part in the development and operation of services that affect their 
lives.’407 While this definition does not expressly set out all of the democratic participatory
principles contemplated above, it is broad enough to encompass these principles. 
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In designing the participatory procedures contemplated, the Framework suggests that five 
factors must exist in order for participatory procedures to 'work':408
• citizens must be able to participate;
• citizens must want to participate;
• participation by citizens must be facilitated;
• citizens must be asked to participate and
• citizens must be responded to.409
These measures are not uncommon objectives of participation. The ability for citizens to 
participate is congruent with the 'reasonable opportunity' to participate dealt with above. 
Similarly, the facilitation of participation matches the requirement that the relevant authority 
must not only provide this opportunity but must also assist parties to take advantage of the 
opportunity to participate. The requirement that citizens want to participate depends on whether 
the participants feel part of the community. That is, they must feel that the local government is 
'their' government. This means that they must feel that they exercise a degree of control over the 
government and the process. This approach is similar to Principle 2: The Principle of Control. 
This sense of control and trust over the process is also likely to be enhanced where local 
authorities consider and respond to issues that are raised by participants. This is similar to 
Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate. Finally, in order for any form of participatory 
process to commence, the relevant parties need to be notified of the process. This is the standard 
notification requirement that is critical to initiating the participatory process. 
With these minimum criteria for participation in mind, the Framework includes a list of 
community participation principles which guide the selection and running of the participatory 
process to make sure that participation 'works'. These principles mirror the participatory 
democratic principles mentioned in Chapter 2 and this chapter and include inclusivity,410
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diversity,411 building community participation,412 transparency,413 flexibility,414 accessibility,415
accountability,416 trust, comment and respect417 and integration.418
The principle of inclusivity has been raised in the previous section.419 Principle 4: The 
Principle of Dignity recognises that the person conducting the participatory process must identify 
which participants may be affected by the proposed decision and provide them with an 
opportunity to participate in the process.420 Meanwhile, the obligation to build community 
participation and accessibility to the participatory process both reflect Principle 1: The Educative 
Effect. Transparency, accountability, trust and commitment are all characteristics that form part 
of Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate. 
As mentioned throughout this Chapter, the appropriate mode of participation is
determined by the surrounding circumstances. There is a tendency, once having selected a mode 
of participation, to apply it rigidly at the expense of the democratic participatory principles. The 
principle of flexibility remains an important one. Persons conducting participatory processes 
need to review and assess the process being implemented continually to confirm that it is 
promoting the democratic participatory principles. To the extent that it is failing to do so, the 
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person conducting the participatory process needs to adapt it accordingly. This cannot be 
undertaken unilaterally as the participants would have been involved in designing the process. 
Through consultation to adapt the process, the participants may waive the proposed adaptation in 
favour of a less onerous process. In such cases, they would also waive their right to challenge 
this lesser process at a later stage. This requirement of flexibility is critical to the participatory 
process and must be included as an additional principle: Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility. 
Variety in participation (and possibly even less participation) is contemplated in the 
Framework and the MSA which include three categories of participation: informing, consulting 
and involving. For example, citizens must be informed of council decisions or the available 
mechanisms, processes and procedures through which community members can participate;421
they must be consulted regarding municipal service delivery and they must be involved in ward 
committees in integrated development planning. 
The MSA does not define these terms. Parliament’s specific use of them, however, 
indicates that it intended there to be degrees of participation in local government. The 
Framework attempts to define these categories of participation in a manner that is useful to 
understand and implement. These definitions must be used with caution in that the rigid 
application of the definition may compromise ultimate fairness and since these terms are not 
consistently used across legislation these definitions may be transferable from one context to the 
next. As set out below, context and not terminology is definitive in determining the form of 
participation that is adopted. However, terminology can be a useful tool in developing a baseline 
level of participation.
3.6.2.1 Informing
According to the Framework 
‘[i]nform means the passing of information between councillors, officials and the community. It 
constitutes the most passive form of engagement between the public and the municipality. It is usually a 
one way communication from a municipality to the public, merely to keep the public informed about 
something in order to assist them in understanding a problem, alternatives or solutions. No real input is 
expected from the public. Examples of the way 'informing' can help from a municipal point of view would 
be advertising an imbizo in a newspaper or a radio, the use of loud-hailers, publication of notices and so 
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on. From the perspective of the community, one mechanism central to 'informing' is the ward committee, 
but others would include direct petition or a letter to a councillor or official.’422
This form of communication, although important for the achievement of participatory 
democracy, does not fulfill the requirements of the substantive principles as it does not allow for 
the exchange of viewpoints, problem-solving or exercising control over the process or its 
outcome as information is merely communicated to the participants. This form of 
communication should only be relied upon where the local government does not expect a 
response423 and so it is tantamount to notification and not public participation as required by the 
democratic participatory principles. 
3.6.2.2 Consulting and Involving
The democratic participatory principles are more evident in the Framework’s definitions of 
'consult' and 'involve'. The reference to 'consult' in the MSA is
‘one step closer to full participation and requires more of the public than merely receiving communicated 
information from the municipality. It is therefore also less passive since the objective is to obtain feedback 
from the public on analysis, alternatives and / or decisions communicated to them by the municipality. 
Consultation will be mainly with stakeholder groups or ward committees but will not exclude the general 
public. Self-selected stakeholder groups will emerge during this kind of process. Consultation represents 
the start of a two way communication between the municipality and the public.’424
This form of engagement would be expected at meetings to discuss the budget / IDP process or 
through surveys to assess service delivery. While this definition is generally aligned with the 
participatory principles in the sense that it recognises that two-way engagement is necessary to 
achieve Principle 1: The Educative Effect, there are some elements of concern:
• Firstly, the reference to 'full participation' is incorrect. As highlighted above, the focus of 
a successful participatory process is not based on the number of people consulted as a 
percentage but rather on whether the process adopted in consulting those who participate 
or wish to participate gives effect to the democratic participatory principles.
• Secondly, consultation in this context places form over substance. It is based on two-way 
communication between the municipality and the community where the municipality 
informs the community (in the manner considered above) and the community provides 
feedback. The mode of participation suggested to meet the requirement to consult is 
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through conducting surveys. This, the Framework suggests, is appropriate when 
assessing the level of service delivery provided by the municipality in respect of water, 
sanitation etc. This kind of approach may be appropriate where the municipality wants 
the community to rank identified projects in order of preference for purposes of 
implementation. In this way there is a closed list of options from which the community 
can elect their individual preference. The feedback received from the community, 
however, is finite. Members of the community cannot suggest new projects or give 
comments in respect of the project.
The term 'involve', on the other hand, has been described as a
‘high level of two way interaction between the municipality and the public. It constitutes an active 
working relationship between the public (represented by ward committees and stakeholder groups) and the 
municipality in order to ensure that concerns and issues raised by the community are directly reflected in 
the way the municipality deals with it. Providing continued feedback to ward committees and stakeholder 
groups is part of the process.’425
This can be undertaken in a variety of ways: ward committees, stakeholder forums, training or 
referenda. This form of engagement is most closely aligned with the concept of participation 
proposed in this Chapter as being 'constitutionally compliant'. 
However, what these three terms indicate is that not all forms of engagement need to 
achieve the same degree of participation which is attached to the term 'involve' in order to meet 
the democratic participatory principles. The concern that arises by using and defining these terms 
is that there is the potential for the descriptions provided in the Framework to be applied 
formalistically. 
As was the case with the classifications of functions doctrine mentioned earlier, caution 
must be exercised in such situations as municipalities may lose sight of the concept of fairness 
and the democratic participatory principles by sticking rigidly to what the terminology requires. 
Furthermore, the legislature has not used terms like 'inform', 'consult' and 'involve' consistently in 
other legislation and so the definitions provided here may not be directly applicable in other 
contexts. This, however, creates a conundrum as in terms of the general rules of interpretation, it 
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is assumed that the legislature’s decision to use different words is intentional and, therefore,
requires different meanings. 
The Framework and the definition provided are useful and should be used as a guide to 
municipalities when they are faced with one of these terms, provided that when they are faced 
with such a term, they evaluate the definition of the term within the context to ensure that the 
form of engagement that the definition contemplates is appropriate under the circumstances in 
light of the democratic participatory principles and the general rules of fairness. These terms can 
form the basis of a lexicon for the legislature to use in future to develop consistency in the 
terminology and intention of Parliament in using particular terms. Over time, consistent 
terminology in the context of participation will be a useful tool, not only to the legislature but
also to administrators, lawyers, EAP's and other stakeholders. 
3.6.3 Developing a public participation strategy 
Once the form of engagement has been selected and tested against the definition to determine its 
appropriateness, the Framework suggests that a strategy must be developed to give effect to it. 
The Framework identifies three strategies (1) communication; (2) ward committees and ward 
forums and (3) stakeholder forums. 
The communication strategy highlights the suggestion that modes of participation (and 
the sharing of information between municipalities and the community) can be enhanced through 
the development and publishing of public participation principles and a Citizen’s Participation 
Charter, as well as by implementing a complaints management system and citizen satisfaction 
surveys. According to the Framework, publishing the principles of participation and educating 
citizens in respect of these principles is likely to assist the municipality in understanding that 
governance at a local level is done in partnership with the community meaning that the 
municipality is constrained in making decisions for the public good. These principles can be 
published in the Public Participation Charter - a document which outlines ‘the rights and duties 
of citizens as regards participating in their municipality’s governance.’426
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This Charter must provide an understanding of what community participation is, how it 
will be implemented, the ways in which complaints can be lodged and the contact details of 
relevant persons. The complaints mechanism should include time periods to ensure that there is 
an efficient response. In addition, the Framework suggests that the communication strategy 
include citizen satisfaction surveys that assess the performance of service provision and 
responsiveness of government employees. These can be used to check that the municipality is on 
track to fulfill the expectations of the community. This strategy, however, does not encourage 
'consultation' or 'involvement' in the manner contemplated in the Framework. 
To achieve this goal, the second strategy deals with structures in which persons can 
participate: namely, ward committees and ward forums. Ward Committees are comprised of the 
Ward Councillor and 10 other people representing the diversity in the ward. The function of the 
Ward Committee is to act as an independent advisory body. This function was refined in a 
ministerial note which described the primary function of the ward committees as being one of 
communication and mobilization including ‘attending to all matters that affect and benefit the 
community, acting in the best interest of the community service payment campaigns, the IDP 
process, the budgetary process, decisions about service provision, bylaws, and by delimiting and 
chairing zonal meetings.’427 As the ward committee is a representative body acting in the 
interests and for the benefit of the community, the municipality must not only provide structures 
within which the community can participate but must ‘explore ways of (i) empowering ward 
committees in respect of council processes, (ii) ensuring ward committees function effectively, 
and (iii) that the relationship with communities is inclusive, transparent and participatory.’428
That is, representative forums such as ward committees need to be actively involved in 'central 
municipal processes' in order for them to be effective and for the views of the community to be 
heard. The participation of the ward committees within municipal structures, however, must be 
real and not illusionary otherwise ‘participation’ of these committees within the council will be 
nothing more than examples of 'non-participation' described by Arnstein.429
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In fulfilling this role, the Ward Committee members must be provided with 
administrative support and training, as well as a budget, to perform its functions.430 However, in 
addition to an empowered ward committee, what is ultimately required in order to reach the 
partnership rung on the Arnstein ladder is the ‘deepening of the interaction between ward 
committees and the community to ensure that it is really the community that can take advantage 
of an empowered ward committee.’431 This, the Framework suggests, can be achieved through 
internal restructuring within the ward committee by making certain committee members 
responsible for a portfolio or particular geographic area. This must be coupled with ward 
committees holding public meetings in which they report back on matters raised by community 
members and consult with the community in development planning. Development planning 
assists ward committees in prioritising community needs which can be reviewed on an on-going 
basis. In considering what these community needs may be, the third leg of the participation 
strategy requires recognition of the different groups within the community. 
The Framework acknowledges two kinds of community groups:
‘The first group is formed with the specific goal of ensuring performance by a municipality in key
performance areas. Such organisations include community based organisations and ratepayers associations 
and are referred to as service or municipal directed groups. The second set of interest groups comprise 
organisations that focus on a particular area of interest which may not be associated directly with 
municipal activities. Examples of such interest groups are Chambers of Commerce and informal trade 
associations.’432
Within the municipal process, the Framework provides that these stakeholders must register with 
the municipality so that they can be notified of and interact with the municipality on issues that 
interest them. This is an important distinction as the first group is one that is concerned more 
with process, rules and procedures (i.e. they are less concerned with the outcome of the process 
and more interested in ensuring that the municipality is acting within its powers). The latter 
group is more interested in pursuing a particular outcome which is in accordance with their 
mandate. For example, environmental groups may be more vigorously opposed to a greenfields 
development than in organisations representing business or labour. 
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Engaging these stakeholders can take various forms. The Framework suggests that this 
should be done through stakeholder forums which are public engagement mechanisms (other 
than ward committees) developed for a particular purpose. The MSA obliges municipalities to 
develop IDP and local project implementation fora. While these fora have been developed with a 
specific purpose in mind, their mandate could be extended beyond this function to deal with 
issues of budget or performance management and thus deal with development in a more 
integrated way. As in the case of ward committees, these fora must be supported with the 
requisite resources - such as the developing and circulating of agenda, documents, records, 
providing training as well as logistical support - and must ensure that participation within these 
fora is effected in the manner contemplated. 
Effectiveness within the Framework recognises that, in order for citizens to exercise a 
real form of participation, there not only needs to be a platform for participation but also that 
these citizens can take advantage of these processes. This requires the supply of resources such 
as administrative support, training and budget. These are components which form part of 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect and which will feed into the development of a public 
participation strategy.433 This strategy will need to be designed, taking into account the kind of 
participatory groups that will form part of the participatory process and the resources that they 
will require in order to participate effectively. In developing this strategy, the facilitator should 
rely on consistent terminology such as 'inform', 'consult' and 'involve' so that a consistent 
approach to participation can be developed and understood by the participants. This strategy 
must also include ongoing monitoring and be adjusted, if necessary, to meet the democratic 
participatory principles. Such strategies may be particularly useful within the scope of 
administrative proceedings. 
3.7Conclusion
This chapter sought to highlight how the substantive principles were undermined during 
apartheid and to consider how these very same principles have been implemented and 
supplemented in the constitutional era. Viewed through this lens, the substantive principles were
not merely inadequately applied during apartheid, they were non-existent. 
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Since then, citizen participation has flourished in accordance with the substantive participatory 
principles identified in Chapter 2 in a variety of situations: voting, in the creation of legislation 
and in local government processes. 
In addition, this form of participation endorses a citizen's sense of 'dignity and 
personhood' (Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity) and therefore IAP's must be included rather 
than excluded unless there is a legitimate government purpose for their exclusion (Principle 5: 
The Principle of Inclusivity). In fact, IAP's must be sought out and identified so that the person 
conducting a public participation process can develop a strategy on how to engage with all IAP's
(Principle 10: Public Participation Strategy) and, where necessary, adapt the selected modes of 
participation (Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility) to ensure that all these IAP's are 
consulted. 
While this may seem onerous on the person conducting the public participation process, it 
is tempered by Principle 6:Finality in Decision-making which allows the person conducting the 
public participation process to terminate the process or decrease the degree of participation 
where he or she is of the view that no value will be gained from further participation and 
Principle 7: The Deference Principle which provides that the person conducting the public 
participation process is not required to defer to the views of the IAP's in all instances; all that he 
or she is required to do is keep an open mind when considering those views. 
The manner in which these principles have been applied and developed in the 
administrative law context is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Participation in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act
4.1 Applying the democratic participatory principles in the administrative law 
context
The opportunity to participate in administrative decisions has dramatically increased since the 
introduction of the Constitution. As mentioned in the previous chapter, natural justice (i.e. the 
opportunity to be heard) only applied to administrative decisions affecting a person's liberty, 
property or legitimate expectation. 434 The consequence of this was that they were prevented 
from participating (and influencing) decisions which clearly affected them. This was contrary to 
Principle 2: The Principle of Control. Since then section 33 of the final Constitution was enacted 
requiring that all administrative action must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.435
'Procedural fairness in the form of audi alteram partem is concerned with giving people an 
opportunity to participate in the decisions that will affect them, and – crucially – a chance of 
influencing the outcome of those decisions. Such participation is a safeguard that not only 
signals respect of the dignity and worth of the participants but is also likely to improve'436
decisions.437
In giving effect to this right, Parliament passed the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act ('PAJA')438 which requires procedural fairness in respect of administrative action affecting 
an individual439 and the public.440 A detailed investigation into these opportunities to participate 
yields further principles that have been incorporated into the CFPP in Chapter 6. 
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4.2 Administrative actions affecting an individual in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act
Where an administrative act ‘materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate 
expectations of any person,’441 the administrator must ensure that the process is procedurally fair. 
A fair process is not prescribed as it is dependent on the circumstances of each case442 but, as a 
minimum, the process must include:
(i) ‘adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action;
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representations;
(iii) a clear statement of the administrative action;
(iv) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and
(v) adequate notice of the right to request reasons.’443
Items (i) and (ii) are critical to the public participation process, while elements (iii) - (v) follow 
when the administrative action has been completed. Adequate notice includes sufficient 
information to ensure that participation is real rather than illusionary,444 details of when and 
where the IAP's can make representations445 and sufficient time in which to prepare and submit 
these representations.446 Identifying who may be affected by a proposed administrative action is 
an important consideration when issuing a notice and determining the mode of participation to 
ensure that IAP's are afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate.447
4.2.1 Identifying and engaging with an interested and affected party
When considering the reasonableness of a notice informing IAP's, the Courts have looked at the 
type of person receiving the notice in determining whether it was fair under the circumstances. 
This requires that the administrator ‘takes some steps to ascertain the identity of the individual to 
be affected by the decisions for purposes of the notice and the opportunity to be heard.’448 Once 
this assessment has been done the administrator will better understand how to notify and engage 
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with those parties. The following cases illustrate how fairness varies, based on the identity of the 
parties:
• In Bushula v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape449 the Court 
reviewed the notification process followed by the Department to inform the recipients of 
disability grants that it was undertaking a process to review the paying of grants. The 
Court held that the printed pamphlets, radio broadcasts and media publications were 
inadequate and that individuals should have received notification with their pay slips and
• In Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba450 the Court found that 
since many of the people that would be affected by an eviction notice were illiterate, 
notification should have been by way of loud hailer announcements. 
Having identified these persons within the notification process, the administrator should be better 
placed to adopt modes of participation that afford IAP's a reasonable opportunity to participate. 
4.2.2 Providing a reasonable opportunity to participate
The reasonableness test developed in the Doctors for Life case in respect of legislative 
participation applies equally in this context. That is, administrators are not only obliged to create 
the platform for parties to participate but also need to take reasonable measures to ensure that 
those parties are able to take advantage of that opportunity. Since administrators make various 
decisions under multiple pieces of legislation, it is unlikely that any two situations will be 
factually identical. Even where situations may be similar, different administrators may 
implement different mechanisms which they believe to be reasonable under the circumstances. 
Factual variance and administrator subjectivity mean that it is impossible to develop a procedure 
that will meet the democratic participatory principles in every circumstance. This 
notwithstanding, ‘[c]ompliance by…government with its procedural fairness obligations is 
crucial, not only for the protection of citizen’s rights, but also to facilitate trust in the public 
administration and in our participatory democracy.’451
Without a set procedure that administrators can rely on and the fact that administrators 
and IAP's may view 'fairness' differently, it may be difficult for an administrator to develop this 
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degree of trust with the participants in the process. One possible remedy is to develop 
terminology such as 'inform', 'consult' and 'involve' in governing legislation and / or the public 
participation strategy. 
As highlighted earlier, developing precedent around terminology has the potential to 
create more certainty around appropriate modes of participation but there is a risk that, like the 
classification of functions doctrine,452 terminology is applied formalistically to the detriment of 
fairness. This concern can be avoided if terminology is used as a starting point in developing a 
mode of participation which is adapted in consultation with the IAP's. To use an overworked 
metaphor, the terminology is the clay that is moulded and shaped (the engagement process) to 
develop a unique sculpture (the mode of participation). The terminology in this process sets a 
baseline level of participation which means that each participatory process does not need to be 
agreed or negotiated from scratch but can be adapted in the interests of fairness. What may 
become apparent through this process is that the baseline level is not appropriate within the 
context and is either not considered fair or will be unacceptable to the IAP's. If this is the case, 
the participatory process can be adjusted or altered at the beginning rather than being criticised at 
the end of the process for not being up to standard. 
Prima facie, such a suggestion would seem to run contrary to the requirement that 
administrators must act expeditiously.453 While this might be the case in the short-term, in the 
long-term discussion and agreement surrounding the process that needs to be followed will foster 
a sense of ownership by the IAP's over the process and the outcome.454 Ownership over the 
process also means that parties are more likely to trust the process and be satisfied with an 
outcome, even if it is contrary to their personal view455 as, through this process, there will be a 
transfer of thoughts, ideas, concerns and information.456 Therefore, although there may be delays 
in the implementation of administrative decisions, it may help avoid appeal and review 
applications down the line. 
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The above represents the Utopian ideal where parties expeditiously agree on the process 
of consultation and (through this agreed process) all the parties are able to express their views, 
exercise a degree of control over the process and generate a decision that is acceptable to 
everyone. Parties may not be able to agree on the nature and extent of the participatory process 
that should be implemented. While this does not bode well for compliance with the democratic 
participatory principles, at least, from the perspective of the IAP's, Principle 6: The Finality in 
Decision-making requires that administrative processes move forward and that the administrator 
in complying with his or her obligation to consult, only needs to have provided a reasonable 
opportunity to participate and to create an environment in which parties can take advantage of 
that opportunity. Therefore, where the parties cannot agree on a suitable process, the 
administrator can select the procedure that will reasonably meet the constitutional principles, 
which is based on the input from the IAP's and which is guided by the base terminology. 
Developing content for the terminology (and the terms 'inform', 'consult' and 'involve') 
can be drawn from the case law (both pre- and post- 1994). The principles developed from these 
cases have not been developed with this terminology in mind but are relevant to creating such 
content as these are approaches that the Courts have held to be fair in certain instances. In these 
instances, a reasonable opportunity to participate: 
• is where the IAP's understand that the purpose of the public engagement is for them to 
make representations.457 While this may seem like an obvious statement, too often 
participants are unaware of the administrative process and the stage(s) in that process. 
They may, for example, believe that a public meeting is being held to inform them of an 
upcoming project, provide them with information and advise them about when they will 
be allowed to submit comments or when a further meeting will be held. The 
administrator, on the other hand, may believe that in consulting with the participants at a 
public meeting, he or she will have complied with his or her legislative mandate. The 
notice informing the IAP's of the public engagement should, therefore, provide some 
guidance as to the purpose of the public engagement (i.e. the stage of the process) and 
whether the participants will be consulted or involved in the process. Neither the PAJA 
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nor the Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures458 compel administrators to make 
this disclosure. Based on what has been mentioned already, it would seem prudent that 
the first meeting with the identified participants would be to develop the public 
participation strategy.
• is where the decision-maker or public participation coordinator discloses information that 
will have an impact on the affected parties and which would result in an adverse decision 
being taken against those parties.459 This obligation is not an absolute duty but depends 
on how the administrator came to know of the adverse information, the materiality of the 
information to the IAP's and the practical implications that such a disclosure requires or 
triggers.460 Without commenting on whether the notice and comment proceedings 
adopted in Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism461 met the democratic participatory principles, the 
Court recognised that in a multi-phased process the participants must be afforded an 
opportunity to view all draft reports as well as the final report submitted to the competent 
authority, particularly where there are significant changes to the initial draft.462 A 
reasonable opportunity must include access to all relevant information throughout the 
process. The public participation strategy can set out the manner in which information 
will be disclosed to the participants. 
• does not imply that such representation must be an oral hearing as section 3(3)(c) of the 
PAJA specifically refers to ‘an opportunity to…appear in person’ and so a reasonable 
opportunity must mean something broader than oral hearings and may include written 
representations.463 However, in recognizing what is appropriate under the circumstances, 
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the Courts have held that it may be inappropriate to require uneducated or illiterate 
people to submit written representations.464 In designing an appropriate public 
participation process, the administrator must look at the categories of participants who
may wish to be involved in the process and design a mode of consultation which caters 
for their needs so as to ensure that the democratic participatory principles are achieved. 
This must be contained in the public participation strategy.
• is where procedural fairness is balanced against the efficiency of the process and the 
capacity of the administrator when designing a suitable mode of participation.465
‘In determining what constitutes procedural fairness in a given case, a Court should be slow to 
impose obligations upon government which will inhibit its ability to make and implement policy 
effectively (a principle well recognised in our common-law and that of other countries). As a 
young democracy facing immense challenges of transformation, we cannot deny the importance 
of the need to ensure the ability of the Executive to act efficiently and promptly.’466
This, however, does not mean that participation can be dispensed with or its value 
diminished under the guise of policy implementation or to develop policies which are 
not linked to a legitimate government purpose. If the administrator too readily dismisses 
suggestions from participants regarding the manner and form of the participatory 
process, those participants are not likely to feel involved in the process, trust the process 
or accept the outcome raising from the process. 
• must take into consideration the objects and purpose of the administrative action in light 
of the empowering legislation.467
The above principles are not only relevant when engaging with individuals but are equally 
applicable when negotiating and agreeing on the modes of participation in respect of projects 
with the general public. However, designing a strategy in consultation may be more difficult to 
achieve when the number of people being consulted is large and / or unidentified. Section 4 of 
the PAJA sets out the appropriate modes of participation where the public at large is concerned. 
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4.3 Administrative action affecting the public in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 
Section 4 of the PAJA requires that the responsible administrator must, in cases where an 
‘administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of the public,’468 ensure 
procedural fairness is achieved by engaging with the public. According to the section, this can be 
achieved by implementing notice and comment proceedings or public inquiries: a 'fair but 
different procedure' provided for in other legislation and another appropriate procedure which 
gives effect to section 3 of the PAJA. 
This section is a novel introduction to South African law as there is no equivalent in the 
common law.469 Audi alteram partem only applied to quasi-judicial decisions which affect an 
individual’s property or liberty. The reason for limiting audi alteram partem was (at least in part) 
because of a fear that public participation would overburden the administration and yield one of 
two results: either, administrators would do nothing more than pay lip service to the consultation 
requirements, rendering the process pointless or slowdown the administrative machine rendering 
it ineffective and inefficient.470 The inclusion of section 4 makes these risks a reality in the 
constitutional era.
Parliament must have been conscious of these risks when drafting the PAJA as the 
obligations of the administrator when engaging the public appear to be significantly less than 
when engaging an individual whose rights are affected by an administrative decision. Unlike 
section 3 of the PAJA which expressly recognises that ‘fair administrative procedures depends 
on the circumstances of each case,’471 section 4 does not contain a similar requirement. Instead it 
states that in ‘cases where an administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights of 
the public,’472 the responsible administrator
‘must decide whether -
(a) to hold a public inquiry in terms of subsection (2);
(b) to follow a notice and comment procedure in terms of subsection (3);
(c) to follow the procedures in both subsections (2) and (3);
                                               
468 PAJA op cit note 438 at s4(1).
469 Save for the very later inclusion of this principle in the South African Roads Board case discussed supra note 
246.
470 Joseph supra note 445 at 67.
471 PAJA op cit note 438 at 3(2)(a).
472 Ibid at s4(1).
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(d) where the administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a procedure which 
is fair but different, to follow that procedure; or
(e) to follow another appropriate procedure which gives effect to section 3.’473
An interpretation of section 4 which allays fears of an overburdened administration is that 
the administrator, in selecting one of the modes of participation cited in paragraphs (a) - (e), will 
(notwithstanding the context) ‘give effect to the right to procedural fairness.’474 This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the decision to select one of these modes of 
participation cannot be reviewed in terms of the PAJA.475 This means that an administrator,
could, for example, conduct a notice and comment procedure in circumstances where the IAP's 
cannot read or write. The inappropriateness of the decision to select this mode of participation 
cannot be reviewed and, provided the notice and comment proceedings are conducted in 
accordance with section 4, the ultimate decision can also not be reviewed on the basis that the 
process was procedurally unfair. 
Arguably such an interpretation is untenable as it is diametrically opposed to the 
democratic participatory principles and would amount to an unjustified limitation of the right to 
just administrative action.476 Although section 4 does not specifically require the administrator to 
take into consideration the circumstances surrounding the administrative action, it is implied in 
order to give effect to the democratic participatory principles. In order for both the administrator 
and IAP's to learn and understand how the proposed decision will impact them, the administrator 
needs to select a mode of participation which facilitates the sharing of information and 
collaboration. 
4.3.1 Identifying and engaging with interested and affected parties
As is evident from Chapter 2, this can be achieved in a variety of ways but in order to know how 
best this can be achieved the administrator needs to understand the community477 or communities 
that may be affected. If the administrator adopts an unsuitable procedure, Principle 1: The 
Educative Effect is unlikely to be achieved as some or all of the parties would be unable to 
                                               
473 Ibid.
474 Ibid.
475 Section 1(b)(ii) excludes the decision or failure to take a decision in terms of section 4(1) of the PAJA from the
definition of administrative action thus making the decision unreviewable.
476 Constitution supra note 13 at s36.
477 Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's.
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communicate their opinions and concerns adequately or at all. As a result, the administrator may 
not consider all the concerns (or may be influenced by those parties which could participate) in 
reaching a decision. In these instances, affected parties may feel:
• that the administrator favours the wealthy and the organized and parties which do not fall 
within this category are unable to influence the outcome of the decision;
• that their concerns are not worthy of attention or are unimportant or
• resentment or distrust of the administrator, the decision or the project and oppose or 
frustrate the process, decision or project on principle or out of a lack of understanding. 
In respect of section 3, this could be overcome by engaging with the IAP's in developing 
the public participation strategy ('PPS'). Given the large number of people who may be affected 
in these circumstances, it would be impractical to engage with the public to agree about these 
rules of engagement. In such circumstances the administrator would need to take the lead in 
developing and publishing the PPS and allowing the public to comment on this proposal. 
Context is critical in selecting a mode of participation as a poor understanding of the 
circumstances in which a decision is taken is unlikely to further the democratic participatory 
principles (Principle 11: The Principle of Context). In this way, adopting a participatory process 
using a social media platform may not be an appropriate substitute for more traditional forms of 
participation (such as public hearings) in certain circumstances but rather should be used in 
conjunction with these traditional forms where appropriate. Consultation via social media alone 
in respect of a decision which affects a largely rural and uneducated population would 
contravene Principle 11: The Principle of Context. Adopting such a mode of participation in 
respect of decisions affecting persons located in an urban area might still prevent IAP's from 
participating (for example, those persons who do not have easy access to technology or are not 
technologically proficient) but it may allow persons who cannot attend public hearings an 
opportunity to participate and express their views. A combined mode of participation may be (in 
these circumstances) the most appropriate. 
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If context is relevant to determining the mode of participation which will best give effect 
to the democratic participatory principles, it begs the question about whether section 4 affords 
the administrator sufficient flexibility to adopt appropriate procedures. To date, there have not 
been any judicial decisions in respect of public inquiries or notice and comment proceedings,
considered in section 4(2). As such, constitutional compliance needs to be assessed, taking into 
consideration the wording of section 4 and the Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures.478
4.3.2 Public inquiries in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
Section 4(2) states that 
‘[i]f an administrator decides to hold a public inquiry -
(a) the administrator must conduct a public inquiry or appoint a suitably qualified person or panel 
of persons to do so; and
(b) the administrator or the person or panel referred to in paragraph (a) must -
(i) determine the procedure for the public inquiry which must-
(aa) include a public hearing;
(bb) comply with the procedures to be followed in connection with public inquiries, 
as prescribed;
(ii) conduct the inquiry in accordance with that procedure;
(iii) compile a written report on the inquiry and give reasons for any administrative action 
taken or recommended; and
(iv) as soon as possible thereafter-
(aa) publish in English and in at least one of the other official languages in the 
Gazette or relevant provincial Gazette a notice containing a concise summary of 
any report and the particulars of the places and times at which the report may be 
inspected and copied; and 
(bb) convey by such other means of communication which the administrator 
considers effective, the information referred to in item (a) to the public 
concerned.’479
The Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures provide some detail to this section. 
Unfortunately, these regulations do not provide any guidance in respect of public inquiry, other 
than the notice advertising it.480 Administrators and lawyers are, therefore, bound by the wording 
of section 4 in developing and implementing the public inquiry. Notably, the task of determining 
the procedure for the public inquiry falls to the administrator. His discretion in determining the 
procedure is only fettered by two restrictions: (1) that the public inquiry must include a public 
hearing and (2) the procedure must comply with any prescribed requirements. To date the 
legislature has not published any such requirements. Once this procedure has been determined, 
the public inquiry must be conducted accordingly.
                                               
478 GNR 1022 GG 23674 of 31 July 2002.
479 PAJA op cit note 438 at s4(2).
480 Regulations on Fair Administrative Procedures op cit note 458 at reg 3.
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There are two potential concerns regarding this section. Firstly, there is no requirement 
for the administrator to engage with the public in developing the procedure. While it is 
acknowledged that the PPS cannot reasonably be negotiated and agreed, given the number of 
potential IAP's, there should still be a degree of interaction between the administrator and the 
public regarding the public engagement procedure, such as by publishing the rules of 
engagement for comment or by inviting key parties or groups to be consulted. As illustrated 
above, this is an important requirement as it enhances trust in the process and the outcome.481
The section does not restrict the administrator from engaging with the public in determining the 
procedure and, since all laws must be interpreted in accordance with the Constitution, it must be 
assumed that the administrator would engage with the IAP's and (in doing so) comply with the 
democratic participatory principles. This requirement could also be included within the 
prescribed procedures contemplated in section 4(2)(b)(i)(bb), as well as the fact that the rules of 
engagement will be published finally. 
Notwithstanding this engagement, the procedure agreed upon by the parties is fettered by 
the fact that it must include a public hearing. The administrator does not appear to be limited to 
only implementing a public hearing.482 The procedure adopted must 'include' a public hearing 
which, at least, allows the administrator some flexibility to include other forms of engagement 
that may be more appropriate within the circumstances but, as a bare minimum, there must be a 
public hearing. 
Insisting on a particular mode of participation has the potential to prevent procedural 
fairness as the public hearing required by PAJA may not be an appropriate mode of participation 
once the administrator has identified the IAP's and determined their specific preferences. In these 
circumstances it seems that the administrator must, if he realises that a public hearing is not the 
most appropriate mode of participation, abandon this process and commence a new process. 
                                               
481 Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate.
482 S4(3) of the PAJA permits the administrator to adopt a public inquiry and notice and comment proceedings.
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Participation in this way is governed by form and not substance in that fairness is 
considered by the mode of participation. The administrator is restricted in moulding the process 
(in consultation with IAP's) that is suitable under the circumstances. This may also be an 
inefficient use of limited resources to insist on a public hearing where it may not be the most 
appropriate mode of participation. Furthermore, it seems nonsensical to provide the administrator 
broad discretionary powers to determine supplementary procedures only to bind him or her to a 
public hearing in circumstances where it may not be appropriate. Rather than binding an 
administrator to a particular mode of participation, it may be better to develop a PPS using the 
terminology 'inform'; 'consult' and 'involve'. 
Once this procedure has been determined, it must be followed and implemented by the 
administrator. Although certainty is important as it engenders trust in the process and the 
outcome, strict adherence to a procedure which turns out to be unfair can be as destructive as 
administrators developing a participatory process on a whim. Administrators need to review the 
process constantly against the democratic participatory principles and satisfaction of the 
participants to determine whether it is necessary to fine-tune the process in favour of ultimate 
fairness. In this way, although the PAJA seeks to facilitate fairness by publishing the public 
inquiry procedure in section 4, it has the potential to generate the opposite effect. 
The deficiencies in the requirements of section 4 become evident when considering 
public inquiries conducted in terms of the Competition Act483 which accords more closely to the 
democratic participatory principles in that it provides for the rules of engagement in market 
inquiries. 
4.3.2.1 Lesson to be learnt from public inquiries in terms of the Competition 
Act
The Competition Act empowers the Competition Commission ('Commission') to conduct 
inquiries into the market for the provision of goods and services without identifying the conduct 
of one firm within the market.484 There is little guidance in the Competition Act concerning how 
the Commission must execute the public inquiry. In fact, it states that the Commission can 
                                               
483 89 of 1998.
484 Ibid at s43A.
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implement an inquiry in 'any manner' depending on the context. All that is required is that the 
Commission publishes a notice advertising the inquiry, setting out the scope, terms of reference 
and timeline485 and inviting IAP's to comment. 
At any time during the inquiry, the scope or time period may be amended by publishing a 
further notice in the Gazette.486 It is assumed that before finalizing this amendment, there will be 
some consultation. The section does not specifically require it but since it refers to 'a further 
notice', it is assumed that the process contemplated in relation to the original notice must apply. 
Once the market inquiry is complete, a report must be prepared, then published in the Gazette
and then forwarded to the Minister with or without recommendations.487 Based on the outcome 
of the report the Commission may:
(a) ‘initiate a complaint and enter into a consent order with any respondent…with or without conducting further 
investigation;
(b) initiate a complaint against any firm for further investigation…;
(c) initiate and refer a complaint directly to the Competition Tribunal without further investigation;
(d) take any other action within its powers in terms of this Act recommended in the report of the market 
inquiry; or
(e) take no further action.’488
Since the inception of the Competition Act, only four market inquiries have been initiated 
by the Commission.489 The process followed in respect of three of these processes is set out 
below as they provide some insight into the form and structure a PPS can take. 
4.3.2.1.1 The banking inquiry
Following an initial investigation into the banking sector by the National Treasury, the 
Commission launched an investigation into the competition laws' impacts arising from the 
findings in the National Treasury’s report ('the NT Report'). The Commission published a notice 
of intention to launch the inquiry and invited all IAP's to respond to the findings in the NT 
Report, submit information voluntarily and to answer questions regarding the industry. The 
                                               
485 Ibid at s43B(1) - (4).
486 Ibid at s43B(1)(5).
487 The recommendations may include (but are not limited to) ‘(a) recommendations for new or amended policy
legislation or regulations; and (b) recommendations to the other regulatory authorities in respect of competition
matters.’
488 Competition Act op cit note 423 at s43C(3).
489 The Banking Inquiry, the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Inquiry, the Retail Inquiry and the Healthcare inquire. The 
reports in respect of these inquiries are available on the Competition Commission website at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/# last accessed on 15 February 2017.
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outcome of the investigation and recommendations would be compiled in a report and submitted 
to the Commissioner.490
In executing the inquiry, a plan was developed setting out the personnel, logistics, 
timelines and financial resources required. ‘Financial constraints dictated that the [I]nquiry had 
to be housed in the current Commission offices, but dedicated office space and separate 
infrastructure were provided for the [i]nquiry personnel.’491 With this infrastructure in place, the 
inquiry was announced in a document titled Composition of the [I]nquiry and Terms of 
Reference.492 The terms of reference and object of the inquiry, as well as the identity of the 
personnel, were included and published in the notice. In terms of the proposed timelines, the 
inquiry published a Programme of Action and Guidelines on submissions in the media and on the 
inquiry’s website. 
‘The Programme of Action informed stakeholders and the South African public in 
general how the [i]nquiry process would unfold. The Programme set out the main activities that 
the [i]nquiry was likely to be engaged in during the various stages.’493 These stages (as amended) 
were:
(a) ‘stage one: August to October 2006
Submissions, analysis and research
(b) stage two: November 2006
First public hearings
(c) stage three: December 2006 to March 2007
Further analysis, engagement and research
(d) stage four: April 2007 to July 2007
Second public hearings
(e) stage five: August 2007
Analysis and writing report.’494
During stage one, the Commission identified and contacted stakeholders. Those that might be 
affected by the banking system included banks, card associations, regulatory bodies (either 
legislative or voluntary), organizations representing consumers, retailers and other stakeholders 
                                               
490 Competition Commission ‘Banking Inquiry Report Chapter 1’ available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/1-Enquiry-Process_non-confidential1.pdf accessed on 13 March 2016 at page 7.
491 Ibid at 9.
492 Ibid.
493 Ibid at 11.
494 Ibid.
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that did not fall within the other categories. Having identified these entities, introductory letters 
were sent to these parties. In these letters 
‘the Panel welcomed the opportunity of an initial meeting with them and encouraged organisations to 
contact the [i]nquiry Manager if they were desirous of such a meeting…The introductory letters also 
explained that the main purpose of such meetings was to afford the Panel members the opportunity to 
introduce themselves and to explain the ambit of the [i]nquiry and the relevant information that the 
[i]nquiry sought from the stakeholders.’495
Meetings were held with those stakeholders that requested them and with those that the 
Panel believed would provide critical information to the inquiry. These meetings were attended 
by the Panel, the Technical Team and representatives of the stakeholders. ‘As success of the 
[i]nquiry was largely dependent on the voluntary participation of the banks, the main aim of 
these initial introductory meetings was to gain the co-operation and confidence of the banks and 
to address any concerns or perceptions that may have existed after the announcement of the 
[i]nquiry.’496 This is congruent with Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate. 
During these meetings, the background of the inquiry was explained, the terms of 
reference and the Programme of Action discussed.497 ‘To facilitate the interaction and exchange 
of views, the [i]nquiry invited consumer and civil society organisations to a briefing workshop 
which dealt with how the work of the [i]nquiry impacted on such organisations and their 
members.’498 This facilitated Principle 1: The Educative Effect. It also provided for more than 
merely a public hearing (as required by PAJA) as the Commission adopted Principle 13: The 
Principle of Multiplicity by employing modes of participation such as workshops to ensure that 
the participatory democratic principles were achieved. 
In addition to the letters and the meetings, the Panel released guidelines detailing the 
manner and form of parties’ submissions. That is, it ‘provided directives on length, language, 
claims of confidentiality, number of copies and deadlines.’499 Much of the information received 
by the inquiry was made under a claim of confidentiality and, therefore, could not be made 
available to the general public. Some of these entities provided non-confidential versions of their 
                                               
495 Ibid at 15.
496 Ibid at 16.
497 Principle 10: Public Participation Strategy.
498 Banking Inquiry Report op cit note 490 at 17.
499 Ibid at 15.
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submissions which could easily be made available to other participants. Having considered all of 
the submissions, the Technical Team asked participants to clarify and amplify their submissions 
before certain entities were invited to take part in the first round of public hearings.500 Only those 
parties invited to attend the public hearings were able to make oral submissions. 
The Report notes that 
‘[i]n an attempt to increase public awareness and greater participation by stakeholders in the process, the 
[i]nquiry held these first set of public meetings in several cities and as far as was reasonably possible, the 
[i]nquiry attempted to arrange venues that were most convenient to stakeholders wishing to make 
presentations. The [i]nquiry also reserved the right to expand the hearings to other cities if the number of
submissions received justified such a decision.’501
This approach recognised the nature of the participants who may wish to be involved and 
recognised that the approach needs to be flexible to ensure that all persons who reasonably 
wished to participate could do so.
The public hearings were conducted in accordance with a further set of guidelines 
published by the Panel. Those parties called upon to make oral submissions needed to do so in 
accordance with the guidelines which required that the party making the submissions ‘provide 
the panel with an introduction to the organization itself and then enlighten the Panel on how they 
had dealt with or were dealing with the issues that are the subject matter of the [i]nquiry. These 
presentations were to be one hour of duration with parties being expected to summarize and 
highlight the main thrust of their submissions.’502 The public hearings would be conducted in an 
inquisitorial manner by the Panel. However, the Panel acknowledged that it had not (by the time 
of the hearings) read all of the submissions in detail and so the hearings were merely ‘intended to 
clarify and test at a general level the significance and reliability of the presentations made.’503
Based on this information and the outcomes of the public hearings, the Panel analysed the 
submissions in detail which involved technical meetings with the banks, card associations and 
other identified stakeholders. The Technical Team also issued a questionnaire in which they 
requested additional information or clarification. Upon receipt of this information, a second 
                                               
500 Ibid at 19.
501 Ibid at 20.
502 Ibid at 20 - 21.
503 Ibid at 21.
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round of public hearings was held to consider specific issues identified by the Panel. Unlike the 
first round of hearings, the second round was initiated by the Technical Team providing an 
overview of the areas of concern coming out of the process to date, making reference to the 
legislative provisions, submissions and academic opinion.504 The Panel invited specific parties to 
make representations in respect of these questions and (where necessary) these were permitted to 
make supplementary written submissions. 
Following the second set of public hearings, the Panel and the Technical Team developed 
recommendations aimed at addressing the competition concerns identified during the public 
inquiry. The Panel required the Technical Team to arrange further meetings with various 
stakeholders to 
‘explore the feasibility and practical implications of certain possible recommendations and / or changes 
which were mooted in public hearings and which could come to form part of the eventual recommendation 
of the Panel…Participation in the process did not commit any participant to support or endorse any 
particular change or measure which was mooted for exploration, nor was the process or its topics taken to 
imply definite findings or recommendations by the [i]nquiry Panel. It was emphasized that nothing said at 
those meetings would be considered as being on the record of the [i]nquiry, unless specifically advanced 
and recorded as an on-the-record statement at the instance of, or by the agreement with, the participant 
concerned.’505
These engagements with stakeholders constituted the final stages of the participatory process. 
Based on these outcomes, the Panel (in conjunction with the Technical Team) prepared the final 
report that was published and submitted to the Minister. 
The banking inquiry highlights the importance of understanding the IAP's that may be 
affected by a process and to engage with those parties directly. However, this engagement should 
be done in terms of a pre-determined process so that the participants are aware from the start of 
their opportunities to participate. They should know that their submissions may be limited to 
written submissions and that they may not be afforded an oral hearing. Where there is face-to-
face interaction with parties, this should be an inquisitive interaction that works both ways. This 
can only happen if the parties are informed about the substance of the inquiry which is largely 
assisted by the Commission publishing direct questions or themes on which they require input 
from the IAP's. This does not mean that the IAP's are prohibited from raising issues outside of 
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what the Commission believes to be important but it does indicate to the IAP's what the 
commission believe to be an issue. This approach was carried into the Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
Inquiry. 
4.3.2.1.2 The liquefied petroleum gas inquiry ('LPG')
In September 2014 the Commission initiated a market inquiry into the LPG market. The reason 
for the inquiry is that the Commission believed that activities within the sector may prevent or 
distort competition and that the inquiry may result in measures that would promote competition. 
In accordance with the Competition Act, the Commission published the Terms of Reference 
subject to the proviso that it could be amended in due course should circumstances require it. As 
in the case of the other market inquiries, the Terms of Reference described the market inquiry 
process as an information gathering exercise which would be achieved by sending questionnaires 
or undertaking surveys with identified parties or the public, information requests, calls for 
submissions on specific issues and meetings with identified parties.506 The outcome of the 
investigation would be reported. 
To facilitate participation, the Commission developed guidelines which would become 
effective at the start of the inquiry. Therefore, rather than having a generic set of guidelines 
applicable to all market inquiries, the Commission elected to develop guidelines for each inquiry.  
This is noteworthy as it creates the impression that the Commission is thinking about developing 
a participatory process that is appropriate for the context, based on the market and the 
participants. That being said, the market inquiry process adopted in general terms in the Terms of 
Reference does not (at face value) appear to be any different from the process that has been 
adopted in any of the other inquiries. This may be based on the fact that the Commission does 
not have an over-arching public participation guideline document to use as a reference when 
designing guidelines for the individual market inquiries. 
Failing to have such guidelines means that the Commission is not testing the participatory 
standard it is adopting against an independent constitutionally acceptable standard but is rather 
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drawing on past practices. While precedent is a useful tool, it should not be blindly replicated as 
the important question of whether the democratic participatory principles are being achieved is 
not being asked at the outset. The LPG Market Inquiry Guideline for Stakeholder Participation 
goes on to state that ‘[t]he guidelines may, however, be reviewed from time to time to reflect any 
best practice that may develop. Any amendments to the guidelines will be notified to the public, 
and the latest version will always be appearing on the Commission’s website.’507 This means that 
the participatory process must be scrutinised to confirm that participation is being effective508
and will be amended if needs be. By not having an over-arching participatory approach which is 
adopted and implemented to determine its effectiveness or fairness, it is unclear how it can be 
determined that the public participation process is effective. 
The procedure adopted in the LPG inquiry during the information-gathering phase is to 
allow parties to submit written comments or avail themselves for a meeting. The Guideline 
document did not impose many formalities regarding the written submissions. Submissions could 
be handwritten or typed and could be in any of the official languages. In this way, parties were 
not required to make representations in a language in which they were not comfortable.509
Similarly, although the meetings would be conducted in English, interpreters would be present to 
assist with translation. Interestingly, however, the Guidelines state that the 
‘Commission may hold meetings with key stakeholders…[and] may exercise its discretion to determine 
which participants these meetings will be held with…[However, p]articipants seeking to have meetings 
with the Commission must provide written submissions first in order to provide information to the 
Commission on the issues to be addressed during the meeting.’510
This process immediately excludes participants which cannot read or write from participating. 
Based on the nature of the investigation, the Commission believed it to be unlikely that 
participants who cannot read and write would be interested in the investigation and, therefore,
they were not specifically catered for. While this may be a true statement, provision should be 
available for such persons to participate should they wish to. 
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On 16 September 2014, the Commission issued a call for submissions.511 This 
notification called upon IAP's to submit comments on the issues set out in the Terms of 
Reference, as well as any other issues that may be relevant to the investigation into the state of 
competition in the LPG market. In respect of these issues
‘the Commission is providing a list of questions that may guide the submissions by stakeholders…These 
questions are not intended to limit the extent of the submissions by stakeholders but rather to guide 
stakeholders in thinking about issues to be covered by the market inquiry.’512
Providing questions such as this as a guideline is an example of the manner in which to narrow 
the divide between regulators and participants and achieve Principle 1: The Educative Effect:
• It highlights matters which the regulator believes to be important and directs participants 
to where they should focus their limited resources.
• It helps IAP's to identify key issues which are not currently on the regulator’s radar and 
bring them to their attention.
• It assists IAP's in developing submissions which are useful and informative to the 
regulator in making recommendations appropriate to the market and the participants 
which, in turn, may lead to more acceptable outcomes for the participants in the market. 
After considering the submissions received, the Commission published a Request for 
Further Submissions on a focused set of issues. In respect of each of these issues, the 
Commission provided context in support of the issues, highlighted the potential competition 
concerns and called upon the participants not only to provide evidence but also to suggest 
potential solutions. 
Although this market inquiry is still underway and no final conclusions have yet been 
published, this approach seems to be more closely aligned with the democratic participatory 
principles in that it promotes Principle 1: The Educative Effect and Principle 5: The Principle of 
Inclusivity in developing an outcome that is acceptable to the participants (or, at least, if it is not 
acceptable to the participants, it is accepted as being legitimate).
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4.3.2.1.3 The healthcare inquiry
In November 2013 the Commission published a notice expressing its intention to conduct a 
market inquiry into the private healthcare market. The Terms of Reference were published along 
with the notice setting out the regulatory and factual aspects of the healthcare market and the 
scope of the inquiry into that ‘portion of healthcare services that are funded by private patients 
themselves, either through medical scheme, insurance or through out-of-pocket payments.’513
4.3.2.1.3.1 The public participation strategy 
The Terms of Reference were supplemented by the Draft Statement of Issues and Guidelines for 
Participation in the Market Inquiry into the Private Healthcare Sector ('the Guidelines for 
Participation'). The Statement of Issues ('SOI') set out the framework for conducting the market 
inquiry which included the general themes that the Panel intended to investigate and a number of 
potential 'theories of harm' to competition. After comments were received from various 
stakeholders, the final SOI was published on 1 August 2014. This statement included a call for 
submissions by stakeholders in which the Competition Commission cautioned that:
‘Participants are requested to make their full submissions at the outset. It should not be assumed that those 
who withhold information and argument at the outset will be afforded an opportunity to provide it later, as 
and when they choose.
Submissions should be as detailed as possible and any views or opinions expressed should be substantiated 
as far as possible. It would be most helpful to the Panel to receive submissions that provide verifiable facts 
to support specific arguments.’514
The call for submissions goes on to state that the submissions:
• must be accompanied by the prescribed form;
• must be compiled in accordance with the Commission's Guidelines for Participation;
• must include the applicant’s details (i.e. their role in the sector, their geographic location, 
the areas where the product is sold, a narrative of the their observations of the market 
etc);
• should be supported by international comparisons and
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• to the extent that they include information of a technical nature, must comply with the 
Guideline for Submissions of Technical Data and Analysis.
The Guidelines for Participation have been created specifically for this public inquiry and 
cannot be relied upon for other inquiries. This is a noteworthy comment in that it means that the 
Commission is implementing Principle 11: The Principle of Context in that it has designed a 
participatory process that it believes to be the most appropriate for this inquiry. In this way, the 
Guidelines for Participation go on to state that information will be gathered through research 
studies, direct consultations (including focus groups, interviews and meetings), public 
consultations in the form of workshops and seminars, data reviews, questionnaires and surveys to 
specific stakeholders, site visits and a formal public hearing.515 Using these mechanisms, the 
Guidelines for Participation go on to set out the various phases of the public engagement 
(information gathering, analysis of information received, further submissions and public hearing 
and the writing of the final report) and the proposed timeline when each of these phases will 
occur and be completed.516
The Guidelines for Participation prescribe who may participate in the inquiry and the 
methods of participation (i.e. written submissions and public inquiries). In respect of written 
submissions, the Guidelines for Participation set out the requirements mentioned above in the 
call for submissions. It also indicates where the written submissions must be sent and / or hand 
delivered, as well as the form that the submissions must take.517 The Commission also 
undertakes to acknowledge receipt of all submissions that are received. In this way, parties 
should follow up with the Commission if they have not received this confirmation.518
These are all important elements in developing a PPS519 in that the stakeholders all have a 
clear understanding of what is expected of them in respect of their written submissions. The 
Guidelines for Participation were also published in draft form and the participants were afforded 
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516 Ibid at 5 - 6.
517 Ibid 7 - 9.
518 Ibid at 9.
519 Principle 10: Public Participation Strategy.
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an opportunity to submit comments to the Commission. The final Guidelines for Participation 
were published based on the comments received. 
4.3.2.1.3.2 Implementing a public participation strategy and the principle of 
reasonableness
The democratic participatory principles are evident in the description of the section dealing with 
public hearings. This section acknowledges that the ‘chairperson may allow some flexibility in 
the [public hearings] process in order to achieve the desired purpose and to avoid infringements 
of the right of any participant in the hearing, and to ensure that the hearings are conducted 
expeditiously and in accordance with the rules of natural justice.’520
Although it is anticipated that the hearings will be conducted in Pretoria, the Guidelines 
for Participation recognise that where the Panel thinks it ‘appropriate in order to ensure access to 
the hearings, such as where the participants and witnesses are in remote areas, or where it would 
be conducive to saving costs, the Panel may decide to hold hearings at other venues across the 
country.’521 The Panel recognises that the identity and circumstances of stakeholders is relevant 
to the inquiry522 and that participation should be inclusive rather than exclusive.523 Hearings were 
held in Pretoria and Cape Town to cater for IAP's. It is noted that the cost of conducting public 
hearings was highlighted as a relevant factor in the Guidelines for Participation. However, cost 
was not a limiting factor in this instance but was used rather as a means to ensure that resources 
were used efficiently. Facts such as cost and practicality are relevant to the public participation 
process (Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness). Although this is a principle that is 
relevant to the public participation process, it is one that must be exercised with caution as 
factors such as cost cannot justify an unfair public participation process. 
Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness recognises that not all parties will be 
afforded an opportunity of an oral hearing. The Guidelines for Participation indicate that the 
Panel will exercise its discretion in awarding persons an opportunity to be heard orally. ‘One of 
the factors that will be taken into consideration in the exercise of this discretion is the extent to 
                                               
520 Call for Submissions op cit note 514 at 9 - 10.
521 Ibid at 10.
522 Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's.
523 Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity.
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which an oral presentation will help to clarify or resolve any issues raised in the written 
submissions.’524 Prior to the public hearing, the Panel may elect to conduct a pre-hearing with 
participants. The purpose of this pre-hearing is to:
(a) ‘establish procedures for protecting confidential information, including the terms under which participants 
may have access to that information;
(b) establish who will represent the participants at the hearing and the language in which each witness will 
testify;
(c) determine the procedure to be followed at the hearing, and its expected duration;
(d) establish a date, time and schedule for the hearing;
(e) give directions in respect of technical or formal amendments to correct errors in any documents filed by 
participants;
(f) identify issues in dispute and those that are common cause as between particular participants;
(g) clarify and simplify the issues;
(h) obtain admissions or confirmation of particular facts, document or issues by particular participants;
(i) determine when documents will be produced or delivered, where formally or informally, if applicable; and
(j) otherwise assist in expediting the inquiry proceedings.’525
Pre-hearings allow for the parties to isolate the issues in dispute which is important for 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect in the sense that the parties will each understand the issue of 
concern held by the other party. It also enhances the stakeholders' feeling that they are being 
heard and that they will be able to influence the outcome of the process.526 Being heard allows 
parties to make their submissions in their own language and meeting with stakeholders enhances 
the participants’ dignity in that they feel that they are being heard.527
4.3.2.1.3.3 Implementing a public participation strategy and the principle of 
flexibility
As the process progressed and submissions were received from the IAP's, a further revised SOI 
and participation guidelines was published. This highlights that Principle 9: The Principle of 
Flexibility has been implemented by the Commission. 
Oral submissions and presentations could be made in Pretoria and Cape Town in four 
public hearings. These hearings ran from February to March 2016. Nothing has been written 
regarding the success or failure of any aspect of the public inquiry: this is probably a result of the 
fact that the inquiry has not yet been completed. 
                                               
524 Call for Submissions op cit note 514 at 10.
525 Ibid at 15.
526 Principle 2: The Principle of Control and Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate.
527 Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity.
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What can be ascertained from the record of proceedings, however, is that the Panel 
adopted an inquisitorial approach in the proceedings. Those parties which made presentations 
were quizzed on matters arising from their presentations, as well as on their role and conduct in 
the sector. The hearings do not appear to have been supported by other modes of participation. 
That is, other than information requests, the Panel does not appear to have hosted workshops or 
distributed surveys in order to solicit information form the participants on particular issues. This 
notwithstanding, there does not appear to be (at least, at this preliminary stage of the inquiry) 
action which pays homage to Principle 1: The Educative Effect. Issues were identified in the 
Terms of Reference and these were refined during the public inquiry to the extent that they dealt 
with the aspects of the inquiry that were specific to those participants. 
In this way, the participants may feel that they exercise a degree of control in the 
outcome of the inquiry. Whether or not this is a true statement is too early to tell as the inquiry is 
not yet complete and will require an investigation into the views of the participants upon 
completion. 
4.3.2.1.3.4 Defects in the existing modes of participation in the healthcare 
sector and future obligations to improve participation
It is not possible from the record to determine whether all of the democratic participatory 
principles have been fulfilled as it does not contain any empirical evidence in this regard. The 
conclusions suggested above are advanced by reading between the lines of the record of the 
public hearings. The oral submissions made at the inquiry were not limited to the elements of 
competition regulation but was also a fact finding mission in which the Panel sought to 
understand the healthcare market. In doing this, submissions were made by the various 
stakeholders in the sector including government, the private sector and individuals. 
Two particular submissions need to be mentioned: that of Kwanale Asante Shongwe 
('Shongwe'), a lawyer and healthcare activist, and Mr Streak ('Streak') representing Discovery 
Health Medical Scheme. The reason for identifying these two submissions is that they highlight 
the public participation difficulties existing in the healthcare sector in South Africa. The 
problems expressed by these parties (particularly Shongwe) are a result of the failure to give 
effect to the democratic participatory principles expressed in this Chapter. 
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It is apparent from Shongwe’s submissions that (in her view) patients are the subject of 
medical treatment and not a party to medical treatment. This distinction lies in Principle 1: The 
Educative Effect. Patients subject to medical treatment have a limited role in deciding on their 
treatment. With reference to Arnstein’s ladder of participation, the patient’s participation is one 
of manipulation or therapy in which the power holders (in this case the medical practitioners) 
'educate' or 'cure' the patients. Their involvement in the process is merely by virtue of the fact 
that their health is compromised to the point where medical intervention is required. A more 
active participation by the patient in treatment options is not only more educative for the patient 
in that they can understand the consequences of the various options that they may receive but it 
will also inform the medical practitioner in developing a treatment plan. 
Similarly when engaging with medical aid schemes, Shongwe mentioned the difficulties 
that she experienced when interacting with Discovery. In particular, she was unaware of any 
platform where she could express concerns which were unrelated to claims.528 The only forum 
that she was aware of was the annual general meeting ('AGM') but she assumed that these 
meetings dealt with the financial aspects of the medical aid scheme and (as she does not fully 
understand the financial aspects of the fund) she did not attend. This perception was created by 
the fact that the agenda that was circulated to the members prior to the AGM did not specifically 
provide for an opportunity for members to raise concerns. Streak indicates that this opportunity 
was permitted under the item described as 'General' on the agenda. Justice Ngcobo, the presiding 
officer on the Panel, requested that Discovery amend this prior to the next annual general 
meeting. 
This amendment is noteworthy in that the current notice informing parties was deficient 
in that it failed to indicate the purpose of the meeting. Shongwe indicated that had she known 
that she could raise concerns at this meeting, she would have attended.529 The amendment to the 
notice is also noteworthy as it obliges private entities to comply with the democratic 
participatory principles when engaging with their stakeholders. In fulfilling this obligation,
                                               
528 Call for Submissions op cit note 514 at 33.
529 Ibid at 38.
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Discovery is not only required to provide a reasonable opportunity to participate (i.e. advertise 
the AGM) but must also take steps to ensure that members are able to take advantage of that 
opportunity. By providing an opportunity for members to raise concerns at the AGM Discovery
may satisfy this obligation. 
Discovery will need to investigate whether providing this platform is sufficient to engage 
with members. Members may not be able to attend meetings due to family commitments or 
travel arrangements or may feel uncomfortable standing up at a meeting to raise their concerns. 
In this way, other modes of participation may be required such as online mechanisms by which 
complaints could be submitted. What became clear from Shongwe’s presentation was that 
Discovery did not provide a platform for general feedback in which members could voice their 
concerns around patient satisfaction and patient services530 and where Discovery did request 
feedback, they did so by sending ‘a survey that says we are interested to hear what our members 
feel about ourselves, please take 15 minutes to complete this survey. Surveys are cold. Surveys 
are designed by somebody else there who is anticipating what the needs would be.’531 Surveys 
have a pre-determined list of options or outcomes and do not generally allow for the free 
submission of information. Based on the submissions made by Shongwe, the form of 
participation that she expects is more closely aligned with 'involvement' and not 'consultation' as 
described in the Framework discussed in the Local Government section above.532 Shongwe, 
however, admitted that a balancing act must be struck between competing stakeholder interests 
but she was unable to provide an answer to ‘what kind of process should we collectively be 
thinking about to make those kinds of decisions.’533
When it comes to the participation of members within the medical aid scheme, Discovery 
acknowledged that member participation is limited. Although the members of the scheme are 
considered to be the owners of the scheme, given the number of stakeholders and the regulatory 
environment, it would not be possible for the members to exercise 'citizen control' as 
                                               
530 Ibid at 35.
531 Ibid at 38.
532 Section 3.6 Participating in local government above.
533 Competition Commission 'Market Inquiry into the Private Healthcare Sector Hearing 3 / Day 3' available at
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Health-Inquirt-3-March-Final-Transcript.pdf at 29 last
accessed on 8 December 2016.
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contemplated by Arnstein. For the sake of practicality (and given the number of complex issues 
which need to be considered), Discovery indicated that the Board of the medical aid scheme was 
operationally responsible for administering the scheme in the best interests of its membership.534
The board’s responsibilities include developing the rules of the medical aid scheme. The 
members (despite being 'owners' of the scheme) do not have an opportunity to approve these 
rules. The rules are merely communicated to them in benefit brochures and via brokers that 
contract with Discovery. So, despite being owners of the scheme, the members have little control 
over the development of the rules that govern them. This does not accord with Principle 2: The 
Principle of Control. Aside from the AGM and the selection of board members, there is no other 
mechanism by which the members can express their dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the one-way 
communication of policies and rules does not allow for the education of both the board members 
and the members. It would be advisable that the board members, by virtue of their fiduciary duty,
engage more actively with the members to ensure that the members’ interests are, in fact,
preserved. 
In response to this, Discovery indicated that the purpose of the AGM is to provide a 
forum in which members can raise these issues. The Panel, however, indicated that merely 
providing for an AGM is not enough. What the Panel wanted to know was ‘where is the ordinary 
member’s voice?’535 Merely providing the platform for discussion is not enough for compliance 
with the democratic participatory principles. Similarly, supplying parties with information may 
also not be good enough. 
The Panel indicates that there must be a way in which the participants are able to engage 
with this information.  Given the number of members of the medical aid scheme, it would not be 
practical to have a pre-AGM meeting similar to those held by the Commission in this public 
inquiry. In these circumstances it may be more appropriate to publish a statement of issues prior 
to the AGM highlighting issues which Discovery believes to be of concern. 
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This SOI could be informed by complaints or concerns received by Discovery via a 
complaints mechanism available to members during the course of the year. The SOI could also 
include proposed solutions to these complaints or concerns which could be debated or discussed 
at the AGM. This approach caters for the participatory democratic principles by (1) allowing 
participants to feel that they have some control over the medical scheme of which they 
apparently are the 'owners'536 and that they may feel as if their concerns are being addressed and 
may be more trusting of the process,537 (2) engaging with the members and respecting their 
dignity,538 (3) being more inclusive than exclusive.539
Discussion of the issues at the AGM does not mean that the Board of Discovery is 
obliged to follow the recommendations given by the members but they must keep an open mind 
and by publishing the SOI, Discovery would have developed a strategy on how to deal with 
public participation.540 Adopting this approach may be most practical under the circumstances541
but Discovery would need to remain open to altering this process (or having additional 
processes)542 where the context requires or based on the identity and circumstances of the 
IAP's.543
The above examples illustrate that the democratic participatory principles may arise as a 
result of the public inquiries but this is also not guaranteed. Merely implementing notice and 
comment proceedings does not guarantee compliance with the democratic participatory 
principles.
4.3.3 Notice and Comment Proceedings in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act
Section 4(3) of the PAJA states that 
‘[i]f an administrator decides to follow a notice and comment procedure, the administrator must-
(a) take appropriate steps to communicate the administrative action to those likely to be materially 
and adversely affected by it and call for comments from them;
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541 Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness.
542 Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility.
543 Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's.
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(b) consider any comments received;
(c) decide whether or not to take the administrative action, with or without changes; and
(d) comply with the procedures to be followed in connection with notice and comment procedures 
as prescribed’.544
As in the case of public inquiries, the Regulations are silent on the manner and form that a notice 
and comment procedure must take. As for the notice advertising the proceedings, the notice must 
include information concerning the proposed administrative action or specify where additional 
information is available or can be reviewed.545 It must also indicate by when and where persons 
can submit comments. It is evident from the wording of the Regulations that these comments 
must be in writing and cannot be made orally. However, section 4(3) of the PAJA permits the 
administrator to adopt notice and comment proceedings in conjunction with public inquiries 
mentioned above.  In this way, comments could be submitted orally (or in another manner) 
where the interests of justice so require, subject to the concerns raised above. In addition, if the 
‘proposed administrative action may materially and adversely affect the rights of members of a 
specific community consisting of a significant proportion of people who cannot read or write or 
who otherwise need special assistance…the administrator must take special steps to solicit the 
views of the members of the community.’546 These measures include:
(a) ‘the holding of public or group meetings where the proposed action is explained, questions are answered 
and views from the audience minuted;
(b) a survey of public opinion in the community on the proposed action; or
(c) provision of secretarial facility in the community where members of the community can state their views on 
the proposed action.’547
In this way, it is suggested that the notice advertising the notice and comment proceedings 
follows the structure similar to the Terms of Reference, SOI and Guidelines regarding public 
inquiries expressed above. The following example, however, highlights the fact that there is an 
inconsistent approach to participation. 
                                               
544 PAJA op cit note 438 at s4(1) - 4(3).
545 Regulations on Fair Administrative Process op cit note 458 at reg18(3).
546 Ibid at reg20(1).
547 Ibid at reg20(2).
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4.3.3.1 Judicial pronouncement on notice and comment proceedings: S v
Smit548
In this case, Smit refused on several occasion when passing through the Nkomazi Toll Plaza to 
pay the prescribed toll fee. His refusal to pay the toll centred on inter alia the validity of the N4 
toll road (on which the Nkomazi Toll Plaza was situated) declaration. In his defence, he argued 
that he was not liable as Trans African Concessions Limited (the concessionaire appointed by 
SANRAL to administer tolling on the N4) was charging tolls unlawfully as tolls could only be 
charged on roads declared toll roads. 
The State alleged that the N4 Toll Road was not declared a toll road under the South 
African National Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act549 but, in terms of section 9 of 
its predecessor, the National Roads Act.550 In terms of this section, the National Roads Board 
('the Board') (not SANRAL) can only declare a toll road once:
(a) ‘…
(b) The Board has consulted with the Premier in question and with any local authority affected by the 
declaration of the proposed toll road; and
(c) The Board has invited, in the manner prescribed by regulation, interested parties to make written 
representations to it, which may include representations on the position of the toll gate, and has considered 
such representations, if any;
(d) The Board has in consultation with any local authority and its invitations contemplated in paragraph (c) 
given an indication of the approximate position of the proposed toll gate.’551
The consultation process with the Premier and the local authority had not been prescribed 
by regulation. 
‘In contrast thereto the process of invitations to [IAP's] to make representations to the Board as prescribed 
by Regulation 2263 published in Government Gazette No 15190 of 30 December 1994. It is an important 
difference: The invitation to [IAP's] must be published in the government gazette as well as two 
newspapers; the representations of the [IAP's] must be submitted within 30 days from the date of the 
notice as published. On the other hand no time limit is placed on the consultation process nor is the 
manner and form of consultation prescribed.552
Smit disputed that the Board complied with its obligations to consult with the local 
authorities in declaring the N4 a toll road. The dispute turned on the meaning of the word 
'consult' as used in section 9(b). Mojapelo J considered the various dictionary definitions of 
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'consult' and 'consultation', as well as the manner in which it has been interpreted in both English 
and South African case law.
Drawing on these cases, the Court adopted an approach congruent with Principle 1: The 
Educative Effect by holding that consultation is not a unidirectional process in which one party 
merely informs or educates another on the outcome of a process or a pending decision. 
Consultation requires ‘a communication of ideas on a reciprocal basis…The procedure 
must…allow reasonable opportunity to both sides…to communicate effectively and achieve a 
purpose.’553 That is, there must be ‘a genuine and effective engagement of minds between the 
consulting and consulted parties. A mere formalistic attempt to consult does not constitute 
consultation.’554
4.3.3.1.1 Building on the Doctors for Life case's reasonable opportunity to 
participate
In the cases discussed in Chapter 3.5 Participation in creating legislation the Court was tasked 
with considering whether the legislature had fulfilled its obligation to facilitate public
involvement. In doing so, it adopted a reasonableness test which considered whether the 
legislature provided a reasonable opportunity to persons to participate and whether the 
participants could meaningfully take advantage of that opportunity. None of the cases 
reviewed555 obliged the Court to consider whether the participants were able to take advantage of 
the opportunity to participate by considering whether the process actually complied with the 
democratic participatory principles. The Court in this case, however, was required to look at the 
actual level of engagement between the Board and the local authorities. 
An assessment of whether the parties actually consulted with one another and whether the 
democratic participatory principles were achieved is a factual enquiry. That is, in identifying the 
process to be conducted or which has been conducted, the administrator or the Court (as the case 
may be) must consider whether the process allows for consultation in the manner required by the 
democratic participatory principles. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is best achieved through 
collaborative learning mechanisms. The second question is whether the consulted parties were 
afforded an opportunity to influence the outcome of the decisions or be involved in the decision-
making process which developed a sense of control over the outcome of the process. And, even 
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where the consulted parties’ position was not adopted, did they trust the legitimacy of the process 
enough to grant the proposed decision (in this case to declare a toll road) the social licence to 
operate. That is, do the participants express dissatisfaction with the decision through litigious 
proceedings, protest action, vandalism or other conduct?
4.3.3.1.1.1 The meaning of 'consult' versus the meaning of 'invite'
Having considered the evidence before it, the Court held that the Middleburg Transitional Local 
Council ('MTLC') and the Marloth Park Municipality ('Marloth') had not been consulted. In 
respect of Marloth, although the Board had sent notice of the proposed declaration of the N4, it 
had sent it to the wrong address. As a result, Marloth was not aware of the proposed declaration 
and did not submit comments or engage with the Board on this point. As the empowering 
legislation specifically required that SANRAL 'consult' with local municipalities, the Court 
found that notification of the proposed declaration only without further conduct did not amount 
to consultation. More was required. That is, even if the notification had been sent to the correct 
address and Marloth had not responded, the Board could not merely rely on Marloth’s silence as 
consent. 
The same did not apply in respect of IAP's as the Act only obliged SANRAL to 'invite'
these parties to participate. If parties are notified of a decision and elect not to participate, they 
cannot be forced to do so. This is reasonably practical and reflects Pateman’s interpretation of 
participatory democracy. However, in the writer’s view, if IAP's elect to participate in the 
process, the duty to consult (i.e. the participatory democratic principles) apply to these persons 
albeit in terms of the common law, Constitution and democratic participatory principles and not 
the empowering legislation. 
4.3.3.1.1.2 Where the legislation does not specify whether the IAP's must be 
invited or consulted
This raises the question of what happens in situations where the empowering legislation does not 
draw a distinction between categories of IAP's affected by a decision. For example, if we assume 
that empowering legislation requires an authority to conduct a public participation process in 
order to build a substation in an urban area but does not differentiate between the various parties 
that may be affected by such a decision, by the nature of the activity, it is evident that some 
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parties may be more affected than others. The adjacent property owners would suffer a greater 
visual impact than those parties that live one block away. In such instances, it is unclear whether 
the authority (in this example) would be obliged in terms of the common law to identify those 
parties that are 'more affected' and would be obliged to 'consult' with them in the manner 
contemplated above in order to overcome his or her legal responsibility. The immediate response 
to this would be to say that in instances where a participatory process is inadequately expressed 
in the empowering legislation, guidance must be sought from the provisions of PAJA.
As is evident above, the PAJA contemplates two very clear situations: one where an 
individual is affected by a decision and another where the public may be affected. These 
sections, therefore, do not immediately address the above examples. Mass556 argues that these 
two sections must be linked, based inter alia on the fact that section 4(1)(e) of the PAJA permits 
the administrator to ‘follow another appropriate procedure which gives effect to section 3’ of the 
PAJA and that there is no compelling reason why the minimum requirements contained in 
section 3(2) of PAJA (i.e. the need to notify IAP's of an administrative action, a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations etc.) cannot apply to participatory processes contemplated in 
section 4.557
Hoexter is unconvinced by Mass’s argument because although section 4 does not 
specifically contain the requirements contained in section 3(2), they are implicit in the processes. 
She states that as 
‘far as s4(3) is concerned, the absence of the matching requirement arguably makes perfect sense in the 
context of notice and comment procedures; and as for s4(2), it does, in fact, contain requirements that 
match two of the three compulsory requirement of s3(2). An administrator who decides to hold a public 
inquiry [or notice and comment proceedings] is required to compile a written report on the public inquiry 
and indicate where it may be inspected or copied. Notice of rights to review or appeal would not make 
sense in this context, as there would not be any specific ones to communicate. In addition Mass tends to 
gloss over some rather compelling indications of a gulf between ss3 and 4 of the sections, the fact that s4 
is evidently intended to be used only in cases where rights, and not mere legitimate expectations, are in 
issue, and the specific exclusion of decisions made in terms of s4(1) (and not those of s3(2)) form the 
realm of administrative action.’558
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Hoexter’s submissions in this regard maintained that sections 3 and 4 cater for different 
categories of persons affected by an administrative action and so the differentiation between 
consulting and inviting persons to participate mentioned above is relevant. There does not, 
however, appear to be any reason why the responsible party cannot adopt both sections 3 and 4 
simultaneously in that there are likely to be different categories of person affected by a decision. 
Seen in this context, section 4(1)(e) does not appear to be a mistake but rather a factor that the 
administrator must consider in deciding on a mode or modes of participation which are relevant
in the circumstances. That is, the administrator may elect to hold a public inquiry (or notice and 
comment proceedings) and an appropriate procedure in respect of those individuals who are 
'more' affected. In order for this interpretation to be accepted, the options listed in section 4(1) 
must not be considered to be alternatives and the word 'or' must be read as 'and (if relevant and 
appropriate)'. Such an interpretation would also render section 4(1)(c) redundant as it already 
permits the administrator to hold both notice and comment and public inquiry procedures. 
On this understanding, even where the legislation does not draw a clear distinction 
between the parties which may be affected by a decision (as was the case in the National Roads 
Act), the person conducting the public participation process needs to analyse which party or 
parties may be affected by a decision in selecting the appropriate mode of participation. 
Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility was noted above. As highlighted here, it is possible that 
one process may not be adequate within the same set of circumstances based on the nature of the 
participants. Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility therefore must be supplemented by 
Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity - that is, there may be multiple modes of participation 
within one set of circumstances in order to ensure that fairness is achieved. 
These principles can be referred to as the structural (or procedural) democratic 
participatory principles as they inform the decision the responsible person will take in selecting a 
participatory process. Other principles, while also being structural, are evaluative in that the 
responsible party will consistently need to evaluate the participatory process against the 
principles to ensure that constitutional compliance is achieved and (to the extent that it falls 
short) the responsible party will need to adjust or vary the process to achieve the substantive 
principles. 
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4.3.3.1.2 Assessing compliance with the substantive principles in S v Smit
In assessing compliance with the substantive principles, guidance can be obtained from the S v 
Smit case in which the Court evaluated the consultation process between the Board and MTLC. 
The evidence regarding the consultation revealed that letters expressing the intention to declare 
the N4 a toll road were sent to the local authorities attaching the published notice ('the initial 
notice') and requesting the local authorities submit their comments to the Board. Having 
reviewed the comments, the Board decided to declare the N4 a toll road.559
The notice was later amended by repealing the initial notice and simultaneously 
publishing a new notice ('the final notice').560 The final notice indicated that the position of the 
toll plazas had been moved, that an additional portion of road would fall within the declaration 
and it notified all IAP's of the Board’s intention to amend the original notice.561 After publishing 
the final notice, the Board sent similar letters to the relevant local authorities, the Premier and all 
IAP's.562
A meeting was held with the MTLC following the publication of the initial notice in 
which concerns were expressed regarding the position of the toll plazas within its jurisdiction. 
After this meeting the MTLC was informed that the location of the toll plazas had not yet been 
finalised. The MTLC requested an update a number of months later. The response to this request 
is unknown. However, local community representatives were informed after this request that the 
position of the toll plazas had not been finalised and the consultation was pending. 
Soon thereafter and notwithstanding the Department of Transport's ('DOT') undertaking 
to inform MTLC of the final position of the plazas,563 at a public participation meeting conducted 
during the EIA process, MTLC were informed that the position of the plazas had been 
finalised.564 MTLC walked out of the meeting in protest as they believed this meeting was the 
first opportunity to be consulted on the revised position of the plazas. ‘In their view the 
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purported consultation was not genuine as the [DOT] had already made up its mind.’565 After this 
public display of opposition to the process, the MTLC sent a letter to the DOT, specifically 
requesting to be consulted. There was no further engagement between the parties until after the 
final declaration of the toll road. 
As in the case of the initial declaration, once again the comments received were compiled 
in a report and submitted to the Board who elected to proceed with the final notice and published 
the final declaration. According to Mr Nothnagel (a representative from the Board) this included 
comments received by the MTLC. 
Following the declaration, the MTLC approach Mr Nothnagel requesting further
discussion on the matter. Mr Nothnagel
‘referred them to section 9(3A) of the Act 54 of 1971…and advised them to make use of that section to put 
their case before the Board. It is noted that the section in question is not one that provides for obligatory or 
compulsory consultation as section 9(3) does, but one which simply gives the Board the option, if it so 
chooses, to give [IAP's] the opportunity to submit further written representations regarding the position of 
the toll gates.’566
In considering the evidence, the Court made the following findings: Firstly, providing 
information to all IAP's regarding the proposed administrative decision does not constitute 
consultation. It is, however, a key component to ensure that the substantive democratic 
participatory principles are achieved but the act of providing information alone is inadequate as 
there is not ‘a genuine and effective engagement of the minds.’567
Aside from collaborative learning efforts that need to be created in order to achieve 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect, relevant and material information needs to be shared between 
the parties. The relevance and materiality of information that must be disclosed depends on the 
facts of each case but, at the very least, sufficient information must be provided so that the 
parties know ‘the substance of the complaints, and the circumstances on which they are 
founded.’568 As highlighted in the previous section, the educative effect can be further enhanced 
                                               
565 Ibid. Principle 7: The Principle of Non-deference.
566 Smit supra note 548 at 169.
567 Ibid at 159.
568 Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa 1874 (3) SA 633 (A); Imbali Taxi Association v KwaZulu-Natal Provincial
Taxi Registrar [2005] 2 All SA 268 (N); Yuen supra note 459.
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if the administrator identifies the issues that he or she believes to be relevant or controversial and 
allows the parties to comment on these (and other) issues as part of the PPS. 
Secondly, the Court draws a distinction between 'invitation' and 'consultation'. To meet its 
consultation obligation, the Court held that the mere publishing of a notice in a Government 
Gazette or newspaper does not amount to consultation. It cannot, based on the understanding that 
consultation requires an exchanging of ideas. According to the Court ‘[p]ublication serves to 
notify the general public and interested parties. It is no substitute for consultation.’569
Furthermore, where consultation does occur, it ‘cannot take place by ambush.’570 The parties 
being consulted must be aware that they are being called upon to express their opinions on the 
proposed decision. In an obiter statement, however, the Court implies that if the Board expressly 
stated in the final notice that it would only entertain comments submitted by parties in response 
to the notice and that there would be no further engagement, that the MTLC would have been 
'consulted'. As strange as this submission might appear, it would meet the participatory principles 
in that:
• only those parties which wish to participate need submit comments to the Board. If a 
local authority received an invitation and elected not to submit comments, the Board 
would not be required to do more to confirm that the local authority did not have 
comments. From a practical perspective, this may be a desirable interpretation (Principle 
6: Finality in Decision-making) and
• where a local authority submits comments, there is an engagement of the minds sufficient 
to trigger the educative effect, provided that the comments are properly considered by the 
Board. 
There is, however, one qualification. In the writer’s view, the final notice can and should 
never state that there will be no further engagement. Principle 1: The Educative Effect requires 
the resolution of problems. If, after the consideration of comments, the Board and the local 
authority’s minds have been aligned, further consultation may be required through collaborative 
efforts in order to resolve the polar opposite views. Further engagement with IAP's would need 
                                               
569 Smit supra note 548 at 158 - 159.
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to take place unless Principle 5: The Finality in Decision-making applies. Further engagement 
would also have strengthened the MTLC’s trust in the participatory process. Its dissatisfaction 
with the process is clear in the judgment.571 It must be stated that notwithstanding further 
engagement, parties may still feel that they have not been heard in that their views have not been 
adopted. However, they may be more accepting of the outcome, provided that their comments 
were properly considered, their concerns eliminated or mitigated or, where this cannot occur, 
adequate reasons provided. 
Many of the principles expressed above have been included in The Generic Public 
Participation Guidelines published by the erstwhile Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
('DWAF Guidelines') in September 2001. These guidelines are comprehensive and informative 
and while they have been developed to assist the DWAF572 in fulfilling its administrative 
responsibilities in terms of the National Water Act ('NWA'),573 it is general enough to provide 
some useful insights into guidelines which apply more generally. 
4.3.3.2 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry Guidelines developed in 
terms of the Nation Water Act
The NWA was promulgated with the intention of reforming water resource regulation. During 
apartheid access to and use of water resources was unequally distributed. Ownership in water 
resources was transferred to the people of South Africa and the South African government was 
tasked with managing and distributing this scarce resource.574 This is fulfilled through various 
mechanisms, including the development of water management strategies, 575 classifying water 
resources and water quality standards,576 determining the water reserve,577 the requirement to 
obtain a water use licence prior to undertaking certain water uses578 and determining water 
consumption charges.579 In implementing these mechanisms, the NWA requires that there is a 
degree of public engagement which is served by inviting written comments from IAP's. The 
                                               
571 Ibid at 170, 172 and 175.
572 Now the Department of Water and Sanitation.
573 36 of 1998.
574 Ibid at preamble.
575 Ibid at s8 read with Chapter 7.
576 Ibid at s12 - 15.
577 Ibid at s16 - 18.
578 Ibid at chapter 4.
579 Ibid at chapter 5.
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NWA provides little guidance on the manner in which these parties should be consulted but 
guidance can be sought from the DWAF Guidelines. 
The DWAF Guidelines are more closely aligned with the objectives of the democratic
participatory principles in that they ‘are not intended to dictate or prescribe the public 
participation process, but to provide ideas on how to undertake public participation.’580 In this 
way, the DWAF Guidelines recognise that the public participation process adopted must be 
flexible, based on the circumstances, in order to achieve ‘the objectives of public participation 
[which] are to improve decision-making, to bring about sustainable development and to 
normalise the attitudes of stakeholders. These three objectives result in the improvement of 
people’s quality of life.’581 If these objectives are achieved the DWAF Guidelines state that the 
benefits of public participation should be achieved equally. ‘These benefits are, among others, 
facilitated co-operation between previously segregated sectors, improved decision-making, 
sustainable development, and positive growth and attitudes among stakeholders.’582 Although the 
terminology may be slightly different, these objectives and benefits are similar to some of 
principles discussed in this chapter.
The DWAF Guidelines also set out a series of principles that underpin public 
participation. These principles have been described using different terminology but generally 
overlap with the principles expressed in this Chapter and Chapter 2.583 Over and above these 
principles, the following principles are worthy of consideration:
                                               
580 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry ‘Generic Public Participation Guidelines - September 2001’ accessible
at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Other/GPPG/guide.pdf accessed on 15 April 2016 at page ix.
581 Ibid.
582 Ibid.
583 The Principle of Inclusivity reflects Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity; The principle of Mutual Respect is
tantamount to Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity; The Principle of Multiple Options is the same as Principle 13:
The Principle of Multiplicity; The Principle of Flexibility is the same as Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility;
The Principle of Rights and Roles is very similar to Principle 10: The Public Participation Strategy and Principle 2:
The Principle of Control in that by knowing their respective rights and roles allows parties to exercise control over
the public participation process. The Principle of Accessibility of Information is an element of Principle 1: The
Educative Effect. The Principle of Awareness Creation and the Principle of Transparency require that the public
participation is open and honest and parties act truthfully. These are all critical elements to Principle 3: The Social
Licence to Operate. The Principle of Capacity Building and Empowerment reflects the requirements of Principle 1:
The Educative Effect and Principle 2: The Principle of Control. Finally, the Principle of Suitability of Scale of
Involvement reflects Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness and Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity.
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• The Principle of Integration: this principle requires that both social and technical issues 
should be raised and discussed in the same decision-making process (Principle 14: The 
Principle of Integration);584
• The Principle of Continuity: Participation is not a once-off process but rather an ongoing 
activity. Public participation process developed must be sustainable for the life of the 
initiative. In order for this to occur, the participants must also be comfortable with the 
form of process that is adopted (Principle 15: The Principle of Continuity);
• The Principle of Efficiency: an efficient process is one which is completed quickly 
without compromising the quality of the process. The Guidelines suggest that this is best 
achieved by developing a public participation plan (i.e the PPS) which is implemented 
throughout the process. If IAP's are aware of the direction in which the participation is 
moving, they will be motivated to continue participating (Principle 16: The Principle of 
Efficiency);
• The Principle of Monitoring and Evaluation: according to the DWAF Guidelines, 
‘[m]onitoring involves continuous assessment of progress and adjusting where necessary. 
Evaluation measures the success or failure of a process in terms of objectives that were 
specified in advance…Evaluation usually takes place after completion.’585 This does not 
seem a logical statement. In order to ensure that the participatory principles are being 
achieved, the person conducting the participatory process needs to monitor the 
participatory process continually, test it against the democratic participatory principles 
and specific objectives required for the process and adjust the process in line (or in the 
direction of) the participatory principles. In this way monitoring and evaluation must 
occur simultaneously and not consecutively (Principle 17: The Principle of Monitoring 
and Evaluation). 
These principles must be applied when developing a public participation process in 
respect of water related issues. The DWAF Guidelines indicate that there are three stages in the 
                                               
584 DWAF Guidelines op cit note 580 at 15.
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participatory process: the planning phase, the participation phase and the exit phase. Each phase 
is comprised of further steps. 
Within the planning phase, the DWAF is required to conduct a decision analysis which 
assesses the nature of the initiative it intends to undertake. The DWAF must define the goal and 
purpose of the public participation process that must be conducted. ‘The goal and purpose is 
prescribed by the nature of the initiative, and could include information dissemination, public 
inputs or shared decision-making.’586 Although the language may be different, this goal is the 
same as the 'inform'; 'consult' and 'involve' distinction contained in the Framework. Once the 
goal and purpose have been defined, the DWAF must determine ‘the appropriate level of 
participation.’587 The degree of participation is directly proportional to the significance and 
controversial nature of the initiative.588 High levels of participation are required where:
• ‘The initiative involves finding a compromise between economic growth, social equity and ecological 
integrity;
• Controversy already exists around the issues of the initiative;
• There is a public perception that people stand to lose or gain significantly from the initiative;
• The initiative will result in certain groups benefitting more than others economically, politically, 
environmentally or culturally;
• Public support is necessary to implement the initiative;
• Environmental or social impact is expected;
• DWAF has low credibility in the specific area of the initiative;
• Previous initiatives were imposed upon the relevant stakeholders;
• Finding out in the middle of the public participation process that different divisions within an organisation 
had different understandings of the decision being made.’589
As part of the decision analysis, the DWAF is required to compile a preliminary list of 
stakeholders that would be interested in the initiative. The DWAF Guidelines provide a series of 
questions that will assist the Department in identifying which person should be included on the 
stakeholder list.590 One question states: ‘Whose behaviour and attitudes have to change for the 
initiative to succeed?’591 This is the only acknowledgment in any of the guidelines governing 
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590 Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's.
591 DWAF Guidelines op cit note 580 at 28.
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participation that participatory processes should require that parties re-evaluate their behaviours 
and outlooks with the intention that parties can align their objectives. This, of course, is a key 
component of the democratic participatory principles set out in Chapter 2. These parties, along 
with others (for example, those that would be directly affected by the initiative) must be included 
as stakeholders. 
The identified stakeholders must undertake the participation planning together.592 This
includes:
• identifying the degree of controversy that the proposed initiative is expected to achieve;
• identifying the various steps that are likely to occur during the life-cycle of the initiative 
and where stakeholders could or should be engaged throughout this process. 
Traditionally, any process includes a planning, design, construction, operational and 
evaluation process;593 and
• selecting (in consultation with stakeholders) the mode of participation594 that should be 
used to facilitate public participation. In selecting these methods the DWAF Guidelines 
require that:
• stakeholders be advised of the manner in which the selected mode of participation 
will impact on their involvement within the process;
• methods promoting team-building opportunities between DWAF and the public 
should be selected within the scope of the budget made available for the process;
• the adopted process allows all stakeholders an opportunity to participate and is not 
dominated by one particular party;
• different modes of participation can be selected for different participants. For 
example, public meetings may not be suitable for the elderly or engagement via 
online platforms may not be suitable in poorer communities which do not have 
access to electronic resources.595
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593 Principle 10: Public Participation Strategy.
594 Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity.
595 DWAF Guidelines op cit note 580 at 31.
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• The development of an implementation plan. This plan provides substances to the public 
participation process by including dates by when parties should have performed 
particular functions. The implementation plan must be developed with the available 
budget in mind. This plan must be developed in accordance with the stakeholders.596
Once the planning phase is complete, the participation phase can commence by finalising 
the stakeholder list, grouping the stakeholders according to the manner in which they will be 
notified of the public participation process and disseminating all relevant information to 
stakeholders.597
The DWAF Guidelines most closely reflect the democratic participatory principles 
required in terms of Chapter 2 and this Chapter. Using these principles to develop an appropriate 
public participation process requires a delicate balance. Thompson cautions that if 
‘the custodians, developers and regulators develop and implement instruments without the will of the 
stakeholders by engineering centralised, paternalistic and 'top-down' approaches, policies and strategies, it 
could result in the instruments not being acceptable. On the other hand, a 'bottom-up' approach should also 
not be followed because the custodians, developers and regulators should stay responsible, accountable 
and liable for developing the instruments. They have to ensure that the processes to develop the 
instruments are structured, focused and correctly driven so as to involve the relevant stakeholders to 
contribute to an interactive dialogue manner.’598
Striking this balance can best be achieved through careful consideration and application of these 
principles in designing and implementing a public participation process. 
4.4 Conclusion
Chapter 3 considered how the substantive principles that underpin normative democratic theory 
were achieved in public participation processes conducted in post-apartheid South Africa. The 
focus in that chapter was on the public participation processes conducted by political parties and 
voting procedures, the creation of legislation and local government. This chapter continued with 
that theme by considering how the substantive principles have been achieved within the 
administrative law sphere. 
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135
This chapter highlights principles, in addition to those raised in chapters 2 and 3, which 
are relevant when implementing a public participation process in order to give effect to 
participatory democracy. The first of these principles is Principle 11: The Principle of Context
which requires that the person conducting the public participation process consider the context 
within which the public participation process will be conducted (i.e. rural versus urban, educated 
versus low-levels of education and different languages). Based on this the person responsible for 
the public participation process must select one or a number of ways in which to interact with 
IAPs (Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity) taking into consideration what would be a 
reasonable process under the circumstances by assessing factors such as time available, the costs 
of the process etc (Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness) and ensuring that aspects such 
as technical and situated knowledge are incorporated into the process where necessary (Principle 
14: The Principle of Integration). 
These processes must be conducted quickly without compromising the quality of the 
process (Principle 16: The Principle of Efficiency) while ensuring that there is some form of 
participation or engagement happening throughout the life of the project or activity (Principle 
15: The Principle of Continuity). Finally, this chapter suggests that any public participation 
process must be continually monitored to ensure that the democratic participatory principles are 
being achieved (Principle 17: The Principle of Evaluation and Moderation). 
These principles have been generated by the traditional modes of public participation and will be 
incorporated into the CFPP set out in Chapter 6. However, in the next chapter it will be 
considered whether there are specific principles that arise from online participation to assess 
whether there are any principles which need to be included in the CFPP. All of these principles 
will be tested against the existing EIA public participation process to confirm whether the EIA 
process will pass constitutional muster and whether online participation will aid public 
participation in the EIA's.
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Chapter 5
RegulationRoom - Online participation
5.1 Lessons to be learnt regarding online public participation in foreign 
jurisdictions
'E-participation is expanding all over the world. With growing access to social media, an 
increasing number of countries now proactively use networking opportunities to engage with 
people and evolve towards participatory decision-making'.599 The principles considered in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 apply to all forms of participation, irrespective of which mode of 
participation is adopted and would apply equally to participation via online methods. What must 
be considered is whether there are additional principles which apply specifically in situations 
where online mechanisms are adopted and need to be incorporated into the CFPP. In South 
Africa there is no significant body of work detailing the long-term implementation of online
public participation processes: studies conducted in other jurisdictions where online participatory 
processes are being practised, investigated and assessed may provide guidance in this regard.
Studies into online participation are numerous and the results of new investigations are 
being published at a rapid rate600 across numerous countries, sectors and industries.601 These 
investigations are based on variable methodologies and outcome goals and, in order to identify 
an authoritative study, only jurisdictions ranked as the world e-government leaders, according to 
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs ('the UN Department') published 
the E-Government Survey 2016 ('the Survey')602 were considered.
These rankings were based on 'a weighted average of normalised scores on the three most 
important dimensions of e-government, namely: scope and quality of online services,…status of 
                                               
599 United Nations E-Government Survey 2016 op cit note 55. 
600 An online search for articles published in 2017 concerning 'eParticipation' yielded 125 articles within the first 6 
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responses. 
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the development of telecommunications infrastructure…and inherent human capital.'603 In 
addition, the UN Department considered a supplementary index referred to as the E-Participation 
Index which focuses on 'the use of online services to facilitate provision of information by 
governments to citizens,…interaction with stakeholders…and engagement in decision-making 
processes.'604 The results of this Index reflect a country's 
'e-participation mechanisms that are deployed by the government as compared to all other countries. The 
purpose of this measure is not to prescribe any particular practice, but rather to offer insights into how 
different countries are using online tools to promote interaction between citizens and government, as well 
as among citizens, for the benefits of all…[The Index] is not intended as an absolute measurements of e-
participation, but rather, it attempts to capture the e-participation performance of countries relative to one 
another at a particular point in time.'605
Based on this assessment, three English-speaking jurisdictions which were highly ranked were 
the United Kingdom (ranked 1), Australia (ranked 2) and the United States of America (ranked 
12).606 607
The United Kingdom's ranking was based on the fact that it has 'been leading the global 
trend in developing new web technologies such as HTML5, as part of the aim to make its 
national portal GOV.UK 'accessible to the widest possible audience''.608 The GOV.UK portal is 
described as the 'best place to find government services and information'.609 It is an interactive 
platform which provides persons with information on inter alia benefits, citizenship, housing and 
local services, passports, travel and living abroad.610 Under each of these headings is a number of 
sub-topics or themes which users can click to find more information or step-by-step guides to 
undertake activities with these general themes such as filing taxes and apply for a visa.611 By 
doing this, the United Kingdom government reported that £1.7 billion had been saved in the 
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609 GOV.UK available at https://www.gov.uk/ last accessed on 15 February 2017. 
610 Ibid. 
611 Ibid.
138
period 2013/2014 through 'digital and technology transformation',612 almost £100 million of 
which had come as a result of GOV.UK.613 This significant saving and the United Kingdom's 
number one ranking in the survey indicates the success of the platform in providing members of 
the public with important governmental information. The website, however, provides limited 
opportunities for IAP's to engage with government. That is, the site only provides users with 
useful information and does not provide citizens with an opportunity to, for example, comment 
on new laws or comment on service delivery. The website does not provide for the two-way flow 
of information between government and the public which this thesis submits is critical to 
Principle 1: The Educative Effect and to participatory democracy. 
The Australian government has implemented a very similar portal.614 'The Australian 
government has been one of the early adopters of an extensive one-stop national portal, offering 
citizens a secured sign-on for access to various interactive services, both at the federal and local 
levels, ranging from birth certificates to medicare, taxation, job search, aged care, child support 
among others.'615 Like GOV.UK, however, the website (while helpful) does not allow IAP's to 
contribute to the construction of knowledge or collaborate thus falling short of the democratic 
participatory principles.616
Despite ranking significantly lower than the United Kingdom and Australia, the United 
States of America was selected for investigation as it adopted (in some instances) a more 
interactive approach to participation than the UK and Australian approaches.617 (That being said, 
the US government has implemented online platforms such as the US Public Participation 
Playbook618 which only sets factors that should be taken into consideration when participating 
                                               
612 Stephen Foreshew-Cain 'How digital and technology transformation saved £1.7bn last year' (2015) available at 
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and does not provide for interaction between the parties).619 The approach of the Cornell 
eRulemaking Initiative ('CeRI') in the United States, however, is different from these approaches
in that it is not used only as a tool to 'educate' IAP's using online portals but also to encourage
them to participate actively in the process by engaging with the information, understanding it and 
submitting comments. That is, CeRI seeks to give effect to the democratic participatory 
principles discussed above using an online platform. The lessons learned from CeRI's 
investigations may prove useful in determining whether there are principles specific to online 
participation which need to be incorporated into the CFPP.
As will become apparent, CeRI has implemented a number of online public participation 
processes using similar methodologies and building on the lessons learnt from their previous 
attempts. In this way, CeRI have refined their online participatory process and reported on their 
findings. The results of these investigations are set out below. Interestingly, the online 
participation process primarily tracks the democratic principles already analysed in this thesis. In 
addition, further principles can be drawn from CeRI's experiences not specific to online 
participation. These are incorporated into the CFPP in the next chapter. 
5.2 The history of online participation in the United States of America
In the United States (as in South Africa), legislation provides agencies with extensive power to 
develop rules and regulations governing the implementation and administration of legislation for 
which each is responsible. ‘The originating agency is required to give public notice of what it is 
proposing, to reveal the scientific studies or other data it is using to support its decisions and to 
explain its legal and policy rationales. It must provide a period of time (usually 60 - 90 days) 
during which any person has the right to comment on any part of the proposal.’620 All the 
comments must be considered before the agency makes a final decision. As proof that the 
comments have been considered, the responsible agency must also publish a report responding to 
the questions, comments and suggestions made.621
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Traditionally this form of participation was conducted using notice and comment 
proceedings. Harter observed that these processes tended to be adversarial such that participants 
took extreme positions on the understanding that by the end of the process they would agree to 
some middle-of-the-road outcome. In order to maintain their extreme position for as long as 
possible (or to make these seem more legitimate), participants would not disclose or share 
information with other stakeholders.622 Parties all make submissions directly to the decision-
maker with no interaction among them. This means that the issues of concern are not ever 
properly identified.623 These (and other) deficiencies ‘inhibit…dialogue over and exploitation of 
creative solutions necessary to resolve vexing problems addressed by agency regulation.’624 For 
this reason, Harter proposed another form of engagement in the rulemaking space: negotiated 
rulemaking. 
Negotiated rulemaking sought to create an environment which is ‘more conducive to 
peer-production of knowledge.625 It sought to replace the collection of isolated monologues that
traditional written comments often represent with genuine responsive dialogue among 
stakeholders including the agency.’626 In doing this, the agency is required to take a more active 
role627 in identifying parties affected by the proposed rule and developing a committee to 
represent the views of all the IAP's. These representatives are tasked with negotiating the rule on 
behalf of the stakeholders. The agency needs (during this process) to ensure that all voices are 
heard. This can be achieved if online platforms
‘encourage commenters to engage more dialogically with other commenters. Some of these design 
elements are relatively simple: threaded commenting allows users to comment not only on the agency 
proposal but also on what others are saying in visible discussion 'threads', so long as users are required to 
register and provide a valid email address, an email can be automatically generated that alerts a commenter 
when someone replies to her comment and provides a direct link to that reply. Other elements that 
                                               
622 Philip J. Harter ‘Negotiating Regulations: A cure for Malaise’ 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982-1983) at 19.
623 Ibid at 20.
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141
encourage responsible commenting are more ambitious: human moderation or automated suggestion 
systems that prompt users to consider and reply to particular contributions by other users.’628  
Since the introduction of the Internet, there have been calls for the United States
government to implement a system of e-government aimed at increasing public participation. 
These calls were officially recognised in the E-Government Act which directs agencies to make 
essential rule-making documents available online and to permit persons to submit comments 
electronically.629 Following this Act, regulations.gov was created. This online platform converted 
the traditional notice and comment procedure into an online format. This first generation e-
rulemaking made it easier for participants to submit comments but ‘it has not significantly 
broadened public awareness of, or effective engagement in, the process.’630 In fact, there has 
been
‘sharp criticism…from political scientists, legal academics, expert commissions and advocacy groups of 
all stripes. Their complaints include: regulations.gov interface is difficult to use, even for the relatively 
small portion of the public who understand the rule making process; the completeness and timeliness of 
posting rule making materials varies widely from agency to agency; the underlying data in [the Federal 
Docket Management System] is incomplete, inconsistent in quality, and difficult to extract; and most 
fundamentally, the system has not enticed new stakeholder voices into the rule making process and 
supported them in informed and meaningful participation.’631
These criticisms reveal that merely providing participation processes online has not 
resulted in 'broader and better' participation. ‘[T]reating the value of participation as self-evident 
has left us without any guidance on how to value the new participation that technology brings, 
and on how to deploy technology to get the participation that we want.’632 Furthermore, as will 
be set out below, the ‘effective designing and deploying of technology, although essential, is 
only one dimension of realising broader, better civic engagement. Effective e-participation 
systems must be prepared to address a set of barriers that are social, psychological and / or 
procedural rather than technological in nature.’633
Much research in this regard has been done by the CeRI in conjunction with various 
Federal agencies via a rulemaking platform called 'RegulationRoom' to ‘discover how a digitally 
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empowered citizen-participant can be meaningfully engaged through processes designed to 
prime deliberative discussion and knowledge production.’634 The results of this research provide 
useful insight into the manner in which online participatory practices can be implemented in 
South Africa to ensure that online participatory processes yield broader and better public 
participation and (in so doing) yield additional participatory principles. 
5.3 RegulationRoom
Since the first attempts at online participation using regulations.gov, the world has undergone a 
'communication revolution' in which social media has re-fashioned the manner in which people 
interact with one another.635
‘Now, the Web has evolved from an environment in which users passively view pre-formulated content on 
their desktop computers to an environment ('Web 2.0') in which users routinely create, transform, and 
share content - not only sitting at relatively fixed computer stations but also on the fly with mobile 
computers ranging in size from laptops to smartphones. The new technologies and use patterns of Web 2.0 
have inspired yet another group of e-rulemaking proposals: blogging about proposed rules; posting videos 
about the rule making information through social networking services like Facebook and Twitter; offering 
group comment drafting via wikis and other collaborative-work software; and using visualization tools to 
present rule making information results.’636
This means that the Internet has evolved from a one-way flow of information from government 
into a conversation that can occur ‘in (or near) real-time.’637
Recognising this, Barack Obama effectively used social media when campaigning for the 
United States' Presidency and, when he came into office, ‘mandated that agencies use Web 2.0 
[Information and Communication Technologies] to increase transparency, participation and 
collaboration in federal policymaking.’638 The government directive also called on agencies to 
use ‘innovative methods…to obtain ideas from and to increase collaboration with those in the 
private sector, non-profit, and academic communities.’639
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In response to this call, the Department of Transport ('DOT') selected RegulationRoom 
‘as its open-government flagship initiative’.640 The RegulationRoom platform is ‘an 
experimental online public learning and participation platform which supports research in using 
social media outreach, web design, and facilitative moderation techniques to achieve broader, 
better public participation in 'live' (i.e. ongoing) federal rule makings.’641 ‘The site is conceived 
and operated by CeRI researchers from computing and information science, communications, 
conflict resolution, law and psychology.’642 It ‘uses selected live rulemakings to experiment with 
human and computer support for public engagement and discussion. The ultimate goal of 
RegulationRoom is to provide guidance on design, technological, and human intervention 
strategies - grounded in theory and tested in practice - for effective Rulemaking 2.0 systems.’643
In developing such participation strategies, CeRI has published numerous papers setting 
out the strategies required to develop broader and better participation online. These papers have 
drawn on the experience gained from the participatory processes conducted in respect of the 
following rulemaking processes:
• The 'Texting Rule' - a rule prohibiting texting while driving by commercial motor vehicle 
drivers.644
• The 'APR Rule' - a rule aimed at addressing air passengers’ rights. The rule governed 
issues such as tarmac delays and bumping passengers from flights.645
• The 'EOBR Rule' - a rule in which commercial motor vehicle operators would be obliged 
to install equipment which monitors their drivers' driving and resting times.646
• The 'Accessibility Rule - a rule that sought to make self-service ticketing kiosks available 
at the airport for disabled passengers.647
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• The 'Home Mortgage Servicers Rule' - a rule that sought to increase consumer protection 
in the home loan industry.648
Based on the participatory process conducted in respect of these rules, CeRI confirmed 
that making more opportunities to participate does not foster more useful comment. They 
conclude that in order to secure more meaningful comments, the agencies need to obtain input 
from 'missing' participants - that is, those participants that would ordinarily not participate in 
rule-making but who can contribute valuable information which informs the development of the 
rule. CeRI highlight that there are certain barriers to identifying these participants and securing 
their useful participation. The barriers (and possible solutions or mitigation measures) discussed 
below arise within the context of online participation in RegulationRoom. Although these 
barriers and the methods of overcoming them germinate from online participation, the findings
equally apply to offline modes of participation. 
5.4 Broader participation: insiders and outsiders
In conducting these participatory processes CeRI, in conjunction with the relevant agency, 
identifies the participants who may be affected by the proposed rule and in particular the 
'missing' participants. CeRI indicates that there are two groups of participants: insiders and 
outsiders. 
Insiders are ‘sophisticated and resourceful commenters from either the regulated 
community’649 or organisations representing affected communities. They have significant 
knowledge regarding the proposed regulations and the industry to which the rule relates. They 
have the resources to conduct investigations, appoint experts, develop reports and prepare 
empirically supported and well-reasoned submissions regarding the suitability or lack thereof of 
the proposed regulations. Information presented in this manner is regarded as valuable to the 
decision-makers who share the knowledge and understanding of the industry, policymaking 
procedures, technical know-how. Because of this, insiders have, in the past, dominated 
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participatory processes and are likely to participate in rulemaking processes which affect them,
irrespective of whether the process is conducted online or using more traditional methods. 
Having participated in these processes, insiders develop a 'community of practice'. That 
is, ‘a process of collective learning within a specific domain, developing shared rhetoric, 
competencies, experiences and expertise over sustained interactions.’650 Comments submitted by 
insiders tend to exhibit certain characteristics considered valuable to rulemakers in drafting rules, 
namely:
• The comments draw a distinction between the rule or regulation and the statutory 
requirements;
• The comments include at least one paragraph of text providing an interpretation of the 
proposed rule and illustrate that the commenter understands the statutory requirements;
• the comments propose a change to the wording of the proposed rule contained in the 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ('NPRM');
• The comments provide examples of arguments warranting the comments being worthy of 
consideration; and
• The comments are supported by legal, policy and empirical information.651
As insiders are likely to participate in the rulemaking, irrespective of whether the process 
is conducted online or using more traditional means and these commenters are likely to submit 
comments with these characteristics, they are not the target of RegulationRoom. In order for 
RegulationRoom to broaden participation successfully, it must identify and target those parties 
which have not previously participated in rulemaking. These parties are referred to as 'outsiders'
to the participatory process. 
Outsiders to the community of practise generally include ‘small businesses, local 
government and civil society groups’652 or IAP's. Outsiders may not participate because of a lack 
of resources, time or motivation or may be barred from or intimidated from participating by the 
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rhetoric of the community of practice or the manner in which to structure comments that are 
considered valuable to decision-makers. Furthermore, when compared with insiders, outsiders 
‘view and experience policy from a very subjective and highly contextualised point of view -
they may have in-depth knowledge about facts, causes, inter-relationships and likely 
consequences’653 of a proposed rule that the agency has not considered but which are valuable to 
the development of the rule. This is referred to as 'situated knowledge'.654 Caution must be 
exercised when engaging with organisations or unions representing individuals as these groups 
may not accurately reflect the individual views of their members or may block direct 
consultation with them in which case situated knowledge may go unheard.
Identifying outsiders is only the first hurdle to broader, better participation. Owing to 
their lack of experience in these proceedings and the manner in which they perceive rulemaking 
processes, the way in which they present situated knowledge does not exhibit the characteristics 
set out above. Rulemakers need to evaluate the submissions they receive to isolate the issues 
being raised. 
5.5 Broader participation: recognising the value of situated knowledge 
expressed in the narrative
As outsiders to the community of practice, these participants lack the skills or knowledge to 
participate in rulemaking in a manner which compares with insiders' participation and which is 
considered acceptable to decision-makers.655 Rather than comments being submitted in a well-
argued submission supported by empirical data, outsiders rely on personal experience which is 
relayed in the form of stories and examples.
‘The personal narrative does not fall within the repertoire of acceptable forms of communication shared by 
the policymaking community of practice…Indeed stories about individual experience appear dramatically 
opposed to arguably objective verifiability of empirical data and abstract logic of principled 
argumentation. Thus, the personalised, narrative form of lay citizen participation may interfere with the 
policymaker’s ability to 'hear' the knowledge being conveyed.’656
Important issues relevant to the rulemaking process may go undiagnosed because the information 
is not presented in accordance with the traditional insider paradigm.
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During the rulemaking process conducted using RegulationRoom, CeRI assumed that by 
adopting an outreach programme targeting outsiders and presenting information in a concise and 
clear way and using moderators, it ‘could engage rulemaking newcomers in the process 
successfully, inculcating them with the norms of effective participation to a sufficient degree that 
they could provide information perceived as useful by agency decision makers.’657 However, 
notwithstanding these efforts, the participants continued to express themselves in the narrative. 
Farina et al report that when CeRI ‘asked for reasons and for factual support, [they] persist in 
telling stories. Instead of hypothetical examples, they offer first person narratives. Instead of 
logic-based reasoning from abstract principles, they support their positions with highly 
contextualised argument from their own experience.’658
While this form of information differs from the 'acceptable' insider approach, Epstein et 
al ‘believe that the information that can be gained by attending to these non-standard types of 
evidence and discourse justifies the effort to develop guidance for their appropriate use in 
policymaking.’659
Based on the APR Rule, EOBR Rule and Accessibility Rule processes, CeRI developed 
four categories of narrative submissions which are useful to rulemakers when interpreting 
narrative comments.
5.5.1 Narrative of complexity
The narrative of complexity concerns ‘stories containing situated knowledge that reveal and 
explore contradictions, tensions and disagreements within what may appear to be the agency to 
be a unitary set of interests or practices.’660 The example cited is the Accessibility Rule in the 
proposal to make check-in kiosks available to travellers with disabilities. The aim of the 
regulation was to save time and to remove the stigma associated with disabled people by treating 
them in the same manner as able travellers. This motion was supported by organisations which
purportedly represented disabled groups. However, the disabled travellers commenting in 
RegulationRoom indicated that:
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‘As a visually impaired person I DO NOT believe kiosks access would be beneficial. In fact, I suspect that 
the plan may 'backfire', making airport access more difficult. Not being able to read airport signage, and 
therefore requiring 'meet and assist' assistance to my designated gate, I find it most convenient to find (sic) 
a ticket agent who will also call for assistance to take me through security and to my gate. If kiosks 
become more widely used (or possibly required) in the future, it is likely to mean fewer ticket agents, thus 
longer wait times in line, and more difficulty and delays acquiring the assistance I need. Making kiosks 
available to those disabled individuals who wish to use them may be a good idea in theory, but, as proven 
by the growth of ATMs and self-service checkouts, the more automation - the less human assistance.’661
Situated knowledge may therefore identify additional concerns or effects that were not 
contemplated when the rule was developed and which may defeat the ends the rule sought to 
achieve. 
5.5.2 Narrative of contributory context
The narrative of contributory context concerns ‘stories containing situated knowledge that 
identifies contributory causes that may not necessarily be within the agency’s regulatory 
authority but could affect the efficacy of the new regulatory measures.’662 The example used in 
support of this narrative is the EOBR Rule and the impact that inefficient or irresponsible third 
party shippers have on the day-to-day operation of long-haul logistics drivers. A commenter 
stated:
‘The use of the EOBRs will tell you how long the truck has been in operation. Road conditions and other 
delays are not addressed. Shippers/receivers have no respect for deadlines they have placed on drivers to 
move their products. Once they get the truck loaded their job is done. 
I’ve sat in a loading dock for 13hrs before and then I had to be at my delivery site in 10hrs. I couldn’t 
sleep while in the dock because the truck would shake every time the forklift loaded another pallet.
It also sounds to me that FMCSA is mandating the use of EOBRs REGARDLESS whether those of us in 
the industry think that they will be effective or not. The shippers and receivers are an integral part of the 
problem that can’t seem to be addressed by FCMSA.’663
Situated knowledge therefore may reveal additional concerns which diminish the efficacy of the 
proposed rule. 
5.5.3 Narrative of unintended consequences
The narrative of unintended consequences concerns ‘stories containing situated knowledge that 
identifies possible outcomes and effect of the proposal other than those the agency is seeking to 
achieve.’664 For example, in respect of the EOBR Rule, one commenter was recorded as stating:
‘Ok, I just took a trip to red deere alberta canada…I am sampling AN e-log, as I said I am sitting on an 
exit ramp in Reed Point Montana, 16 miles from my home and I have to sit here for 10 hours before I can't 
legally drive the 16 miles home…I could legally unhook from my trailer and drive home, Personnel 
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conveyance…but not with an electronic recorder…so I’ll sit here on this exit ramp for 10 hours and then 
drive the 16 miles to my home…makes a lot of sense.’665
Situated knowledge reveals practical outcomes that the regulator did not identify when 
developing the proposed rule. 
5.5.4 Reframing narratives
Reframing narratives refers to ‘stories containing situated knowledge that reframe regulator 
issues.’666 Many of the comments received in the EOBR Rule indicated that the drivers felt that 
they were being treated as criminals as previously only reprobate drivers were required to have 
EOBRs. This had the effect of pushing drivers into alternate careers.
The problem with situated knowledge is that, by its very nature, it is ‘often complex, 
contingent and, at any given moment, inchoate.’667 This knowledge ‘is not a static body of 
identifiable material that could even, in theory, be mastered by an expert planner. Rather, it is 
dispersed in individual actors, is created by and continually changing in response to changed 
circumstances, and is often neither quantifiable nor readily expressible.’668
As situated knowledge may be difficult to assess, it is important to develop criteria to 
assess the veracity of the comments. In the RegulationRoom examples, CeRI found that the 
veracity of situated knowledge was determined on the basis that ‘experiential claims were 
repeated, or affirmed, by multiple commenters. Moreover, many of the accounts had both 
internal coherence (i.e. completeness and consistency) and external coherence (i.e. plausibility 
given what we know about what typically happens in the world).’669 Therefore, while the 
typology proposed by Epstein illustrates the way in which situated knowledge can be useful to 
decision-making, there is reason to be wary of the narrative because it can be highly politicised 
or dramatic which can ‘impede rather than advance, public deliberation on contested policy 
questions.’670 That being said, information provided by insiders in the community of practice is 
also not incontestable. Experts often disagree on the methodology and interpretation of technical 
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information: the mere fact that the comments submitted by sophisticated parties are presented in 
a manner that is more acceptable to the decision-makers does not mean that it is correct or should 
be accepted at face value. Like narrative submissions, this information needs to be evaluated and 
tested before it can be accepted. The difficulty with the narrative is that sometimes it requires 
rulemakers to read between the lines or sift through stories to identify the point that is being 
made and then determine if the point has value within the context. 
Having understood whom online participation processes seek to reach and that comments 
are not likely to be submitted in the traditional format by these participants, CeRI identified 
certain barriers to participation which need to be addressed when designing the online public 
participation process which will encourage these participants to participate and assist them in 
understanding the issues at hand so that they can provide their situated knowledge. (Principle 16: 
The Principle of Integration).
5.6 Barriers to broader and better participation 
The first generation e-participation movement merely digitised the conventional rulemaking 
process by making information available online and allowing participants to submit comments 
electronically.671 Despite expectations (at the time), online participation did not generate the 
number and kind of comments that rulemakers expected. The reason for this is that first 
generation e-participation did not ‘directly address public ignorance about the process, 
unawareness of particular rulemakings of interest, or information overload from rulemaking 
materials.’672 These factors became the focus of Regulation 2.0.673 Having determined which 
participants had not pervasively participated in rulemaking procedures, CeRI identified the 
following barriers to participation.
5.6.1 Lack of awareness
Before Regulation 2.0, in order for any person to be aware that a proposed rule was available for 
public comment, he or she had to review the Federal Register. Given the large number of rules 
generated by various government agencies the number of pages of proposed and final rules could 
amount to 70 000 to 90 000 pages per rule. Sometimes, when the agency deemed a rule to be 
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important, conventional media were adopted to advertise the commenting period. This process 
was made marginally easier when the documents were made available online - however, 
potential participants were still obliged to trawl through the Register in order to enlighten 
themselves. Insiders to the community of practice would have been aware of the proposed rules 
from participating in industry, allocating resources to monitor the process, as well as through 
interactions with other insiders. Outsiders, on the other hand, do not know of the process, the 
nature and extent of the impacts on them and whether or not they are entitled to participate.674
To overcome this barrier, CeRI notes that each public participation process must develop 
an outreach programme identifying parties and engaging them in the process. The nature and 
extent of the outreach programme will be driven by the identity of the outsiders as these are the 
target parties whose input is required in order to achieve broader, better participation. 
As ‘"social networking" - through Web-based services…allows users to share ideas, 
activities, events and interests within a designated group or with the world at large’675 so it is the 
perfect tool for alerting and engaging participants. That being said, CeRI found that ‘using Web-
based social networking to lower unawareness barriers turns out not as simple as it sounds.’676 In 
fact, in order for social networks to alert and engage outsiders effectively requires a great deal of 
human effort and does not happen spontaneously merely by posting notifications on Facebook or 
Twitter. People are only alerted to a particular post once 
‘a critical mass of people have been 'exposed' to it. Blogs inform those who come to the site to read them, 
or take the steps to set up automatic delivery of new content to their email account or browser homepage. 
Microblogs spread info through communities declared 'friends' and 'followers', who use Facebook and 
subscribe to Twitter tweets…Successful social networking happens only when people (ideally, those with 
large networks of readers, friends or followers) both learn about and feel motivated to share new 
information.’677
CeRI found that in order to generate this kind of traction, the following human actions 
were required:
‘(i) working with the agency to identify the range of stakeholders for rule making;
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(ii) locating gatekeeper groups and influential individuals who represent or speak to members of these 
stakeholder communities, as well as groups interested more generally in open government or the 
rulemaking process; 
(iii) segmenting these groups and individuals into categories for development of audience-targeted 
messaging; and then
(iv) using a variety of methods, initially throughout the comment period, to capture the attention of the 
gate keepers long enough to motivate them to spread the word to their readers, members, friends, 
and followers.’678
Item (i) has been dealt with above in identifying outsiders. Once these persons have been 
identified, CeRI needs to determine where they receive their information - such as ‘membership 
associations, recreational and trade publications and influential individuals (such as bloggers), 
and reach out to them through email, telephone and online communications’679 (items (ii) and 
(iii)).
In explaining this outreach programme, CeRI reported that 
‘[t]echnology certainly assists this process - we find individuals and groups through search engines…but 
considerable human time and energy is required. In addition to daily Facebook posting and Twitter 
tweeting, we monitor blog traffic about rulemaking and attempt to alert the blogger about the availability 
of RegulationRoom if the blog has not included the site. And, we use email and telephone follow-up with 
the bellwethers to advocate that our message be among the content they feature online or through 
newsletters and other print sources.’680
In addition, 
‘a list of keywords and phrases to use proactively on Twitter was developed, and we posted ads on 
Facebook and Google by setting continuous automated searches and responding with comments or 'tweets'
when the rule or its subject appears in news sites, blogs, or Twitter. RegulationRoom has a presence on 
Facebook, which is designed to encourage users to share issue posts and individual comments. [CeRI] 
coordinate media outreach with agency partners to persuade conventional and online media to publicise 
the rulemaking and availability of RegulationRoom.’681
Although there has been skepticism regarding whether traditional media would drive 
participants onto an online platform, CeRI’s experience has been that traditional media resulted 
in a spike in the number of visitors to RegulationRoom. The outreach programme, therefore,
needs to develop a strategy that provides for a mix of media based on where outsiders obtain 
their information. That being said,
‘organisations…must adapt, from the model of a single voice broadcasting a message via multiple media, 
to a model in which information spreads 'virally' from user to user. The downside, from a 'marketing' point 
of view, is that the organisation quickly loses control of the message as users redistribute it. The promise 
of free access to a potential audience of millions thus comes with the threat of countless users who share 
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and recommend it. As a result, organisations are forced to become not just proactive communicators, but 
reactive ones as well, as the fortuity of circumstances and the capriciousness of word-of-mouth are 
magnified by the immediacy and reach of the web.’682
Developing the outreach programme in respect of the Texting Rule and the ARP Rule, CeRI 
learnt a number of lessons regarding factors which impact on the effectiveness of the outreach 
and participation programme. 
In respect of the Texting Rule, CeRI and DOT identified over 100 groups of IAP's. These 
groups were categorised into six categories, based on their respective interests in the rule:
• safety interest;
• driver interest;
• business interest;
• public servant interest;
• open government interest and 
• academic interest.
Having identified these groups, the outreach strategy involved a mix of media, including 
traditional media and social media posts, as well as reactive messaging where 'followers' or 
'friends' shared or posted comments regarding the rule. 
CeRI also sent press releases to 73 media contacts in the transport and technology 
industries, business, government and law. The DOT press releases and the NPRM directed 
participants to RegulationRoom. Not all the articles arising from the 73 press releases mentioned 
that IAP's could participate via RegulationRoom. In respect of the 100 constituent groups, each 
group ‘received an email twenty-four hours after the rule opened, and a follow-up phone call ten 
days later. Some groups were not interested in the rulemaking or did not wish to help promote it 
to their members. Others reported promoting it via e-mail, newsletter or social networking.’683
This resulted in a spike in the number of visitors to the site.
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The outreach programme also included accessing social networks affiliated with the 
identified target groups such as Facebook and Twitter. 
‘When the rule opened, we asked the owners of the group to post the message about rulemaking and 
RegulationRoom. Where permitted by the group’s privacy setting, we also posted directly to their wall. 
Unfortunately, this was considered spamming by Facebook and the posting persona we had used was shut 
down…To organisations on Twitter, we delivered an invitation to participate via direct messaging their 
Twitter account. Some ignored the message while others reposted or retweeted it. We estimate the total 
number of followers exposed to the initial tweet at nearly 35 000. We also encouraged people to 'friend'
RegulationRoom Facebook page or follow us on Twitter to receive updated information as the rulemaking 
process progressed.’684
In addition to proactive messaging, CeRI adopted a reactive outreach programme. Using 
online tools which monitor social networks, CeRI ‘continually monitored social networks, for 
phrases such as 'distracted driving' or 'texting and driving' and uncovered nearly one hundred 
blogs about the rulemaking. We visited the blogs and, where possible to post a comment, we left 
an invitation to participate in RegulationRoom.’685
Despite the extensive outreach programme, the Texting Rule did not generate the volume 
of participants that CeRI or DOT expected. CeRI put this down to the fact that in the months 
leading up to the Texting Rule being released, there had been significant media coverage 
regarding texting and driving, including the Secretary of Transportation issuing a statement 
immediately outlawing texting while driving commercial motor vehicles and launching a 
campaign on the Oprah show against texting and driving.686 As a result, by the time the NPRM 
was released (notwithstanding that the NPRM raised issues that had not been discussed in the 
lead up to the release of the rule) banning texting while driving was ‘old and uncontroversial 
news.’687 As a result, CeRI reported that the ‘most important lesson we took away from the 
texting rule is the importance of an outreach plan that is attained and, to the extent possible, 
responsive, to external circumstances, including the level of traditional media coverage of the 
rule.’688
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This participation fatigue is caused in part by the fact that there is so much information 
available which makes it difficult to keep the participants’ attention.689 If the subject matter and 
the means of engaging the participants do not motivate and maintain engagement, the 
participants will easily be distracted and focus their time and attention on something else. The 
lack of attention may arise from the subject matter becoming stale but also from external factors 
like where a ‘natural disaster occurs across the world; a famous actor dies in suspicious 
circumstances; a funny video is posted to YouTube.’690
In the APR Rule, CeRI noted how social media could be used to maintain the attention of 
the participants and to continue the debate. As set out above, the APR Rule concerned 
regulations relating to travel delays. The approach adopted in advertising the rule in traditional 
media was similar to that in the Texting Rule.691 During the comment period, it became evident 
that most of the participants were air travel customers, few had identified themselves as working 
in the air travel industry. CeRI were of the view that participants from the sector would offer a 
different perspective on the rule and, as a result, industry groups were targeted in order to obtain 
their views. Emails were sent to groups which ‘have a social media viewership.’692 Despite these 
efforts CeRI 
‘did not receive any response from the site owners nor did we see any sign of our announcement being 
promoted vial social media. Based on this poor response, and in light of the substantial response generated 
by traditional media, we cut back our proactive social networking to concentrate resources on personal 
outreach to these groups and traditional media outlets. However, we did continue to post regular messages 
on RegulationRoom’s Facebook page and Twitter account, weekly at first, and then daily in the early 
weeks of the targeted outreach to air travel industry workers…In the last weeks of the comment period, we 
increased proactive tweeting, focusing on each major issue in the rulemaking in turn and trying to add a 
sense of urgency to the tweets as the discussion period closed. In general, proactive tweeting was only 
mildly successful.’693
Despite the fact that social media efforts were less effective than traditional media in 
engaging the public, social media were used effectively to engage users’ attention around a 
particular sub-topic which formed part of the NPRM; namely, whether a rule should be
developed in respect of peanut allergy sufferers.
                                               
689 Farina et al op cit note 63 at 423.
690 Ibid at 424 - 425.
691 Farina et al op cit note 626 at 405.
692 Ibid at 407.
693 Ibid.
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‘In the first week the rule was open, the Peanut Allergy post got more than 300% more traffic coming 
from Facebook. By the end of the rule, visits to the Peanut Allergy post were more than 3.5 times as high 
as the next most popular issue (tarmac delay). More than four time as many different users commented on 
that post as on the next highest issue post; these 185 users made almost as many comments on the peanut 
allergy regulations as users made on all other issues combined (454 of 931 total comments). These 
comments were overwhelming in favor of regulation. A CNN article about the peanut issue three weeks 
into the rule making certainly helped spread the word of DOT’s possible intervention to help allergy 
sufferers. More than one-third of total traffic came from Facebook - a considerably larger percentage than 
Facebook’s 4.5% contribution to overall site visits.’694
The interesting part of the peanut allergy situation is that CeRI did not see it as a primary 
issue and did not develop an issue post on this topic and did not implement targeted promotion. 
‘Through Facebook, several blogs, and perhaps e-mail and print newsletters, members of this 
group managed from the outset of the rule making to mobilise each other to come to site and 
comment in large numbers than any other stakeholder group.’695 The peanut allergy example 
illustrates that ‘person-to-person’ engagement is more effective than ‘entity to audience’ 
promotion in soliciting participation. Members of groups such as trade unions were not informed 
of the opportunity to participate because it was against conveying the message to its members 
and so barred participation. However, person-to-person networking resulted in ‘an intense, 
sometimes heated, debate about the existence and validity of evidence on the incidence, severity 
and exposure methods of peanut allergies.’696 This maintained participants’ interest in the subject 
matter. CeRI recognised that, in order for interest to be maintained, it is necessary to engage 
directly with members rather than doing so through associations. This needs to form part of the 
outreach programme.697 One suggested method would be Facebook advertising. If the 
membership association follows RegulationRoom and RegulationRoom posts a 'paid-for'
advertisement, it will be visible to the 'friends' of the membership association by virtue of the 
fact that it follows RegulationRoom. This may encourage more individuals to follow 
RegulationRoom themselves. However, if the member receives information regarding the 
rulemaking from both RegulationRoom and the membership association, he or she may be faced 
with the same problems of information overload and maintaining that participants’ attention for a 
sufficient period of time to engage the information.698
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Holding participants’ attention requires a significant amount of human effort as more 
‘creative audience targeted, proactive and reactive communication’699 methods will be needed, 
including the manner in which large amounts of information can easily be communicated to and 
understood by outsiders. 
5.6.2 Information Overload
During rulemaking, there is generally not a lack of information. In fact, the NPRM can run into 
hundreds of pages. Not only are these documents lengthy but they often require readers to have a 
graduate school reading age in order for the documents to be understood. The difficulty level in 
comprehending this information may chill participants from participating. Rulemakers often 
include simplified summaries aimed at assisting various users in understanding enough about the 
rule to participate effectively. 
‘Unfortunately, even when the material is available to citizens, it is rarely comprehensible to them without 
help. Often voluminous and filled with technical, legal, or other jargon, such material is virtually always 
written from the 'insider' perspective of the professional consultant, regulator, or planner - with little effort 
to present context, problems, constraints, and options in terms that make sense to ordinary people.’700
The difficulty associated with rulemaking (and a similar problem is experienced in EIA public 
participation processes) is packaging this information in such a way that it can easily be 
consumed and digested by participants. In order to make the information more comprehensible, 
CeRI adopted three techniques in designing the online platform:
 information triage and sign-posting;
 translation; and
 information layering.
5.6.2.1 Information Triage and Sign-posting
The first technique involves CeRI conducting 'information triage' by selecting information in the 
relevant document that participants need to know in order for them to participate effectively.701
These information needs will vary on a case-by-case basis. 
‘For example, in a DOT rulemaking used for a limited beta test of RegulationRoom, a central question was 
how to design a label for automobile  tires that would effectively inform consumers about how choice of 
tire model could affect fuel economy. Here, the information requirements for effective participation were 
low: Participants needed to know the objective of new labelling requirement and the designs DOT was 
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considering. By contrast, in a DOT rulemaking requiring air travel websites and airport check-in kiosks to 
be accessible to travelers with physical and other disabilities, the information requirements were fairly 
high. Participants needed to know what standards of accessibility DOT was considering, when and how to 
propose phasing in implementation, and what methods would be used to verify compliance. An example in 
the middle comes from a DOT rule making proposing to require that commercial motor vehicles be 
retrofitted with electronic devices (EOBRs) to monitor operators’ driving and rest time. Initially this 
sounds information intensive, but knowledge about EOBRs was widespread in the trucking community, 
even among the small businesses that made up 99% of affected companies (the unsophisticated 
stakeholders being targeted). What participants needed to know was who would be affected, when 
compliance would be required and how violations would be punished.’702
CeRI initially implemented 'targeted commenting' in which participants were able to 
submit comments online in respect of specific wording of the NPRM. CeRI believed that 
rulemaking would benefit where participants could comment on the text of the rule as this would 
allow for the clustering of comments that the agency or CeRI could use to isolate issues. 
Technology was implemented so that participants could write comments alongside the actual text 
of the NPRM. This approach was found to be too cumbersome as the NPRM703 was too long for 
people to read and comment on. CeRI found that ‘[f]orty-five percent of comments were made 
on the first paragraph - regardless of the paragraph to which they were related.’704
As targeted commenting was too cumbersome, CeRI decided to use issue posts which 
broke down the NPRM into manageable units.705 Issue posts were grouped together under a 
general theme. Under the issue posts there may be a number of subtitles to further assist the user 
in navigating the information to find matters of interest to him or her ('signposting'). This more 
focused commenting approach prevented ‘global, unfocused and conclusory comments’706 as the 
comments were clustered to a particular issue under discussion in the issue post and it allowed 
participants to see the comments submitted on that same subject matter by other participants.707
This allowed for further debate between parties in respect of that issue as was seen in the peanut 
allergy discussion. The issue posts need to be written in such a way that the information being 
relayed to the participants could be easily understood. It has been suggested that this should be 
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conducted by someone outside of the process as he or she will not be bound by jargon and 
technical terminology. 
5.6.2.2 Translation
Translation involves taking the technical and jargonist language contained in the information 
provided to the participants and restating it in a simpler form so that it can be better understood 
by the 'ordinary' person (i.e. outsiders).
This notion has been discussed and implemented in the US since before the Nixon 
administration. Various executive orders, guidelines and legislation have been promulgated since 
then which have both contributed to and inhibited the comprehensible information movement.708
Most recently, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ('OIRA') published the 
Clarifying Regulatory Requirements ('CRR') in January 2012 calling for public participation in 
rulemaking which, it submitted, can only occur if the public are able ‘to obtain a clear sense of 
content’ of the proposed rules.709 To achieve this, the CRR required that rulemakers include 
‘'straightforward executive summaries' in preambles for 'lengthy and complex rules (both 
proposed and final)'.’710
In the two years following the publication of the CRR, CeRI investigated whether these 
executive summaries provided the public with a ‘clear sense of content’711 by evaluating the 
incidence,712 length,713 format714 and readability715 of the proposed and final rules. Contrary to 
what was expected the investigation concluded that:
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interpreting the instruction that executive summaries should be provided for 'long and complex rules'?’ (Ibid).
713 ‘How long are executive summaries? The Guidance provides a 'suggested template' that contemplated 'generally
3-4 pages of double spaced Word document maximum, although usually complex or lengthy regulatory actions may
require longer executive summaries.'’ (Ibid).
714 ‘Has the Guidance standardised the structure of executive summaries? The Guidance template is formatted with
three titled sections ('Proposed of the Regulatory Action', 'Summary of Major Provisions of the Regulation Action in
Question,' and 'Costs and Benefits'). Are agencies following the template? (Ibid).
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give only a preliminary indicator of comprehensibility, but testing methods that involve human readers are not
160
‘plain-language efforts still have not produced rulemaking documents that most of the public could use in 
writing meaningful comment. 
The preambles are very long and written at a level most college graduates would find challenging. More 
sobering is the unexpected discovery that, when agencies try to summarise these documents, what readers 
gain in shorter length is offset by substantially less readable text. Apparently, when rule writers try to 
compress content, they use more complex sentences and more jargon - and the greater the compression the 
greater the loss in clear and simple expression.
In particular, OIRA’s efforts to use executive summaries as a way to 'promote public understanding' and 
give 'members of the public…a clear sense of the content' of proposed and final rules is a regulatory 
misfire. Most agencies are indeed providing executive summaries more often, and the practice is more 
common in long rules and in proposed rules. But the executive summaries in proposed rules are less likely 
to follow a standard format, and are written at a higher grade level, than those in final rules. In general, 
experience doesn’t seem to help agencies in writing more readable executive summaries. Executive 
summaries are significantly less readable than the preambles they are supposedly explaining…’716
Based on the above, Farina et al conclude by saying that merely providing additional 
directions to agencies to write in plain language and more clearly is not going to result in the 
members of the public having a better understanding of the content. What is required is a better 
understanding of why the authors of these executive summaries are unable to write clearer and 
simpler documents.717 They speculate that it may be because the rules are drafted by insiders 
(lawyers, engineers, experts, government officials etc.) or by parties who do not value 
participation.718
Ultimately, they conclude that further investigation should be conducted to determine 
whether the reasons above are empirically correct. Based on the outcome of such investigations 
it would be possible to design methodology that would be more appropriate to assist lay persons 
to understand. For example, appointing trained drafters or editors to draft the rules may be an 
appropriate solution.719 However, since executive summaries written by experts tend to be more 
complicated than the reports themselves, they cannot merely be inserted under the issue posts 
dealing with a particular subject - more is required. This information must be broken down into 
issue posts that lay persons can understand. 
                                                                                                                                                      
practicable for a large number of documents. Is there any evidence that Guidance has improved readability of
executive summaries among those agencies that had an executive summary practice in place before the Guidance?
How readable are the executive summaries produced by agencies for which the practice is new? Are executive
summaries more readable than other parts of the rulemaking documents in which they appear?’ (Ibid).
716 Ibid at 33 - 34.
717 Ibid at 35.
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There are some concerns that the ‘practices of triage and translation might be considered 
objectionable because of the power over participant knowledge that they place in the hands of 
the designer. 'Information layering' somewhat ameliorates this concern’.720
5.6.2.3 Information layering 
The final technique is information layering which takes into consideration the features that can 
be applied in an online format. That is, hyperlinks and glossaries allow participants to click 
through to more detailed information on a subject if they wish to do so. This may link them to 
the NRPM, statutes or research studies which provide more technical or detailed information.721
‘For users needing additional help, a mouse-over glossary defines acronyms and terms that might 
be unfamiliar. Also, links may give users access to other pages on the site and offer brief 
explanations of regulatory background of other relevant topics.’722 This method reduces the 
likelihood of participants being overwhelmed by the volume of information provided. It can also 
be a tool to assist online moderators in guiding users to review more information or answer 
users’ questions.723
Layering allows the users to engage with as much information about the proposed rule as 
they feel is comfortable. This means that the first layer of information is relatively superficial but 
because of the ability to layer the information participants should not be driven away on the basis 
that it is too simplistic. Similarly, if the information is too complicated, it may have a chilling 
effect on further participation. ‘For this reason, a guiding principle of the information 
architecture in RegulationRoom is that information should, to the extent possible, be stratified: 
more basic information should be available for users who need it, without getting in the way of 
sophisticated users.’724
Once parties have a better understanding of the information underlying the proposed rule, 
they should be more equipped to engage in the kind of participation that RegulationRoom 
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requires. However, as set out below, merely being informed does not mean that the participants 
are equipped with the skills necessary to participate meaningfully. Part of the reason for this is 
that participants approach participatory processes with the wrong mindset. That is, they expect 
their participation to involve voting for a preferred option and the option with the most support 
'wins'. Instead, they are faced with a process in which participants are required to engage with 
one another on issues of preference and evidence, to debate these issues and to broker solutions. 
Participatory process designers, therefore, need to build a process which moves participants 
away from a voting mindset.
5.6.3 Low participation literacy
Despite the importance of rulemaking and the fact that it can have a serious impact on the day-
to-day lives of many people, few people (including those who are educated or politically savvy) 
outside the rulemaking process really appreciate how the process works.725 ‘For most US 
citizens…participating in government decision-making means casting a vote - formally in 
elections and referenda, or informally in opinion polls.’726 As rulemaking requires the 
development of laws based on reasons, fairness and the rule of law and not merely on majority 
preference, treating it as a plebiscite renders the process useless as all it does is generate 
hundreds of expressions in support of or opposition to a particular viewpoint.727 This is not to say 
that voting has no place in society. (As will be illustrated below, voting can be an effective tool 
in certain instances). The question, rather, is when is a mere expression of preference adequate?
Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to distinguish between forms of 
preference. Farina, Newhart and Heidt proffer the following classification:
• Spontaneous preference: this is where the participant selects a preference off-the-top-of-
his-head which is informed by his own biased world view or knowledge;
• Group preference: this is where a group or agency dictates the views of its members or a 
group of people;
• Informed preference: this is where the participants make an educated preference and
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• Adaptive preference: this is where the participants’ informed preference is modified 
following an assessment of the larger sociopolitical environment.728
In electoral democracy it does not matter which of these preferences the participants 
choose as the decision is one of majority (although it may still result in unsatisfactory results). In 
rulemaking, however, the participants should be expressing an informed or adaptive preference. 
The task at hand is to design a participatory process which encourages IAP's to express a 
preference which is appropriate for the kind of decision which will be made. The example cited 
by CeRI concerns the labelling requirements of the sale of car tyres. Various examples of 
labelling were proposed and participants were asked to select the one that they believed to be 
most suitable. In this instance, an off-the-cuff expression of preference without much 
background information may be adequate. On the other hand, the recent election by the British 
citizenry to exit the European Union is an example of where citizens expressed a spontaneous 
preference, rather than an informed or adaptive one 'resulting in the worst calamity to befall 
Britain in the last half century and has inflicted severe damage not only on the EU but also on all 
countries of the North Atlantic Rim.'729 According to the Daily Mail, following the decision to 
exit the EU, an 'analysis of Internet searches made…revealed many people may not have known 
exactly what they were voting for in the EU referendum. Google Trends recorded a huge spike in 
the number of people asking ‘What happens if we leave the EU?’, after the polls had closed.'730
The problem is that many US citizens approach rulemaking in the same manner in which 
they would select the tyre label: as an expression of preference as this is their default 
understanding of what participation entails. Participants view participation as only being able to 
vote for a predetermined option and not an ‘informational investment’ in which citizens engage 
with information, learn, debate and solve problems. This voting culture is strongly reiterated 
online. This is evident on Facebook by 'liking' a post; voting for books or movies using a star 
rating or rating driving services on Uber. One of the biggest challenges to online participation in 
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rulemaking is moving participants away from a 'vote or vent' mentality to one which is more 
engaged, reasoned and solution driven. 
The mechanisms mentioned in the previous section aimed at assisting participants to find
their way through the large volumes of information provided in the Federal Register: most 
people visiting RegulationRoom will not come prepared to participate in the manner needed for 
'better' participation. This is emphasised in online participation where, rather than engaging with 
information in detail, most people tend to spend an incredibly short period of time on a webpage. 
In fact, statistics illustrate that almost two-thirds of webpages are not even scrolled. Users merely 
scan the text and click on the items that catch their attention so the ‘basic habits of web use do 
not prepare people for the attentional investment required by a rulemaking participation site.’731
Online participation platforms need to be designed in such a way as to force participants to 
engage with the information and make informed comments rather than mere expressions of 
preference.
5.6.3.1 Moving from 'voting and venting' to effective participation
Voting mechanisms are attractive options for public participation as they solicit an immediate 
response and allow parties to interact quickly with the content and (depending on the context 
within which they are used) can be a valuable tool.732 The tyre labelling voting mechanism is an 
example of this. 
‘Ironically, however, the more successful Rulemaking 2.0 outreach is, the more problematic it becomes for 
the site to offer these [voting] features. Rating comments is not like rating movies or restaurants. Users 
who have never participated in the conventional process are highly unlikely to be knowledgeable about 
what makes a 'good' rulemaking comment. And voting devices are useless if they reinforce users’ starting 
assumptions that the agency will respond to the position that has the most supporters’.733
That being said, since participants will approach online participation with a preconceived 
understanding of how to participate (i.e. voting), they will not expect to be required to ‘consider 
facts, seriously reflect on opposing policies and arguments and give reasons for their preference 
that 'make sense' within the factual and policy landscape.’734 The fact that their preconceived 
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participation requirements will not be met immediately may prevent participants from involving 
themselves in the process. 
Based on the understanding that user engagement with some form of voting interaction 
facilitates further participation, CeRI developed a question which users were faced with as soon 
as they entered the page relating to the APR Rule: 'What matters to you?' Having selected an 
answer from a pre-determined list, the user would be informed of the results and was encouraged
to click through to the issue posts relating to this topic. The results showed positively that people 
responded to the poll and made the effort to register and participate thereafter. In order to 
encourage the desired participation, the facilitators may need to play on the expectations of the 
participants. However, caution must be exercised that voting mechanisms are not used more 
regularly as a convenient way of engendering support. These mechanisms should be the 
exception rather than the rule, for the reasons stated above. 
Once the participants have been encouraged into the process, they may ‘require support 
and encouragement to offer facts or data, give reasons, consider competing argument and claims, 
make suggestions and discuss alternatives.’735 CeRI found that this was most effectively 
achieved using moderators. 
5.6.3.2 Moderation
As participants approach rule-making with the intention of expressing a spontaneous preference 
as opposed to an informed or adaptive preference and since participants seem disinclined to want 
to learn736 how to participate effectively (i.e. engaging with the relevant information, debate 
competing interests, problem-solve solutions etc.), public participation processes need to be 
designed in a manner which will encourage participants to move away from unthinking
spontaneous reactions to informed or adaptive decision-making. One way of achieving this is by 
employing moderators to facilitate public participation processes. 
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Facilitative moderation was missing from the first generation of e-rulemaking. Merely 
making information available does not guarantee better participation as ‘many participants need 
additional help to contribute most effectively.’737 CeRI appointed
‘[s]tudent moderators training in active listening, neutral and open-ended questioning, and other 
techniques of group facilitation [to] periodically review and respond to comments. Their role goes beyond 
the traditional online moderator function of policing civility; rather, they fulfil many of the functions that a 
facilitator would play in an offline deliberative exercise. They point participants to information, prompt 
them to give reasons for positions, urge them to consider other perspectives, and encourage them to offer 
alternative solutions.’738
The Texting Rule and the APR Rule showed that ‘moderator comments designed to elicit further 
information or discussion generated responsive comments from either the targeted user or 
another user between sixty percent and seventy percent of the time.’739 Facilitative moderation 
has, therefore, yielded positive outcomes in offline participatory processes.740
However, as CeRI discovered, the line between debate that is knowledge-generating and 
that which is destructive is difficult to define. This is even more so in online forms of 
participation where participants feel less inhibited to comply with social etiquette and more 
willing to express themselves.741 The role of the moderators in these circumstances is critical. 
While more online fora have a guide to civil conduct which requires that participants comment 
on the content and not the commenter or that they do not write in capital letters as this represents 
shouting, moderators need to be circumspect in the manner in which they apply it. 
As illustrated above, moderators have an important role in directing participants to 
participate but if they involve the user guidelines too readily, they may dissuade participation by 
parties or be seen to be censoring the participants’ viewpoints - particularly those which may be 
contrary to the proposed rule. Similarly, if participants are attacked by other participants and the 
moderator does not intervene, they may be dissuaded from returning to the site. Moderators 
should not be too hasty to intervene as controversial comments (i.e. those that may border on 
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being offensive) will, in fact, spur further participation.742 This was in fact CeRI’s experience in 
respect of the peanut allergy debate in the APR Rule.743
The moderators can also play a training role. In addition to guiding participants to 
particular information or answer direct questions, the moderator can also rate comments that the 
rule maker would consider valuable. This could be done in a manner similar to the TripAdvisor 
website which ranks commenters based on the veracity with which they comment on their 
experiences at hotels, restaurants etc. By doing this, participants (both insiders and outsiders) 
would learn about the community of practice and the manner in which comments are submitted. 
This argument, however, presupposes that the participants have access to the relevant technology 
to participate online. 
5.6.4 The Digital Divide
There are always concerns that participants do not have access to the necessary technology to 
enable them to participate. Furthermore, providing access to technology does not necessarily 
mean that the stakeholders have the skills744 to use that technology. The lack of access and skills 
may be a barrier to participation.745 However, these factors should be considered by the 
facilitator when identifying the affected stakeholders and designing the mode(s) of participation
(Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's). Where the facilitator believes that participation can take 
place using online platforms, the following factors should be considered:
• participants may be dissuaded from participating if their identity is made public. For 
example, participants may not participate because their employers may see their 
comment and this may impact on how they are treated in the workplace. Anonymity may 
be an important element to encourage further engagement.746 There is the potential that 
an anonymous persona could be adopted by an individual or organisation to try and 
disrupt the participation process or push a particular agenda. However, as conclusions are 
not based on majority support - the identity of the participants becomes less important. 
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• participants are likely to use online platforms more readily if they are familiar with the 
platform.747 For example, participants may feel more comfortable using Facebook (or 
features similar to that) than an online page designed specifically for the public 
participation process.
• participants have found it difficult communicating online with people they did not know 
well as they were not able to obtain additional information about the participant which 
may contextualise their comments.748
5.7 Conclusion
There is an increasing amount of literature on the subject of online participation, stemming from 
a variety of experiments into the effectiveness of online participatory efforts. These experiments 
are founded on different methodologies. For example, some online portals (such as GOV.UK and
Australia.gov.au) merely serve as a platform in which governments can inform their citizens of 
important and relevant information around specific issues. It is not disputed that these forms of 
online participation can be (and are) effective. However, this unidirectional flow of information
by itself does not subscribe to the form of participatory democracy contemplated in the 
Constitution discussed and explained in this thesis. Therefore, to determine if there are additional 
principles that must be included in the CFPP which are specific to online participation, it is 
necessary to consider online platforms which seek to give effect to participatory democracy as 
conceptualised in the Constitution. 
One platform which apparently provides this kind of engagement and on which there is a 
substantial amount of published literature is RegulationRoom. What this chapter reveals is that 
online participation is currently not an easy way to engage with the public but requires a great 
deal of effort and resources to monitor and implement. Many parties will not have the benefit of 
time and the resources to implement online participation to such a degree that it will generate a 
genuine benefit. However, if online mechanisms are used, once they gain traction they may be a 
useful and effective way for IAP's to participate. In particular, it may encourage 'outsiders' to 
participate and contribute situated knowledge to the decision-making process. 
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One lesson learned from RegulationRoom is that when outsiders participate, they do not 
submit comments in a well-reasoned manner, supported by evidence. Instead, they tend to 
express themselves through stories and personal experience. While this may be an unfamiliar 
way in which to submit comments it may reveal valuable information which may influence the 
ultimate decision. Principle 18: The Narrative Principle requires that the party running the 
participation process allows participants to express themselves in a manner in which they are 
comfortable, even if this does not comply with the 'acceptable' method of submitting comments. 
The comments must be taken seriously as they may provide situated knowledge which is relevant 
to the decision or project and may introduce aspects that were not considered or contemplated. 
The fact that outsiders do not express themselves in a manner which is acceptable to those parties 
within the community of practice may be a barrier to participation.
Another lesson is that IAP's may not know that a participatory process is being 
conducted, or even if they do know, they cannot digest the voluminous technical information in 
order to submit intelligible comments. Principle 19: The Issue Posts Principle requires that 
information is presented in such a way that it can easily be understood and commented on. These 
posts must highlight the key issues of importance, the concerns and the mitigation measures. The 
information can be presented using layering techniques if online mechanisms are adopted, 
otherwise cross-referencing with other relevant documents is necessary in order to for more 
sophisticated users to review the more detailed and technical information. It is important to note 
that executive summaries of expert reports are not considered to be 'issue posts' and so should be 
avoided.
Even where information is available and can be understood by the IAP's, public 
participation processes may require a moderator to intervene to ensure that the public 
participation process moves along and direct IAP's to relevant information. The moderator needs 
to understand when to intervene and when to let discussion continue as sometimes aggressive 
and provocative participation clarifies the issue in dispute. This is referred to as Principle 20: 
The Principle of Moderation.
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What is evident from the above principles is that they not only apply to online 
participation but also to traditional offline participation. In the next chapter these principles are 
consolidated into a constitutional framework for public participation which can be used as a 
framework for constructing participatory processes so as to ensure that the democratic 
participatory principles are achieved. 
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Chapter 6
Constitutional Framework for Public Participation 
6.1 Consolidating the democratic participatory principles into a framework 
for public participation 
The democratic participatory principles described in the previous chapters were drawn from 
democratic theory, South African history, culture, the Constitution, law, and foreign 
jurisdictions. Relying on these principles, this chapter sets out a CFPP which can be used as a 
template for any participatory process. 
At first glance, the CFPP may not appear to be substantially different from most other 
public participation processes described in legislation or exercised in practice. There are, 
however, two points distinguishing it from existing codified participatory procedures: Firstly, it 
is underpinned by a defined set of principles which guide its interpretation and application and, 
secondly, it includes an on-going independent assessment of the public participation process to 
ensure that the democratic participatory principles are achieved.749
In elaborating on the CFPP, it is necessary to touch on various research paradigms, 
theories and interpretative tools associated with social science research. These paradigms, 
theories and tools have been described in broad overview to explain how and why the CFPP
could be implemented. It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the purpose of 
the CFPP is to provide a legally and constitutionally compliant framework for participation and 
not to define a methodology that persons conducting public participation processes must adopt 
when engaging with IAP's. In explaining the CFPP, it is necessary to categorize the principles 
into two groups: the substantive principles (principles 1 - 4) and the procedural principles (the 
balance of the principles). 
                                               
749 Principle 1: The Educative Effect; Principle 2: The Principle of Control; Principle 3: The Social Licence to
Operate; Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity; Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity; Principle 6: Finality in
Decision-making; Principle 7: The Deference Principle; Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's; Principles 9: The
Principle of Flexibility; Principle 10: The Public Participation Strategy; Principle 11: The Principle of Context;
Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness; Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity; Principle 14: The
Principle of Integration; Principle 15: The Principle of Continuity; Principle 16: The Principle of Efficiency;
Principle 17: The Principle of Evaluation and Monitoring; Principle 18: The Narrative Principle; Principle 19: The
Issue Posts Principle; and Principle 20: The Principle of Moderation.
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The procedural principles are those which relate to the structure, format and operation of 
the public participation process being implemented while the substantive principles look at the 
IAP's, their opportunity to participate and their subjective assessment of the process. In 
evaluating the public participation process holistically within the CFPP, the person assessing the 
public participation process would rely on both the substantive and procedural principles. In 
monitoring the implementation of the modes of participation, the assessor evaluates the 
fulfillment of the substantive principles. 
Based on the outcome of this investigation, the person conducting the public participation 
process may be required to apply some or all of the procedural principles. This will be dealt with 
in more detail below: assessing compliance with the substantive principles means developing and 
implementing a qualitative data collection methodology. This means that the assessor needs to 
determine the IAP's subjective views of the public participation process to assess whether the 
substantive principles have been achieved. If they have not been achieved, the public 
participation process needs to be revised so as to ensure that the substantive principles will be 
achieved. While this may appear to be an additional administrative burden on the person 
conducting the public participation process, it is suggested that it will lessen the likelihood of 
IAP's challenging decisions arising from the public participation process. In addition, this 
chapter proposes ways in which this burden can be lessened using Principle 7: The Principle of 
Deference and Principle 13: The Reasonableness Principle.
In the next Chapter, the EIA public participation process (with particular reference to 
online participation) will be tested against the CFPP to determine whether it stands up to these 
requirements or should be amended. Before doing so, it is necessary to differentiate between two 
persons involved in the CFPP: the proponent and the assessor. 
6.2 The proponent and assessor
The 'proponent' refers to the party who is conducting and is responsible for a public participation 
process. In the case of the EIA public participation process, this refers to the EAP. However, the 
term 'proponent' (as used in this Chapter) goes further than this and would, for example, also 
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include the applicant seeking the environmental authorisation on whose behalf the EAP is 
conducting the public participation process. Proponent is, therefore, used broadly.
The 'assessor' refers to an independent person monitoring the public participation process 
to confirm whether it complies with the public participation strategy ('the PPS') and gives effect 
to the substantive principles. To the extent that the substantive principles are not achieved, the 
assessor will make changes to the PPS which will need to be implemented by the proponent. It is 
important that the assessor is independent of the proponent and the IAP's and that both parties 
trust the changes (if any) required by the assessor. 
The appointment and function of assessors will need to be regulated in order to ensure 
that this independence is maintained. Probably the fairest and most efficient way to appoint the 
assessor is for a body of assessors to be created from which an assessor is randomly assigned to a 
public participation process. Although the proponent would be responsible for the cost of the 
assessor, this money would be paid to the body of assessors and not to the assessor directly. In 
this way, the assessor will not feel obliged or pressured to find an approach that favours the 
proponent. 
6.3 The Constitutional Framework for Public Participation
The CFPP was developed with the democratic participatory principles in mind. Theoretically, by 
implementing this CFPP, the public participation process will accord with the Constitution and 
the requirements of participatory democracy. The most important aspect of the CFPP is 
developing and publishing the PPS as this sets out the participation process which informs IAP's 
of the process that will be followed, when they are expected to participate and what forms the 
baseline against which the public participation process will be audited to confirm that it is 
complying with the democratic participatory principles. Although the PPS must be designed for 
each public participation process, it is not intended that each process would be initiated without 
any previous knowledge or experience informing it. Therefore, while the CFPP contemplates that 
each public participation process must be tailored to meet the requirements of the IAP's, it does 
not do so in a vacuum. Guidance must be taken from previous public participation processes so 
as to ensure that similar matters are treated in a similar way and to learn from practices which 
failed to give effect to the democratic participatory principles.
174
The first stage of the PPS is to look at the factors informing the PPS: the identity of the 
IAP's, the time available to the proponent to conduct the public participation process; the 
reasonable costs and resources available to implement the public participation process; the nature 
of the decision or activity which will result following the public participation process and any 
empowering legislation or document. Using this information, the proponent will be able to 
develop a draft PPS which can be made available to the IAP's for comment. 
6.3.1 Identifying the Interested And affected Parties to the public 
participation process
The first factor to be addressed is the identity of the IAP's. Identifying IAP's will depend on the 
facts of each case and will be left largely to the proponent to determine in each instance. For 
example, determining the IAP's in respect of a proposed project to build a substation would 
require that the proponent look at the relevant parties that reside in close proximity to the 
proposed substation. It may also require that resident associations are notified and contacted. 
Certain local authorities (such as municipalities) should be notified as well as non-governmental 
bodies such as nature groups if there is a potential environmental impact. In these instances, the 
proponent may also be guided by governing legislation and regulations which provide some 
input as to who may be interested and affected. The process followed in identifying the IAP's 
that may wish to comment on health legislation, however, would require the proponent to review 
the themes that the legislation deals with and identify those persons that may be affected, such as 
patients, doctors, hospital groups, medical aid groups, public health care groups, traditional 
medicine, healthcare members associations etc. There is, therefore, not a 'one-size-fits-all' 
approach to identifying IAP's. Both the insiders and outsiders need to be identified.750 That is, 
those parties which will participate in the process, irrespective of the kind of process adopted by 
virtue of the fact that they have a vested interest in the outcome of the process and they have the 
resources and skills to participate in the process and those parties that would traditionally be 
'missing' from the participatory processes for whatever reason (i.e. intimidation, lack of 
resources, lack of knowledge or time etc.)751 or are a ‘discrete and identifiable group’752 but 
                                               
750 Section 5.4 Broader participation: insiders and outsiders above.
751 'Missing' persons may include the elderly, disabled persons, disadvantaged persons, the poor or people with no or 
limited education.
752 Section 3.5 Participating in creating legislation above.
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which could provide situated knowledge which may highlight issues that the proponent did not
identify or consider.
Having identified all the IAP's, the proponent must consider whether any IAP's have been 
intentionally excluded and whether there is a legitimate government purpose753 for doing so. The 
examples cited above indicate that persons under the age of 18 or persons without a bar-coded 
identity document are legitimate reasons for excluding persons from voting. Where there is any 
uncertainty as to whether persons should be excluded, the presumption should favour inclusion 
rather than exclusion.754
6.3.2 Time and costs of implementing the public participation process
The amount of time available to the proponent to conduct the public participation process is a 
relevant consideration as it influences the mode or modes of participation which will be adopted 
to engage with the IAP's. However, the democratic participatory principles require that 
participants are, at least, afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate.755 The proponent 
cannot reduce the time period in order to meet a commercial deadline and (in so doing) 
compromise the IAP's right to participate in the process.756 Similarly, a compromised public 
participation process cannot be implemented merely because a constitutionally acceptable 
process is too costly.757 However, costs are a relevant factor to consider when assessing the 
reasonableness of a public participation process as whatever process is selected must be 
supported by adequate resources, such as administrative and logistical support.758
6.3.3 The reason for the public participation process
The reason for conducting the public participation process is an important factor as it dictates the 
nature and extent of the process. As is evident from the tyre labelling example cited above,759
where there is a predetermined number of options and a limited amount of information, it may be 
suitable to conduct a public participation process which reflects a spontaneous preference, rather 
                                               
753 Section 3.4 Participating by Voting above.
754 Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity; section 3.4 Participating by Voting above.
755 Doctors for Life supra note 215 at 1445.
756 Section 3.5 Participating in creating legislation above.
757 Ibid.
758 Section 3.6.3 Developing a public participation strategy above.
759 Section 5.6.2.1 Information Triage and Sign-posting above.
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than an informed or adaptive preference.760  Given the simplicity in the feedback required, there 
is not a significant amount of information and instruction that needs to be conveyed to the IAP's 
and no reasons or justification need be provided in support of the decision. Ultimately, the choice 
comes down to the personal preference of each IAP.761 This form of participation mimics voting 
and is, therefore, generally known and understood by the participants. The option with the most 
votes 'wins' by way of majority rule.
Where the nature of the decision is more complex and without clearly defined 
conclusions or options - such as in an EIA or the creation of legislation governing healthcare –
IAP's need to move away from 'voting and venting'762 to something which compels them to 
engage with the information and develop solutions which promote the public good.763
Understanding the reason for engaging the IAP's will also highlight whether the matter is 
controversial or not. In matters which are more likely to generate polarised views concerning
what is being proposed (for example, authorisation to construct a nuclear power plant or 
undertake fracking activities in the Karoo), the proponent will need to develop highly interactive 
participatory processes which support the construction of knowledge contemplated in Principle 
1: The Educative Effect so that the concerns of each of the parties are clarified. The proponent 
will need to exercise strong moderation764 skills so as to encourage lively debate while not 
allowing mud-slinging.765 Where there is an impasse, the proponent will need to develop and 
implement effective problem-solving techniques. It is also critical that the proponent has an 
understanding of the IAP's and their pre-conceived ideas about and emotions towards the 
process, project or decision as this will inform the manner in which he or she approaches 
breaking the impasse.766  
                                               
760 Section 5.6.3 Low participation literacy above.
761 Principle 11: The Principle of Context.
762 Section 5.6.3 Low participation literacy above.
763 Principle 1: The Educative Effect.
764 Principle 20: The Principle of Moderation.
765 Section 5.6.3.2 Moderation above.
766 Principle 20: The Principle of Moderation.
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6.3.4 Empowering legislation relating to the public participation process
The final factor (although circumstances may require that additional factors be considered)
which must be taken into consideration when designing the PPS is whether there is any 
empowering legislation governing the public participation process being implemented as this 
may impose restrictions or qualifications which will determine the structure of the public 
participation process.767 For example, as will be set out in detail in the next chapter, the NEMA 
and EIA Regulations impose certain restrictions governing the public participation process in 
EIA's. As has been expressed above, however, the legislation (barring the PAJA which is fairly 
prescriptive) tends to be vague regarding the manner in which participation must be 
implemented. To the extent that the legislated public participation process deviates from the 
democratic participatory principles, there would be an opportunity to challenge the 
constitutionality of the empowering legislation and the process. 
6.4 Designing the Public Participation Strategy
Based on the information generated above, the proponent will be able to prepare a first draft of 
the PPS which can be negotiated with IAP's (if it is a small group) or made available for 
comment where the group is larger.768 The draft PPS must set out inter alia the various phases of 
the proposed public participation process, the nature and extent of the public participation 
process being conducted, the modes of public participation that will be implemented and the 
contact details of the relevant persons. A unique PPS must be designed for each public 
participation process769 and must include the following characteristics. 
6.4.1 Implementing the lexicon: inform, consult and involve
When setting out the PPS, the proponent must use the language associated with the participatory 
framework. That is using the words 'inform',770 'consult'771 and 'involve'772 at the various stages 
of the PPS so that the IAP's have a clear understanding of the extent of their involvement 
throughout the process.773 This approach will not only solidify a participatory lexicon but will 
                                               
767 Section 4.3.3.1 Judicial pronouncement on notice and comment proceedings: S v Smit above.
768 Section 4.3 Administrative action affecting the public above.
769 Section 4.3.2.1.3 The healthcare inquiry above.
770 Section 3.6.2.1 Informing above.
771Section 3.6.2.2 Consulting and Involving above.
772 Ibid.
773 Section 4.2 Administrative actions affecting an individual and Section 4.3.2.1.1 The banking inquiry and Section
4.3.2.1.3 The healthcare inquiry  above.
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also give the IAP's an understanding of the degree of participation that will be allowed at each 
particular phase. For example, in selecting the site for a proposed hospital, the PPS may state that 
the IAP's will be consulted by obtaining feedback using surveys in which they can rank the 
identified sites in order of preference. In reviewing the draft PPS, the IAP's may wish to object to 
the fact that they will only be consulted regarding the proposed sites and would prefer to be 
involved as none of the identified sites may be desirable and so ranking the suggested sites may 
be pointless if none of the sites is viewed as feasible.  
The lexicon should serve as a guide to assist IAP's and the proponent in understanding 
the base level of participation expected at each stage of the public participation process.
However, strict adherence to wording to the detriment of fairness must be avoided.774
6.4.2 Develop a timeline for implementing the public participation process
Having developed the rhetoric of participation, this terminology must be consistently used to set 
out the various phases of the participatory process. The PPS must clearly set out the timetable to
be followed. It should set out the date on which information will be published, when comments 
must be received and when any pre-meeting or meetings will be held. This timeline should be 
adhered to as closely as possible and to the extent that it varies, the IAP's must be informed of 
such changes subject to the caveat that the timeline can never be shortened to the detriment of 
the IAP's.
6.4.3 Notifying Interested And Affected Parties
Having identified the insiders and outsiders to the process and the empowering legislation, the 
proponent will have an idea of how to notify certain of the IAP's. The more traditional way (and 
the manner normally set out in legislation) is for notices to be published in the media and for 
written notification to be submitted to people directly affected. This is an appropriate approach 
for insiders and may catch the attention of certain outsiders but it falls short of actively seeking 
to engage outsiders who may contribute situated knowledge during the implementation phase of 
the PPS. 
                                               
774 Section 3.2.2 Principle 2: The Principle of Control above.
179
Part of the process of notifying IAP's is identifying outsiders and understanding where 
these people obtain their information regarding a particular subject matter. For example, 
members of a gun association may receive notice of gun ownership laws via the local gun 
owners' association newsletter or Facebook page. In order to target these IAP's, the proponent 
should include posting information regarding proposed changes to these laws in the newsletter or 
on the Facebook page. Where the IAP's are unknown, online tools which monitor social 
networks for articles, updates or posts including key phrases such as 'private gun ownership' can
be adopted. Where these searches yield results, the proponent can target the author of the article, 
update or post regarding the proposed changes to the law and the public participation process.775
As highlighted in the examples from RegulationRoom,776 it is best for the proponent to 
engage directly with individuals rather than associations or groupings which purport to represent 
the interests of a group of people as (on occasion) the individual members may be able to 
contribute an 'on the ground' perspective to the decision or rule. Therefore, although efforts 
should be made using associations or groups to identify and notify IAP's, directly engaging with 
individuals should be the objective during the implementation phase of the PPS. Although 
requiring a significant amount of effort and number of human hours, online platforms have made 
it possible to find, target and engage with outsiders who make use of these online fora. Where 
online tools are not appropriate to notify IAP's (for example, in rural areas) alternate solutions 
may need to be adopted such as loudhailers, notifications in pay packets etc.777 Whichever 
method is adopted, it is important that the critical information is conveyed to the IAP's.
6.4.4 Identifying and sharing critical issues 
Depending on the nature of the participatory process and the empowering legislation, 
information critical to the public participation process can either be disclosed initially or at a 
later stage, provided that this information is communicated to the IAP's and included in the 
PPS.778 For example, in the EIA process, IAP's must be notified at the start of an application for 
an environmental authorisation. At this early stage of the process the proponent may not know 
what impacts the proposed project will have on the environment as none of the investigations has
                                               
775 Section 5.6.1 Lack of awareness above.
776 Section 5.4 Broader participation: insiders and outsiders above.
777 Section 4.2 Administrative actions affecting an individual above.
778 Ibid.
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yet commenced. As such, IAP's may be notified initially with some of the more critical issues 
following in the implementation phase. Whichever approach is adopted is not important,
provided it is set out clearly in the PPS.
Whenever information is disclosed to IAP's, it must be in a format that encourages 
participants to engage with and understand the information. This means that the information 
must be easily understood so that IAP's can express an informed or adaptive preference779 during 
the participation phase (irrespective of the mode of participation adopted). This may be difficult
to achieve in situations where there is a significant volume of information relevant to the activity 
or decision and / or where the information is technical in nature. In these instances the proponent 
should not rely on executive summaries of the relevant reports to identify the topics in these 
reports as these have been found to be overly complicated and require a graduate school reading 
age in order to comprehend.780
The proponent must collate the information into a readable format that can be understood 
by laypersons. This has been effectively achieved using issue posts781 where a general theme is 
discussed drawing issues from a variety of sources and cross-referencing the more technical 
reports for insiders or more sophisticated IAP's who may wish to read the underlying documents. 
Where online platforms are used, this can easily be achieved using hyperlinks.782 There are 
arguments to suggest that qualified writers (as opposed to the proponent, lawyers, engineers) 
should write the issue posts as they will be more likely to draft understandable wording which is 
divested of technical jargon but detailed enough to engage insiders.783
The issue posts highlight the pressure points that the proponent foresees with the project 
or decision. For example, in the EIA process for the construction of a mine, the proponent may 
indicate that there are concerns around water availability as water is a scarce resource in the area. 
The subcategories of the issue post may include the possible solutions to this problem. A further
subcategory would set out the advantages and disadvantages of these various options. By 
                                               
779 Section 5.6.3 Low participation literacy above.
780 Section 5.6.2.2 Translation above.
781 Section 5.6.2.1 Information Triage and Sign-posting above; Principle 19: The Issue Posts Principle.
782 Section 5.6.2.3 Information layering above.
783 Section 5.6.2.2 Translation above.
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presenting the information in this way, the proponent will highlight the key issues that he or she 
believes to be relevant to the inquiry, in this way, assisting IAP's in using their limited resources 
efficiently.784 It also indicates which issues the proponent is not focusing on, such as the peanut 
allergy in respect of the APR Rule785 and should be brought to his or her attention. 
Technology can be useful in these situations as layering allows the issue posts to be 
simply worded rather than filled with technical jargon. Hyperlinks will allow the more 
sophisticated users to click through to more detailed information or to the source documents 
underlying the issue posts. Where technology is not a feasible option, adequate cross references 
must accompany the issue posts. This may be more cumbersome than technology but should still 
achieve the desired result. 
6.4.5 Selecting the modes of participation
The appropriate mode(s) of participation will depend on the facts of each case.786 Where the 
process requires more than the expression of a spontaneous preference and the IAP's have had an 
opportunity to engage with the information, there may be an opportunity to submit written 
comments and participate in a hearing or some other form of meeting at which the IAP's can 
express and debate issues of concern and collaboratively (using moderators) develop acceptable 
solutions. As indicated above, insiders to the process will have the resources to participate in any 
mode(s) of participation - written submissions or oral hearings. In both instances, their comments 
are likely to be well reasoned and supported by evidence.
Outsiders, on the other hand, will need to be handled with more consideration. The 
proponent must ensure that IAP's are able to express themselves in a manner in which they are 
comfortable. For example, outsiders will submit their comments in the narrative supported by 
firsthand experience, rather than facts and figures.787 The mode(s) of participation need to allow 
IAP's to contribute knowledge in a manner that is not traditionally acceptable in the community 
of practice.788 The modes of participation used to collect this narrative must also be analysed to 
                                               
784 Section 4.3.2.1.2 The liquefied petroleum gas inquiry ('LPG') above.
785 Section 5.6.1 Lack of awareness above.
786 Principle 11: The Principle of Context.
787 Principle 18: The Narrative Principle. 
788 Section 5.5 Broader participation: recognising the value of situated knowledge expressed in the narrative above.
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identify the situated knowledge and whether it is corroborated or disputed by other IAP's.789 This 
information must be interpreted as being as valuable as the information submitted by insiders. 
Whichever method is selected, it must be clearly communicated in the PPS using the 
terminology 'inform', 'consult' and 'involve' so that the IAP's know exactly what is expected of 
them at each stage of the process. The PPS must be published for comment790 so that IAP's have 
an opportunity to indicate whether they agree791 with the methodology being employed to engage 
with them. For example, they can express concerns that at a particular stage they should be 
'involved' rather than 'consulted'.  To the extent that these comments are acceptable to the 
proponent, the PPS could be adapted accordingly.792 Where the comments are not acceptable, the 
proponent should engage the relevant IAP's in problem-solving processes until a solution is 
developed. Where the mode of participation is altered or amended following the audit by the 
assessor, this will also need to be clearly indicated in the revised PPS. 
Neither the proponent in developing the PPS nor the assessor in auditing the PPS is
bound to one process. Multiple processes can be adopted based on the identity of the IAP's. More 
sophisticated IAP's may be satisfied with notice and comment proceedings while outsiders may 
need workshops and public meetings to assist them with understanding the critical information 
and assessing the impacts of the proposed project / decision on them. It should also be reiterated 
that participation is an ongoing activity, rather than a once-off event (Principle 15: The Principle 
of Continuity). The modes of participation should not only include the formal modes of 
participation but also the ongoing ways in which IAP's can engage with the proponent outside of 
                                               
789 Section 5.5.4 Reframing narratives above.
790 Section 3.6.2 The National Policy Framework above.
791 The use of the terms 'consent', 'agree' and 'consensus' when used within the context of the CFPP must not be 
interpreted to mean unanimity. It would not be practical to insist that there is this level of agreement between 
participants. Where there is disagreement between the parties, the proponent must adopt problem-solving 
mechanisms as required in terms of Principle 1: The Educative Effect. However, even having implemented these 
procedures does not guarantee that the parties will reach some form of 'consensus'. In these circumstances the 
proponent implementing the public participation process must adopt Principle 6: Finality in Decision-making; 
Principle 7: The Principle of Deference; and Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness. 
Principle 6: Finality in decision-making allows the proponent to conclude a public participation process even though
the substantive principles may not have been achieved and informs the IAP's of the process that will be followed. 
Principle 7: The Principle of Deference permits the proponent does not need to defer to any of the IAP's views 
(provided he has at least considered those views); and Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness which requires 
that the proponent take into consider time, cost etc when implementing a process.
792 Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility.
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these formal modes of participation. For example, the development of a grievance mechanism 
where IAP's can express concerns about the PPS and its implementation.793 Whichever approach 
is adopted, the proponent should seek to remove or minimise any obstacles to participation. 
6.4.6 Obstacles to participation
Implementing the mode(s) of participation may have unexpected consequences which prevent 
IAP's from actively participating. That is, any person acting reasonably must be able to 
participate in the process. If there are any factors preventing IAP's from participating, these 
should be identified and the mode of participation adapted or changed. As indicated above, 
reasonable obstacles include only being allowed to vote with a bar-coded identity book.794
Unreasonable obstacles may include situations where registered voters were required to return to 
South Africa to vote if they were abroad at the time of the election.795
One of the most significant obstacles to meaningful participation processes with multiple 
parties is the imbalance of power between IAP's. Insiders tend to wield more power than 
outsiders as they are backed by a greater amount of resources and technical knowledge than 
outsiders and therefore tend to dominate public participation processes. It is important that the 
proponent managing the public participation process ensures that all IAP's are afforded an equal 
opportunity to participate and that their submissions are treated equally. Principle 5: The 
Principle of Inclusivity, Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's, Principle 14: The Principle of 
Integration and Principle 20: The Principle of Moderation are relevant in this regard as the 
proponent will be responsible for identifying all IAP's and ensuring that they are included in the 
process.796 By engaging with all IAP's the proponent must ensure that all technical and situated 
knowledge is taken into consideration. 
Where the proponent believes that IAP's have not considered a particular view or have 
not understood or considered certain information, he or she should direct the IAP's to that 
information or assist them in understanding it. In doing this, the proponent will be facilitating
implementation of the substantive principles and will assist the IAP's to recognize a common 
                                               
793 Section 3.6.3 Developing a public participation strategy above.
794 Section 3.4 Participating by Voting above.
795 Ibid.
796 Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity.
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goal. If they are able to do this it enhances their sense of control over the outcome of the 
participatory process and they are likely to support the outcome (even if it does not directly align 
with their personal views). The assessor should ensure that this occurs and that the views of the 
more powerful participants have not dominated the process. If this has occurred, the assessor 
may adapt the PPS to cater for this discrepancy. 
The obstacles to online participation are that notifying IAP's of the modes of participation 
around a particular subject matter requires a significant investment of man-hours. Merely posting 
a Facebook or Twitter post regarding the proposed public participation process does not 
guarantee that the matter will go viral and encourage IAP's to get involved. This is more likely to 
happen where the subject matter is controversial or where there is a strong divergence of views 
(such as the Peanut Allergy discussed above).797 Proponents may not have the resources 
available to allocate to extensive online participation methods in order to target missing IAP's. 
This obstacle to engaging with IAP's should not be treated too harshly as these efforts attempt to 
solicit situated knowledge from outsiders which may not be obtained by merely publishing a 
notice in a newspaper.  
6.4.7 Publishing the Public Participation Strategy
There are multiple reasons for publishing the draft PPS: firstly, based on the information feeding 
into the PPS, the proponent will select mode(s) of participation which in his or her view are 
likely to facilitate collaborative learning. Publishing this information in the PPS and allowing 
IAP's to consider the appropriateness of the modes of participation gives them an opportunity to 
exercise a degree of control over the process which may ultimately engender a sense of trust in 
the process (and acceptance of the decision) even where the IAP’s personal views are not 
reflected in the decision.798
Once the draft PPS is published for comment, it may require (depending on the nature 
and extent of the comments and the revision) that a revised draft of the PPS is published for 
comment. In order to avoid an endless cycle of drafts and comments, the proponent will need to 
                                               
797 Section 5.6.1 Lack of awareness above.
798 Section 2.3 Principle 1: The Educative Effect, Section 2.4 Principle 2: The Principle of Control and 2.5 Principle
3: The Social Licence to Operate above.
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exercise discretion in respect of the comments received. That is, the proponent is not required in 
all instances to defer to the view-points of the IAP's but must keep an open mind when 
considering their comments.799 Failing to include the IAP's comments adequately places the 
process at risk of being challenged as the IAP's may feel that they do not exercise any control 
over the process or do not trust the process or the outcomes.800 However, complete deference can 
never be an acceptable solution as the public participation processes suggested by IAP's may be 
too extensive or costly which is contrary to Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness and 
such an approach could be adopted by IAP's to hamstring projects or render them unfeasible. 
In exercising discretion in accordance with these principles, the proponent may (once 
satisfied that the principles have been adequately addressed) publish the PPS in its final form.801
Doing this does not mean that the PPS cannot be altered in the future. In fact, the PPS will need 
to be monitored continually by the assessor to ensure that it gives effect to the substantive 
principles and (to the effect that this is found to be inadequate) it may need to be amended. In 
monitoring the process, the assessor acts as a counterbalance to the decisions made by the 
proponent in designing the PPS and incorporating (or not incorporating) the comments from the 
IAP's. The proponent should also assess whether, in implementing the PPS, the participatory 
democratic principles are being achieved and (if not) take appropriate action.  
6.5 Implementing the Public Participation Strategy
The proponent must implement the published PPS to ensure that both technical and situated 
knowledge is shared (Principle 14: The Principle of Integration). Any material deviation to the 
PPS without the consent of the IAP's or on the instruction of the assessor may render the process 
defunct.  In implementing the PPS, the IAP's may disagree on a particular issue. In such 
instances, the proponent will need to implement problem-solving techniques to resolve this 
dispute.802 It is not possible during the development of the PPS to specify which problem-solving
techniques will be adopted as it will depend on the nature of the dispute and the parties to the 
dispute. All that need be said in the PPS is that the proponent will implement such processes 
where required and adopt problem-solving techniques that are proportional and appropriate to the 
                                               
799 Principle 7: The Principle of Deference.
800 Principle 2: The Principle of Control and Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate.
801 Principle 6: The Principle of Finality.
802 Section 4.3.3.1 Judicial pronouncement on notice and comment proceedings: S v Smit above.
186
nature of the dispute. That is, where there are two parties who cannot reach agreement, all that 
may be required is a moderated meeting between these parties. If there is more widespread 
disagreement, it may be necessary to hold a workshop in which the issues and proposed solutions 
are re-framed. These problem-solving methods, however, should not cause the public 
participation process to be delayed indefinitely and the proponent will need to exercise his or her 
discretion as to when to impose Principle 6: Finality in Decision-making.
Principle 6: Finality in Decision-making is also important in moving the PPS along. One 
of the key issues that inhibits public participation online (but the same can be said of offline 
participation) is that the subject of the public participation process becomes 'old news' and the 
IAP's lose interest in the process and the outcome. This can happen for a multitude of reasons: 
the matter has been widely debated in the media prior to the launching of the public participation 
process or there is an event unrelated to the public participation process (such as 9-11 or the 
Public Protector issuing her report on state capture) which directs IAP's attention away from 
participating. If the process runs for too long with significant intervals IAP's may be discouraged 
and lose interest in the process. Where IAP's do lose interest, the proponent may be required to 
implement new measures to resuscitate participation (if necessary). The assessor, in auditing the 
process may also make recommendations on how to encourage participation where the PPS is 
failing to sustain effective participation. 
6.6 Auditing the Public Participation Strategy
Monitoring the PPS is comprised of two stages: firstly, the assessor must confirm that the 
process that has been implemented matches the process set out in the PPS. This is an objective 
inquiry. To the extent that the proponent has deviated from the process without following due 
process, the public participation process may (if the deviation is material) be defective. The 
second phase of the investigation considers whether the implemented process gives effect to the 
substantive principles (Principle 17: The Principle of Monitoring and Evaluation). 
This second phase is difficult to prove scientifically as achieving these principles is 
completely within the IAP's subjective assessment of the public participation process. The 
assessor must, therefore, design a monitoring programme to understand whether the IAP's 
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mindsets align with the requirements of the substantive principles.803 The assessment may appear 
to be an additional administrative burden to conducting a public participation process. However, 
while the assessment may be an additional step during the public participation process, it will 
improve the efficacy of the public participation in the long run as it will assist the proponent in 
developing a public participation process that meets the democratic participatory principles and 
thus it is less likely to be challenged.
The following four factors inform the monitoring programme: ‘(1) the purpose of the 
research, (2) the theoretical paradigm informing the research, (3) the context or situation within 
which the research is carried out, and (4) the research techniques employed to collect and analyse 
the data.’804
6.6.1 The purpose of the monitoring programme
Defining the purpose of the monitoring programme requires that the assessor define who and 
about what he or she seeks to draw conclusions. The 'who' can easily be answered as the 
proponent will have identified the IAP's prior to developing the PPS. The assessor, however, will 
need to consider whether there are any IAP's missing or have been excluded without a legitimate 
government purpose. If there are any IAP's that have been excluded or are missing, the PPS will 
need to be amended to cater for these IAP's.  
The purpose of the monitoring programme is to determine whether the IAP's feel that, 
through the implementation of the PPS, they:
• understand the various competing interests of all the IAP's as compared to their own 
personal interest and appreciate the viewpoint which reflects the public interest;
• feel that they exercise a degree of control over the process and can influence the outcome 
of the decision; 
                                               
803 The monitoring programme needs to assess whether: (1) the participatory process set out in the PPS educates the
individual in distinguishing between his personal interest and the common interest and (in so doing) eliminates
polarised views (Section 2.3 Principle 1: The Educative Effect) by sharing of information (section 2.3.1
Constructing Knowledge) and collectively problem-solving solutions (Section 2.3.2 Problem-Solving Mechanisms);
(2) the process develops the IAP's’ sense of control over the process and the outcome (section 2.4 Principle 2: The
Principle of Control); (3) the IAP's favour the decision(s) made or at least trust that the process if fair and
transparent; (4) the IAP's believe that their views count, that they are heard and that they feel valued.   
804 Martin Terre Blanche, Kevin Durrheim & Desmond Painter (Eds) Research In Practice 2nd Ed (2007) at 37.
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• support the outcome of the participatory process because they believe the process to be 
fair and
• believe their views have been taken into consideration and addressed.
The monitoring programme seeks to determine the subjective state of mind of the IAP's. The 
research paradigm, on the other hand, provides the theoretical framework which defines the 
scope of the investigation into whether the substantive participatory principles have been 
achieved.
6.6.2 The research paradigm
Terre Blanche et al describe research paradigms as
‘all-encompassing systems of interrelated practice and thinking that define for researchers the nature of their 
enquiry along three dimensions: ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Ontology specifies the nature of 
the reality that is being studied, and what can be known about it. Epistemology specifies the nature of the 
relationship between the researcher (knower) and what can be known. Methodology specifies how 
researchers may go about practically studying whatever they believe can be known.’805
The interpretive research paradigm applies in situations such as this where the reality 
under investigation (ontology) is related to the subjective experiences of people.806 In these 
instances the assessor will adopt qualitative research techniques to collect and make sense of 
these participants’ views about the public participation process and the fulfillment of the 
democratic participatory principles. ‘Thus the interpretive approach does not focus on isolating 
and controlling variables, but on harnessing and extending the power of ordinary language and 
expression to help us understand the social world we live in.’807 The results of qualitative 
research such as this tend to be less scientific than the quantitative information gathered in a 
strictly positivist investigation. To ensure that the results of these investigations are useful, the 
assessor must be conscious of two principles when conducting interpretive research: firstly, the 
researcher must understand the context within which the information is gathered and secondly, 
the role of the researcher in collecting and interpreting the information must be determined.808
                                               
805 Ibid at 6.
806 Sharan B Merriam and Elizabeth J Tisdell Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation (2016)
at 243.
807 Terre Blanche op cit note 804 at 274.
808 Ibid.
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6.6.3 Epistemology and Context
It is important to understand the context in which the monitoring programme will be conducted: 
it is an assessment of the IAP's mindset to determine whether the PPS is effectively 
implementing the democratic participatory principles.809 This investigation cannot be drawn out 
by endless interviews and inputs. It is important, therefore, that this assessment is conducted as 
quickly as possible to allow for the PPS to be amended (where necessary) so that the public 
participation process can proceed without significant delays. To the extent that principles are not 
being achieved, further (more detailed) investigation may be required. To ensure a speedy 
assessment of the efficacy of the PPS, the monitoring programme must adopt a methodology that 
is able to 'check the pulse' of the participants, evaluate the mindset of the IAP's and take the 
appropriate action, be it amending the PPS, engaging further with certain IAP's or deciding that 
no further action is required. 
In assessing the suitability of the PPS and its implementation, the assessor must also 
determine whether the proponent exercises any subjective bias towards the proposed 
development or decision which impacts on the proponent’s actions in implementing the PPS. For 
example, a situation in which a proponent with a capitalist bent adopts a robust attitude to 
exclude outsider participants as he is of the view that they are unlikely to add value to the 
process but may delay the proposed project. In these instances, the assessor may require the 
proponent to take specific action to ensure the process is fair and IAP's are not discriminated 
against based on the proponent’s inherent bias. 
6.6.4 Methodology: The research techniques and data analysis
The assessor needs to adopt a monitoring programme that is appropriate for the context and the 
purpose. That is, the assessor needs to implement a programme which quickly and efficiently 
determines the subjective mindset of the IAP's to confirm whether the democratic participatory 
principles have been achieved. 
The method used to assess the PPS can be described as both descriptive and exploratory. 
It is descriptive in the sense that the assessor must compare the implemented process against the 
                                               
809 Rachal Ormston, Liz Spencer, Matt Barnard and Dawn Snape 'The Foundations of Qualitative Research' in 
Qualitative Research Practice A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (2013) Jane Ritchie, Jane Lewis, 
Carol McNaughton Nicholls and Rachel Ormston (Eds) at 6.
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PPS. Any discrepancies which may exist between it and the PPS may compromise the public 
participation process unless (notwithstanding the discrepancy) the democratic participatory 
principles are achieved. The exploratory element of the investigation requires that the assessor 
‘employ an open, flexible, and inductive approach to research’810 in answering the research 
question (i.e. does the implementation of the PPS give effect to the democratic participatory 
principles?)
6.6.4.1 Qualitative Research
Answering the research question requires that the assessor adopt a qualitative research 
methodology (as opposed to a quantitative methodology) as it is naturalistic, holistic and 
inductive811 and involves
‘[s]tudying real-work situations as they unfold naturally; non-manipulative; unobtrusive, and non-
controlling; openness to whatever emerges - lack of predetermined constraints on outcomes…The whole 
phenomenon under study is understood as a complex system that is more than the sum of its parts; focus
on a more complex interdependencies, not meaningfully reduced to a few discreet variables and linear, 
cause-effect relationships…Immersion in the details and specifics of the data to discover important 
categories, dimensions, and interrelationships; begin by exploring genuinely open questions rather than 
testing theoretically derived (deductive) hypotheses.’812
Given the context within which the monitoring process takes place, it is not possible to adopt 
genuinely open questions which allow the IAP's to provide open-ended answers in the same 
manner as they would during the public participation process. The purpose of monitoring the 
public participation process is to 'check the pulse' of the process to ensure that it gives effect to 
the democratic participatory principles. Conducting a survey (either in writing or orally, 
depending on the identity of the IAP's) may be a quick and easy way to determine whether there 
are any problems with the public participation process which may require further investigation 
with specific IAP's or on a particular subject matter (Principle 16: The Principle of Efficiency). 
The Monitoring Survey of Public Participation Process could be structured in the 
following manner:
(a) The mode of participation employed in the public participation allowed IAP's an opportunity 
to express their views, concerns or ideas.
(i) disagree
                                               
810 Ibid at 44.
811 Ormston et al op cit note 809 at 6.
812 Terre Blanche op cit note 804 at 48.
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(ii) agree
(b) Where parties expressed opposing views, the mode of participation employed required those 
parties to explain, justify and debate their views.
(i) disagree
(ii) agree
(c) Once parties explained, justified and debated their views, the number of contested issues 
decreased as parties understood the various viewpoints and found them not to be in dispute.
(i) disagree
(ii) agree
(d) Where matters could not be resolved, the conflicting parties participated in problem-solving 
mechanisms which successfully resolved in the dispute.
(i) disagree
(ii) agree
(iii) not relevant. 
If the results of the survey generate a positive result (i.e. the IAP's agree with the research 
questions), it would not be necessary to undertake further investigation. Where only certain 
questions have been answered negatively or only certain IAP's have answered negatively, the 
assessor can adopt a qualitative research methodology to determine the cause of the IAP's
dissatisfaction and create solutions which could be adopted to rectify the non-compliance with 
the democratic participatory principles. For this reason it is important that the surveys are not 
anonymous.
In considering the outcome of the survey and implementing the qualitative assessment (if 
necessary), the assessor will rely on the procedural principles, including:
• Principle 7: The Principle of Deference
• Although the qualitative assessment investigates the subjective views of the relevant 
IAP, the assessor does not need to defer to the IAP’s demand to amend the PPS. The 
assessor, as an independent party, can consider the reasonableness of the IAP’s 
subjective views in light of the context (Principle 11: The Principle of Context).
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• As part of the qualitative assessment, the assessor must consider whether the 
proponent is inhibiting the IAP's from participating (Principle 5: The Principle of 
Inclusivity) or if the IAP's are trying to frustrate the public participation process. In 
the former cases, the assessor can amend the PPS to ensure that the substantive 
principles in respect of the IAP's are achieved. In the latter case, the assessor can 
refuse to amend the strategy. (The assessor’s decisions would need to be included in 
the list of administrative decisions contained in PAJA which cannot be reviewed 
otherwise disgruntled IAP's could use this as an opportunity to frustrate the public 
participation process prior to its completion).
• Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility 
• Where the assessor concludes that the PPS is deficient, the assessor can make 
various changes including (but not limited to):
• The adoption of a new mode of participation in respect of certain IAP's 
(Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity);
• an adaption to the existing mode of participation described in the strategy;
• the development of problem-solving mechanisms where IAP's are at 
loggerheads with one another or the proponent.813
Having identified the research question which needs to be answered, the purpose of the 
monitoring programme, the theoretical constructs defining the nature of the monitoring 
investigation, as well as the type of study which will be implemented in order to answer the 
research question in the monitoring programme design, the assessor will also need to determine 
whether there are any practical constraints which would inhibit the monitoring programme such 
as timing, cost and number of IAP's. As set out in the previous chapters, although cost may be a 
limiting factor, it cannot justify a sub-standard or unconstitutional participatory process. Where 
the group of IAP's is large, it may prevent the assessor from quickly assessing the 
constitutionality of the participatory process. In this case, the assessor may only assess a sample
of the IAP's.
                                               
813 Principle 1: The Educative Effect.
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6.6.4.2 Sampling of Interested and Affected Parties
Sampling involves the selection of parties from the list of IAP's who will be monitored to 
determine whether they believe the substantive principles have been achieved in implementing 
the PPS. As expressed in Chapter 2, although full participation is not a requirement of 
participatory democracy, where parties elect to participate, the democratic participatory 
principles must be achieved. Since the achievement of these principles is based on a subjective 
evaluation of the IAP's, the assessor cannot assume that the proponent has complied with the 
democratic participatory principles by including a certain number of participants in the process. 
This means that the assessor needs to monitor and interact with each and every IAP who elected 
to participate in the public participation process to determine whether the substantive principles 
were achieved in respect of that person. 
In some instances this may be possible as the IAP's may be a small defined group. For 
example, in an EIA public participation process, the IAP's are required to register with the EAP. 
The EAP is required to maintain a database of all IAP's for that project. In other situations, the 
group of IAP's may be less definite and may refer to general groups of people. For example, the 
'health legislation' that the National Assembly and NCOP sought to pass and which was the 
subject of the Doctors for Life case (discussed in Chapter 3), may have affected an amorphous 
group of people and organisations. 
In the former example it may (depending on the number of IAP's) be satisfactory to 
monitor all of the IAP's listed on the database. In these instances, it would be possible for the 
EAP to forward the Monitoring Survey of the Public Participation Process mentioned below to 
the IAP's to seek out their responses.814 Where the database is very large, it may not be practical 
or feasible to monitor each participant. In these instances the assessor would need to select IAP's 
to monitor. The assessor will need to ensure that the sample is representative of all IAP's 
participating in the process and that the size of the sampled group is large enough for the 
assessor to draw accurate conclusions about the group. The same requirement applies in respect 
of the IAP's who wish to participate in the development of the health legislation. However, the 
                                               
814 Merely forwarding the survey to registered IAP's may not be appropriate where the IAP's are part of a rural
community and do not have a reliable postal service, access to electronic resources or cannot read or write. In these
cases it may be necessary for the assessor to meet directly with the IAP's.
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manner in which the sample of participants is monitored may differ, based on the circumstances. 
For example, probability sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling or 
non-probability sampling.815
Based on the outcome of the Monitoring Survey of the Public Participation Process, the 
assessor may be able to identify if there are any particular individuals or groups which require 
further assessment in order to identify changes to the PPS. Once the assessor is aware of the 
individual(s) or group(s) which feel that the substantive principles have not been achieved, he or 
she can develop a strategy (in conjunction with the IAP's) on how to engage with these groups or
individuals. Based on this investigation, the assessor can propose changes to the PPS. 
The assessor's function is ongoing to ensure that the democratic participatory principles 
are being achieved. Through this function, it is hoped that there will be 'broader and better'
participation which gives effect to the democratic participatory principles and results in fewer 
challenges to the project or decision to which the public participation process relates (Principle 
15: The Principle of Continuity). 
6.7 Conclusion
The CFPP consolidates the democratic participatory principles into a framework which can be 
used to develop a public participation process in any circumstances (be it online or by more 
traditional forms of participation). Given its broad application, the CFPP is general in nature and 
will need to be moulded to every particular circumstance and application. In the next chapter, the
South African EIA public participation process is measured against the CFPP to determine 
whether the current legislated requirements and day-to-day implementation of these sections 
comply with the CFPP and, as a result, pass constitutional muster. 
                                               
815 Merriam and Tisdell op cit note 806 at 96;Terre Blanche et al op cit note 710 at 131 - 140.
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Chapter 7
The Environmental Impact Assessment Public Participation 
Process in South Africa
7.1 Reviewing Environmental Impact Assessment public participation 
processes in terms of the Constitutional Framework for Public 
Participation 
The CFPP embodies the democratic participatory principles identified in this thesis. It is 
suggested that it can be applied by lawyers, administrators, government representatives and 
others responsible for implementing and facilitating public participation processes to ensure 
that these processes are more closely aligned with the Constitution. The CFPP will assist in 
developing a consistent approach to participatory processes and the terminology used in those 
processes. As has been discussed in detail in other chapters, the purpose of the CFPP and of 
the development of participatory practice and terminology is not to remove or limit the 
discretion afforded to the proponent but is aimed at facilitating the expression of that 
discretion so that both the proponent and the IAP's have a clear understanding of their rights 
and obligations in a public participation process. 
In this chapter, the participatory process required during an EIA in South Africa will 
be analysed in light of the CFPP to determine whether it passes constitutional scrutiny. Since 
the introduction of the Constitution and the environmental right, there have been four 
iterations of EIA regulations.816 The public participation process set out in each of these has 
not changed substantially. Therefore, although only the EIA public participation processes 
developed in terms of the National Environmental Management Act817 ('NEMA') will be 
considered in light of the CFPP, the outcome of this assessment is likely to apply to the 
previous versions under the Environment Conservation Act.818 Before considering the public 
                                               
816 A number of academics have published works regarding the effectiveness (or not) of the various iterations of 
the EIA public participation process including: A du Plessis 'Public participation, good environmental 
governance and fulfilment of environmental rights' (2008) 11(2) PERJ 252; Luke A Sandham and Hester M 
Pretorius 'A review of EIA report quality in the North West province of South Africa' (2008) 28 Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review 229 – 240; John O Kakonge 'Problems with Public Participation in EIA Process: 
Examples from sub-Saharan Africa' (1996) 14:3 Impact Assessment 308 – 317; Ian Sampson 'So near and yet so 
far with environmental impact assessments' (2007) 15:2 Juta Business Law 77 – 82. 
817 107 of 1998.
818 73 of 1989.
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participation process, it is necessary to consider briefly the empowering legislation which 
impacts upon the public participation process in the NEMA. 
7.2 The empowering legislation: the Constitution and National 
Environmental Management Act
As highlighted in the previous Chapters and the CFPP, the procedural principles are required 
to give effect to the substantive principles. Therefore, unless there is any valid limitation on 
the democratic participatory principles in the NEMA, the public participation processes 
implemented in terms of this legislation must also give effect to them. 
Over and above the environmental principles set out in section 2819 of the NEMA 
which requires public participation820 in environmental processes and decisions, Chapter 5 of 
the NEMA establishes environmental management tools aimed at ensuring integrated 
environmental management of activities. Section 23(2) of the NEMA sets out the general 
objectives of integrated environmental management which include the promotion of the 
environmental principles, as well as ensuring an ‘adequate and appropriate opportunity for 
public participation in decisions that may affect the environment.’ There are a number of 
options which could be used to achieve these objectives, the most common of which is the 
EIA process.821
Section 24 of the NEMA states that ‘the potential consequences for or impacts on the 
environment of listed activities or specified activities must be considered, investigated, 
assessed and reported on to the competent authority…except in respect of those activities 
                                               
819
The relevant section 2 principles include:
 'The participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental governance must be promoted, 
and all people must have the opportunity to develop the understanding, skills and capacity necessary 
for achieving equitable and effective participation, and participation by vulnerable and disadvantaged 
persons must be ensured' (s2(4)(f));
 'Decisions must take into account the interests, needs and values of all interested and affected parties, 
and this includes recognizing all forms of knowledge, including traditional and ordinary knowledge' 
(s2(4)(g));
 'Community well-being and empowerment must be promoted through environmental education, the 
raising of environmental awareness, the sharing of knowledge and experience and other appropriate 
means.' (s2(4)(h));
 'The vital role of women and youth in environmental management and development must be 
recognized and their full participation therein must be promoted.' (s2(4)(q)).
820 Public participation is defined in the NEMA as 'in relation to the assessment of the environmental impact of 
any application for an environmental authorisation, means a process by which potential interested and affected 
parties are given opportunity to comment on, or raise issues relevant to, the application.' 
821 Michael Kidd and Francois Retief 'Environmental Assessment' in HA Strydom and ND King Eds Fuggle and 
Rabie's Environmental Management in South Africa 2ndEd (2009) at 981.
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which may commence without having to obtain an environmental authorisation.’822 In 
considering, investigating, assessing and reporting the environmental impacts of an activity, 
the applicant must comply with any procedure relating to public participation.823 These 
procedures must ensure that IAP's are provided with a reasonable opportunity to participate in 
participation procedures and ‘public information’.824 The notion of a 'reasonable opportunity 
to participate' has been considered above within the context of the Doctors for Life case825
and thus incorporated into the CFPP. Therefore, to the extent that these regulations fail to 
meet the obligations of the CFPP either in the text or in the way in which the regulations are
implemented, the IAP's will not have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate. 
The content of these procedures can be prescribed in regulation.826 It must be noted, however, 
that in 'South Africa the parameters and level of public participation are shared no only by the 
legal and institutional framework, but also by other variables like the social and economic 
status of the citizens or [IAP's]…While public participation should aim to strike consensus or 
shared understandings, this may be difficult to achieve in a society with very wide gaps 
between the rich and the poor. The needs and concerns of these population groups are by no 
means homogenous.'827
The EIA public participation process contemplated in the EIA Regulations is set out below. 
7.3 The Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations
In 2006 the Minister of Environmental Affairs published listed activities which were later 
replaced by the 2010 EIA Regulations and these were again replaced in 2014 (collectively 
'the EIA Regulations'). There are no substantial differences between these versions and so
they will be dealt with together, and any guidelines created in terms of one version of EIA 
Regulations are likely to apply to the other versions (to the extent that they are still relevant).  
7.3.1 The 2006 and 2010 Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations
In terms of these regulations, the EAP is required to notify all potential IAP's of an 
application for an environmental authorisation. Except for notifying certain landowners and 
authorities, the EIA Regulations do not require that the EAP investigate all possible IAP's and 
(in particular) the stakeholders or outsiders who may have situated knowledge. This should 
                                               
822 NEMA supra note 817 at s24(1).
823 Ibid at s24(1A).
824 Ibid at s24(2A)(4)(v).
825 See section 3.5 Participating in creating legislation.
826 Ibid at s24(5)(b)(vii).
827 T Murombo 'Beyond Public Participation: The Disjuncture between South Africa's Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) Law and Sustainable Development' (2008) Vol 3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal at 4.
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form part of the PPS which focuses on the way in which IAP's receive information and can be 
notified of the proposed activities. 
The notification requirements set out in the EIA Regulations are prescriptive in that 
the notice must
(a) ‘give details of the application which is subjected to public participation; and
(b) state-
(i) that the application has been submitted to the competent authority in terms of these Regulations, as 
the case may be;
(ii) whether the basic assessment or scoping procedures are being applied to the applications, in the 
case of an application for environmental authorisation;
(iii) the nature and location of the activity to which the application relates;
(iv) whether further information on the application or activity can be obtained; and
(v) the manner in which and the person to whom representations in respect of the application may be 
made.’828
In respect of the public participation process itself, the EIA Regulations provide limited 
direction to the EAP regarding the manner in which it should be conducted. All that the EIA 
Regulations require is that the EAP
‘must ensure that-
(a) information containing all relevant facts in respect of the application is made available to 
potential interested and affected parties; and
(b) participation by potential interested and affected parties is facilitated in such a manner that all 
potential interested and affected parties are provided with a reasonable opportunity to 
comment on the application.’829
In giving effect to this obligation, the EAP must open and maintain a register of all 
IAP's including their names, contact details and addresses. The register must include parties 
which have submitted comments in terms of the public participation process, parties which
have requested to be included in the register and all organs of state which have jurisdiction 
over activities related to the application.830 All of these registered IAP's are 
‘entitled to comment in writing, on all written submissions, including draft reports made to the 
competent authority by the applicant or the EAP managing an application, and to bring to the attention 
of the competent authority any issues which the party believes may be of significance to the 
consideration of the application, provided that-
(a) comments are submitted within-
(i) the timeframes that have been approved or set by the competent authority; or
(ii) any extension of a timeframe agreed to by the applicant or the EAP;
(b) a copy of comments submitted directly to the competent authority is served on the EAP; and
(c) the interested and affected party discloses any direct business, financial, personal or other 
interest which that party may have in the approval or refusal of the application.’831
                                               
828 Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations op cit note 71 at reg56(3).
829 Ibid at reg54(7).
830 Ibid at reg55(1).
831 Ibid at reg56(1).
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All draft reports must be submitted to the competent authority prior to awarding IAP's 
an opportunity to comment. The IAP's must submit their comments to the EAP ‘who should 
record it in accordance’ with the regulations.832 The final reports compiled and submitted to 
the competent authority must be made available to the IAP's for comment. The IAP's 
comments in respect of the final reports must be submitted directly to the competent 
authority.833 The prescribed process does not require the EAP to conduct any form of process 
which facilitates debate and discussion of issues.834 Parties are only afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to comment - a process similar to notice and comment proceedings, which Harter 
suggested led to adversarial positioning rather than collaboration.835 Without facilitated 
moderation, participants are unlikely to accept decisions arising from these processes as they 
will feel that they have not exercised any degree of control over the process.836
In 2012 the Minister of Environmental Affairs published guidelines in respect of EIA 
public participation processes titled the National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act 
No 107 of 1998) Publication of Public Participation Guidelines ('the Guidelines'). The 
purpose of the Guidelines is to assist applicants, EAP's and IAP's in identifying their 
respective roles in the EIA process.837 The importance of public participation in EIA's is 
highlighted in the Guidelines.
‘It is considered so important that it is the only requirement for which exemption [in terms of NEMA] 
cannot be given. This is because people have a right to be informed about potential decisions that may 
affect them and to be afforded an opportunity to influence those decisions. Effective public participation 
also facilitates informed decision-making by the competent authority and may result in better decisions 
as the view of all parties are considered.’838
The Guidelines go on to list the benefits of public participation:
• ‘it provides an opportunity for IAP's, EAPs and the Competent Authority (CA) to obtain clear, accurate 
and understandable information about the environmental impacts of the proposed activity or 
implications of a decision;
• it provides IAP's with an opportunity to voice their support, concerns and questions regarding the 
project, application or decision;
• it provides IAP's with the opportunity of suggesting ways for reducing or mitigating any negative 
impacts of the project and for enhancing its positive impacts;
• it enables an applicant to incorporate the needs, preferences and values of affected parties into its 
application;
                                               
832 Ibid at reg56(5).
833 Ibid reg56(6).
834 Principle 1: The Educative Effect.
835 Harter op cit note 622.
836 Principle 2: The Principle of Control and Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate.
837 Integrated Environmental Management Guidelines Series (Guideline 7): Public Participation in the
Environmental Impact Assessment Process GNR 807 of 10 October 2012 in Government Gazette 35769.
838 Ibid at 240.
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• it provides opportunities for clearing up misunderstandings about technical issues, resolving disputes 
and reconciling conflicting interests;
• it is an important aspect of securing transparency and accountability in decision-making; and
• it contributes towards maintaining a healthy, vibrant democracy.’839
The Guidelines are more closely aligned with the democratic participatory principles than the 
EIA Regulations are. They recognise that the requirement to conduct public participation can 
arise in a variety of circumstances: the assessment of the environmental impacts associated 
with the undertaking of proposed activities; an application for an exemption or an amendment 
to an authorisation. The nature and extent of the public participation process will vary 
depending on the circumstances.840 Irrespective of which process is adopted, the EAP must 
invite all stakeholders to participate in the process. Certain stakeholders must require (in 
terms of the EIA Regulations) written notification of the proposed activities. Others will be 
informed through the public advertisements. The EAP should identify key stakeholders with 
situated knowledge which should be approached to engage in the process.841 This hints at the 
notion of 'outsiders' to the participatory process.842
Under the heading 'Commenting periods and consultation with State departments and 
other IAP's, the Guidelines indicate that IAP's must be provided with an opportunity to 
comment on all written submissions which the proponent submits to the competent authority. 
The time period within which these written comments or submissions must be lodged must be 
set out in the invitation or notice calling for comments.843 This opportunity to comment is 
recognised as the bare minimum form of consultation. The Guidelines acknowledge that the
‘minimum requirements for public participation outlined in the EIA Regulations will not necessarily 
be sufficient for all applications. This is because the circumstances of each application are different, 
and it may be necessary in some situations to incorporate extra steps in the public participation 
process.’844
This concession that the minimum requirements specified in the EIA Regulations may 
not be sufficient in all instances is a matter for concern. While it is acknowledged that 
variability is an essential component when implementing a public participation process, 
neither the NEMA, the EIA Regulations nor the Guidelines provide sufficient guidance on 
how the proponent can meet the participatory obligations in the democratic participatory 
                                               
839 Ibid.
840 Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility.
841 Public Participation Guidelines op cit note 837 at 243.
842 Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's.
843 Public Participation Guidelines op cit note 837 at 243 - 244.
844 Ibid.
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principles. As such, the EAP conducting the participation process is required to implement a 
process which he or she believes to be suitable in the circumstances. In doing so, the 
Guidelines state that he or she should consider (1) the degree of the impact arising from the 
proposed project; (2) the sensitivity of the affected environment and the degree of 
controversy surrounding the project and (3) the characteristics of the IAP's which will be 
impacted upon by the proposed project.845
In providing content to these considerations, the Guidelines include some questions:
‘Scale of anticipated impacts:
Are the impacts of the project likely to extend beyond the boundaries of the local municipality?
Are the impacts of the project likely to extend beyond the boundary of the province?
Is the project a greenfield development (a new development in a previously undisturbed area)?
Does the area already suffer from socio-economic problems (e.g. job losses) or environmental 
problems (e.g. pollution), and is the project likely to exacerbate these?
Is the project expected to have a wide variety of impacts (e.g. socio-economic and ecological)?
Public and environmental sensitivity of the project:
Are there widespread public concerns about the potential negative impacts of the project?
Is there a high degree of conflict among interested and affected persons?
Will the project impact on private land other than that of the applicant?
Does the project have the potential to create unrealistic expectations (e.g. that a new factory would 
create a large number of jobs)?
Potentially affected parties:
Has very little previous participation taken place in the area?
Did previous public participation processes in the area result in conflict?
Are there existing organisational structures (e.g. local forums) that can represent interested and 
affected persons?
What is the literacy level of the community in terms of their ability to participate meaningfully within 
the public participation process?
Is the area characterised by high social diversity (i.t.o. socio-economic status, language or culture)?
Were people in the area victims of unfair expropriations or relocations in the past?
Is there a high level of unemployment in the area?
Do the interested and affected persons have special needs (e.g. a lack of skills to read or write, 
disability, etc)?’846
These questions are useful in directing the EAP’s attention to the objectives of Principle 3: 
The Social Licence to Operate, Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's and Principle 10: The 
Public Participation Strategy in selecting a public participation process in that they raise 
issues regarding the social licence to operate, diversity in the community and the literacy 
level. Unfortunately, although forcing the EAP to identify these issues, he or she is not 
assisted in what to do with the information generated by these questions (i.e. to build the 
PPS). Furthermore, the Guidelines do not provide for a benchmark against which the 'success'
of the process can be assessed to determine whether it is effective. All that the Guidelines 
state is that the EAP would (having answered these questions) be better placed to determine 
                                               
845 Ibid.
846 Ibid at 245.
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which mode of participation could best be implemented: ‘public meetings, or open days; 
conferences; press releases; questionnaires or opinion surveys; information desks and / or 
info lines (helpline) or meetings / workshops with constituencies’.847
The Guidelines do not provide any guidance on how these modes of participation 
should be implemented so as to best give effect to the CFPP or on how to resolve some of the 
difficulties known to arise from public participation processes which the CFPP seeks to 
rectify, for example:
• EAP's (although independent) can be pressured to select a mode of participation that 
meets the formal legislative requirements but which limits the IAP's role as 
participation can frustrate rather than support development. Modes of participation 
which amount to nothing more than tokenism do not necessarily speed up the process 
in the long run as alienated citizens do not trust the process and are more likely to 
appeal and review administrative decisions;
• the public engagement process generally excludes the public’s views in favour of 
polarised views of interest groups.848 This is particularly evident in situations 
involving environmental NGO's in 'controversial' projects849 or where participants are 
more organised or have financial backing;850
• low levels of participation due to apathy, insufficient information or negative past 
experiences;851
• participating in public participation meetings is costly and time intensive. Parties 
which are self-employed cannot afford to spend time attending meetings rather than 
generating income;852
• participation is often undertaken too late in the process, preventing IAP's from 
properly influencing the alternatives for the proposed activity or other important 
variables like the size or location of the activity;853
                                               
847 Ibid at 245 - 246.
848 Judith Innes and David Booher ‘Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century’ (2004) Vol
5, No 4 Planning Theory & Practice 419 - 436 at 419.
849 Moote, Mcclaren & Chickering op cit note 176 at 877.
850 Hoexter op cit note 436 at 80.
851 Roger Few, Katrina Brown & Emma L Tompkins ‘Public participation and climate change adaptation:
avoiding the illusion of inclusion’ 7 (2007) Climate Policy 46 - 59 at 49.
852 Moote, Mcclaren & Chickering op cit note 176 at 883.
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• people stop participating because they feel frustrated by the process as there are no 
definite conclusions or outcomes. This can be coupled with the fact that the 
participants do not understand the consultative process, their right or the objectives 
and generally feel frustrated and exasperated;854
• certain objections during the EIA public participation process are purely strategic. 
These855 IAP's participate in EIA processes with the hope of preventing the 
development from proceeding at all or in a manner that will affect them or their 
members, directly or indirectly. Participating in an EIA process can in many ways be 
compared with a negotiation in that each party takes a position, provides evidence in 
support of the view he or she has put forward and makes certain concessions in order 
to reach an amicable solution. Fisher and Ury refer to this form of negotiation as 
‘positional bargaining.’856 Although positional bargaining is useful in identifying 
what each party wants in an agreement, they indicate that it ‘fails to meet the basic 
criteria of producing wise agreement, efficiently and amicably.’857 They go on to state 
that when:
‘negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock themselves into those positions. The 
more you clarify your position and defend it against attack, the more committed you become 
to it. The more you try to convince the other side of the impossibility of changing your 
opening position, the more difficult it becomes for you to do so. Your ego becomes
identified with your position. You now have a new interest in 'saving face' - reconciling 
future action with past position - making it less and less likely that any agreement will 
wisely reconcile the parties’ original interest.’858
Increased communication and understanding of the participants’ views does not necessarily 
result in compromise or consensus.859 When conflicts occur, the proponent is required to 
implement problem-solving mechanisms to try and resolve any conflict. 
What is evident is that the modes of public participation implemented during an EIA 
require re-evaluation. It is insufficient for the EAP merely to identify a traditional mode of 
public participation, implement this and expect that the form of participation will meet the 
constitutional and legal requirements of participatory democracy or solve the difficulties 
                                                                                                                                                 
853 Anne Shepherd and Christi Bowler ‘Beyond Requirements: Improving Public Participation in EIA’ (1997)
40(6) Journal of Environmental Planning and Management at 727.
854 Moote, McClaren & Chickering op cit note 176 at 883; Innes and Booher op cit note 848 at 419.
855 Tim Holmes and Ian Scoones ‘Participatory Environmental Policy Processes: Experiences from North and
South’ (2000) IDS Working Paper 113 Institute of Development Studies; Few, Brown and Tompkins op cit note
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857 Ibid.
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associated with public participation set out above. The recently promulgated 2014 EIA 
Regulations unfortunately do not create a public participation system that is more closely 
aligned with the CFPP for the reasons set out below. 
7.3.2 The 2014 Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations
The most recent version of the EIA Regulations was promulgated on 4 December 2014.860
Chapter 6 of the EIA Regulations, entitled 'Public Participation', is comprised of six sections,
setting out the consultation requirements which must be implemented during an EIA. For the 
most part, these sections are not different from the 2006 and 2010 EIA Regulations. As in the 
case of the previous EIA Regulations, IAP's must be afforded access 
‘to all information that reasonably has or may have the potential to influence any decision with regard 
to an application including an opportunity to comment on reports…prior to submission of an 
application but [also] must be provided an opportunity to comment on such reports once an application 
has been submitted to the competent authority.’861
The 2014 EIA Regulations are prescriptive about the manner and form in which IAP's 
must be notified about a proposed application. A new section states that the notification 
requirements do not need to be repeated in respect of subsequent additional public 
participation processes which may be required, provided that the initial public participation 
complied with the regulations and the IAP's receive written notification of where they can 
obtain a copy of relevant information and to whom they can make submissions. 
In complying with these responsibilities, the EAP 
‘must ensure that-
(a) Information containing all relevant facts in respect of the application or proposed application is 
made available to potential interested and affected parties; and
(b) Participation by potential or registered interested and affected parties is facilitated in such a 
manner that all potential or registered interested and affected parties are provided with a 
reasonable opportunity to comment on the application or proposed application.’862
In doing this, the EAP may use 'reasonable alternative methods…in those instances where a 
person is desirous of but unable to participate in the process due to – (i) illiteracy; (ii) 
disability; or (iii) other disadvantage' to assist these IAP's in participating. The EIA 
Regulations do not indicate what these 'reasonable alternative methods' may be but this 
section allows (at least in principle) the adoption of the CFPP and in the inclusion of 
'outsiders'.  
                                               
860 Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations op cit note 71.
861 Ibid at reg40.
862 Ibid at reg 41(6).
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A register of all IAP's must be created, and maintained and submitted to the 
competent authority with the application: this must include the names, contact details and 
addresses of-
(a) ‘all persons who, as a consequence of the public participation process conducted in respect of 
that application, have submitted written comments or attended meetings with the proponent, 
applicant or EAP;
(b) all persons who have requested the proponent or applicant, in writing, for their names to be 
placed on the register; and
(c) all organs of state which have jurisdiction in respect of the activity to which the application 
relates.’863
The registered IAP's are ‘entitled to comment, in writing, on all reports or plans submitted to 
such party during the public participation process…and to bring to the attention of the 
proponent or applicant any issues which the that party believes may be of significance to the
consideration of the application.’864 These comments must be included in the reports along 
with the responses provided by the EAP and the minutes of any meetings held with these 
IAP's.
Based on the above, it is evident that in all iterations of the EIA Regulations, the 
public participation process does not differ significantly. One consistent factor is that the 
EAP is afforded significant discretion in the manner in which he or she designs the public 
participation process, while the notification requirements are more prescriptive. 
Unfortunately, as is evident from the example set out below, the EAP tends to adopt a process 
that is remarkably similar to the notice and comment proceedings and fails to implement the 
other vital components of the CFPP, failing to align with the democratic participatory 
principles. 
7.4 The Environmental Impact Assessment public participation process 
analysed against the Constitutional Framework for Public Participation
As is evident from the above, the EIA public participation process tends to focus more on 
notifying IAP's of the proposed activity rather than on the mode(s) of participation which
would be implemented. That being said, the following aspects of the process, when compared 
to the CFPP are notable.
First, the EIA Regulations oblige the proponent to give notice to all IAP's. However, 
the general obligation is limited by the fact that the notice must be placed on a notice board in 
a conspicuous place on the affected property, written notice must be given to specified parties 
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and an advertisement must be placed in a newspaper.865 The proponent, therefore, is not 
obliged to consider whether there are outsiders or missing parties who may not read a notice 
board or an advertisement but who may be able to contribute situated knowledge and should 
be targeted or notified specifically. In this way, the existing EIA public participation process 
disregards Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity and Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's
as there is no requirement for the proponent to consider whether such persons exist and take 
reasonable steps to include these parties in the process. 
Secondly, there is no obligation for the proponent to develop and publish a PPS 
setting out when and how the IAP's will be engaged; whether they will be allowed to submit 
comments on only one occasion or whether there will be numerous opportunities or whether 
the proposed modes of participation that will be implemented are appropriate. All that the 
proponent must ensure is that IAP's must be provided with a reasonable opportunity to submit 
comments. This is broad and does not provide the proponent with any guidance as to how this 
should be implemented. The vagueness in the legislation may not be problematic provided it 
is implemented in accordance with the democratic participatory principles. As will be set out 
in detail below, the proponents (EAP's) have failed to achieve this objective. 
Thirdly, the EIA Regulations state that all relevant facts must be made available to 
IAP's. To meet this condition, all the proponent is required to do is provide the relevant 
technical documents. There is no obligation on the proponent to ensure that the information 
can be understood by IAP's, particularly outsiders.866 To combat this, the DEA and provincial 
environmental departments require proponents to prepare a 'basic information document' that 
must be circulated to the IAP's. The purpose of this document is to explain the project and the 
EIA process in simple terms. In the author's experience, this document is often superficial. It 
sets out the legislative public participation requirements and briefly sets out the project. It 
does not provide any detail on the key impacts that are expected to arise, how they will 
impact the IAP's or how they will be suitably mitigated. The reason for this is often because 
the basic information document is circulated at the initiation of the project – before any of the 
impact assessments have been considered. If this document was provided at the outset and 
another iteration was prepared later in the process with details of the impacts, it may be more 
                                               
865 Ibid at reg41(2).
866 Although not in the EIA arena, there is case law to suggest that persons should receive information (or legal 
process) in their home language. See Cape Killarney supra note 450.
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useful to IAP's. The current process therefore isolates outsiders and is a barrier to 
participation to those participants who do not speak the language of the community of 
practice.867 It is also contrary to Principle 14: The Principle of Integration.
Fourthly, by not providing a PPS setting out the details of the public participation 
process, IAP's will not have sense of their rights and obligations in terms of the entire public 
participation process. Instead they will be notified on an ad hoc basis, indicating that they are 
required to comment on a detailed EIA report within 30 days which is contrary to Principle 
15: The Principle of Continuity.
Fifthly, there is no requirement to audit the public participation process to confirm 
whether it is effective in engaging with the IAP's and achieving the democratic participatory 
principles and the Constitution. To counteract this, proponents tend to conduct public 
participation processes aimed at a high number of consultations. As indicated in Chapter 2, 
the democratic participatory processes are less concerned with the number of IAP's and more 
concerned with the quality of the participatory process. 
In spite of the defects set out above, it is conceivable that given the broad 
discretionary powers afforded to proponents (EAP's) in the EIA Regulations to select the 
mode(s) of participation and to implement the public participation process, they may 
implement processes which reflect the democratic participatory principles. A brief 
assessment of two EIA reports prepared by different EAP's indicates that the EIA public 
participation processes tend to fall short of the CFPP.   
7.5 The Implemented Environmental Impact Assessment public 
participation processes
Although EIA Reports need to be made available to the public in terms of the EIA public 
participation process and these reports must be submitted to the competent authority, the 
authorities do not currently have a public repository where all EIA Reports are made 
available. The only place where these reports may be found (although this is not a legislated 
requirement) is on the EAPs' websites. 
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Having scoured the websites of the five most well-known EAP firms in South 
Africa868 and having briefly reviewed some of the available reports869 it became apparent that 
the public participation process implemented in all cases was the same – namely, a notice and 
comment process and public hearing. 
As a result, I randomly selected two EIA Reports from two different EAP's to 
determine whether the democratic participatory principles were (in these cases) achieved,
notwithstanding the fact that the EIA Regulations do not include significant guidance on how 
public participation processes should be implemented.  The details of these EIA's are set out 
below. 
7.5.1 Amendments to licensed activities associated with the Platreef 
Underground Mine
The EIA report relating to the amendments to the licensed activities associated with the 
Platreef Underground Mine was prepared by Digby Wells in January 2016. The report 
contains an executive summary which sets out the purpose of the EIA, namely, to conduct an 
addendum EIA in order to update the Environmental Management Plan regarding the Platreef 
Underground Mine. No new listed activities were triggered by the proposed amendments but,
in terms of the EIA Regulations, any amendments to the mitigation measures contained in the 
Environmental Management Plan require that a public participation process is conducted 
prior to the application for amendment is considered by the competent authority. 
7.5.1.1 Purpose of the Public Participation Process
The EIA report includes a description of the public participation process. It must be noted 
that a separate public participation report was not compiled and attached to the EIA report. 
This means that the only information relating to the public participation process is the brief 
description contained in the EIA report. According to this description, the purpose of the 
public participation process is so ‘that stakeholders who are affected by the Project are given 
an opportunity to identify concerns and ensure that local knowledge, needs and values are 
                                               
868 SRK Consulting, Digby Wells Environmental, Savannah Environmental (Pty) Ltd, Environmental Resource 
Management and Jones and Wagner Engineering and Environmental Consultants.  
869 SRK Consulting available at http://www.srk.co.za/en/public-documents last accessed on 8 February 2017; 
Digby Wells available at http://www.digbywellsdocs.com/PublicDocuments/ last accessed on 8 February 2017; 
Savannah Environmental available at http://www.savannahsa.com/projects/index.php last accessed on 8 
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understood and taken into consideration.’870 This, however, must be understood in the context 
of the authorisation to mine has already been granted and that this EIA is merely to amend 
the existing environmental management plan. This is a relevant consideration in that a public 
participation process would have been conducted in first obtaining this approval but, although 
this objective is congruent with the democratic participatory principles and the CFPP, the 
execution of this objective fails to meet the standards of the CFPP. The key areas of concern 
are addressed below. 
7.5.1.2 Identifying Interested and Affected Parties
The report lists the following IAP's:
• ‘Directly affected and surrounding landowners;
• National, Provincial and Local Government;
• Ward Councillors;
• Local villages;
• Traditional authorities;
• Agricultural entities;
• Local businesses and
• Non-governmental organisations.’871
There is no indication that any particular measures have been taken to identify outsiders or 
persons missing from the public participation process. The above list is a generic list based on 
the kinds of participants who would be expected to be interested and may be able to 
contribute situated knowledge. Within each of these groups are various sub-groups who may 
require that the proponent exercise more of less effort to notify and engage with them.872 As 
is evident from the next section, little effort appears to have been made to engage with these 
outsiders to the participatory process. 
                                               
870 Digby Wells ‘Amendments to Licensed Activities Associated with the Platreef Underground Mine’ available
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871 Ibid.
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7.5.1.3 Notification to Interested and Affected Parties and identifying and 
sharing critical issues
The failure to investigate the IAP's in more detail in the section above is carried through into 
the manner in which they are notified of the proposed project.873 The EAP has merely
complied with the black letter of the EIA Regulations by sending letters to specific parties 
and publishing notices in the newspaper.874 While it is admirable that this notice was in 
English, Tsonga and Sepedi, such notice may be inappropriate if the community members are 
not literate.
Furthermore, the EAP did not appear to ascertain where the IAP's identified above 
obtain their information.875 That is, are local villagers obtaining their information from the 
newspaper? This is not evident from the facts contained in the EIA report. Given the rural 
nature of most villages, it seems unlikely that the newspaper will be the best source to notify 
and inform all the IAP's. This appears to undermine Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity
and Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's.
If written notification was not the appropriate way in which to inform certain IAP's of 
the proposed project, providing them with a Background Information Document, Posters and 
Pamphlets and access to the EIA Report is equally inappropriate.876 If outsiders were engaged 
and were sufficiently literate to understand the EIA Report, the question then needs to be 
considered whether the information contained in the report was presented in a manner that 
made it easy to understand to allow these IAP's the opportunity to participate.877
Contrary to Principle 19: The Issue Posts Principle, the EIA Report contains an 
executive summary. As argued in Chapter 5, executive summaries have a tendency to be 
more difficult to understand and, therefore, issue posts setting out the issues, risks and 
mitigations has been found to be a far more effective way to bring the important issues to the 
attention of the IAP's.878 While the executive summary does not include issue posts, it does 
include a summary of the 'Project Amendment Impacts' which highlight the potential impact 
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875 See 6.4.3 Notifying Interested And Affected Parties above.
876 Ibid at 35 - 36.
877 See 6.4.4 Identifying and sharing critical issues.
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211
and the significance before and after mitigation.879 As an overview this highlights the areas of 
concern to IAP's. However, the table does not set out the mitigation measures that will be 
implemented and does not cross refer to the pages of the EIA Report where this is dealt with 
in more detail, and so it does not easily allow IAP's the opportunity to review the underlying 
more detailed information without reading the entire report.880
Even if the outsiders managed to link the table set out in the executive summary with 
the detailed impacts and mitigations, the impacts are generally stated and there is not a clear 
indication as to how these impacts will affect individuals. Furthermore, the wording of the 
impacts is very technically phrased in the EIA Report.881 For example, in respect of Air 
Quality:
‘The results of the pollutant dispersion model…indicate that the predicted 24-hour (daily) PM10
concentrations show that the standard is exceeded at the four compass points with the worst cases at 
the western and southern boundary. In both cases the limit value (75ug/m3) is exceeded several 
kilometers from the mine boundary. The major contributions are emissions from hauling and crushing 
of ore and waste. In terms of spatial impact, the western and southern portions are affected most. The 
predicted concentrations are the likely additions that can be anticipated from the Project on ambient air 
quality and not cumulative impact from all the existing sources in the area. 
The predicted 99th percentile 24-hr (daily) ground level concentration of PM2.5 indicates exceedances 
at the mine boundary hence violating the current standard of 40 ug/m3.’882
The failure to illustrate how outsiders will be affected makes it difficult for these IAP's to 
understand the information and its impacts and so inhibits them from contributing during the 
public participation process either in writing or orally at the public meetings. 
7.5.1.4 Modes of Public Participation 
Consultation with IA'Ps took place during the 30-day period within which the EIA report was 
available for public comment. A variety of stakeholder meetings were conducted with 
‘traditional authorities, key stakeholders, communities and the general public.’883 The 
comments raised by these stakeholders (including the written comments) were incorporated 
into a notice and comment report which was included in the EIA report. It is evident from the 
EIA report, however, that the consultation meetings failed to meet the standards of the 
CFPP.884
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The modes of participation selected are the notice and comment proceedings in which 
the EIA Report was made available for comment in English, Tsonga and Sepedi. As 
expressed above, this option may be satisfactory for insiders to the process but this level of 
sophistication does not meet the requirement for all IAP's. To cater for less sophisticated 
IAP's, the EIA Report indicates that public meetings were held where a presentation 
regarding the amendments to the EIA was discussed and the attendees were 'educated' as to 
the amendments.885 Whether these meetings were successful in giving effect to the 
participatory democratic principles is unclear.
In certain instances, the EIA Report reveals that a number of the public meetings were 
disrupted by disgruntled community members and, in some instances, the meetings were 
cancelled.886 It is evident that Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate regarding the 
existing mining operations is not held by the mine. There does not appear to have been any 
further effort to re-initiate these meetings or engage with these communities in any other 
format. In this way, IAP's acting reasonably have been unable to participate in the process 
and have been unable to voice their concerns. This is contrary to Principle 1: The Educative 
Effect and Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity. The disruption to the public meetings is an 
obstacle to participation which needs to be overcome in order for the CFPP to be successfully 
implemented.
Given the existing hostility to the mine, action should have been taken by the 
proponent to develop a PPS aimed at discussing ways in which the IAP's would be consulted, 
including those IAP's opposed to the mine.887 If the proponent had done this, the IAP's may 
have been more willing to participate in the public meetings, rather than to disrupt them 
(Principle 1: The Educative Effect) and may be satisfied with outcomes in which they were 
involved (Principle 2: The Principle of Control) and would, ultimately, grant the social 
licence to the mine (Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate).888
Furthermore, if the existing public participation process was audited in accordance 
with the CFPP, the inadequacy of the previous public participation process may have been 
                                               
885 Ibid and 6.4.4 Identifying and sharing critical issues.
886 Ibid at 32 - 33.
887 6.4 Designing the Public Participation Strategy.
888 See 6.5 Implementing the Public Participation Strategy.
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identified and resolved.889 To the extent that this still resulted in the IAP's not wanting to 
participate, the EAP could have relied on Principle 6: The Finality in Decision-making by 
continuing with the process notwithstanding the failed attempts. This case highlights the 
importance of and value in auditing the public participation process against an independent 
standard. (Principle 17: The Principle of Monitoring and Evaluation).
7.5.2 Sasol South Africa (Pty) Ltd’s Postponement Application Public 
Participation Process
In June 2016 Sasol South Africa (Pty) Ltd, operating through its Second Synfuels Operations 
('SSO') submitted its Final Motivation for the Postponement of Compliance Timeframes in 
terms of Regulation 11 of Section 21 NEM:AQA Minimum Emissions Standards ('the Final 
Motivation') to the National Air Quality Officer. The Final Motivation requested a further 
postponement from the Minimum Emission Standards890 ('MES') ‘for three pitch tanks within 
the Tar Value Chain for Sasol’s Second Synfuels Operations.’891
7.5.2.1 Purpose of the Public Participation Process
In November 2013 the Department of Environmental Affairs ('DEA') published the MES for 
a variety of activities which caused air emissions. The MES included standards for new 
plants which were developed after the regulations were promulgated, as well as standards that 
existing operations need to meet. These existing operations were initially afforded until 1 
April 2015 to bring themselves in line with the MES. As SSO was not going to meet the 1 
April 2015 deadline in respect of the pitch tanks (and other infrastructure), a postponement 
was sought and granted. The postponement was granted until 31 March 2017. 
‘The initial postponement period of two years granted for the above mentioned tanks was shorter than 
the five year postponement period which was requested in line with an estimated 5 - 6 year project 
timeframe to ensure safe completion of the associated compliance project. Since SSO was granted a 
postponement shorter than required for its compliance project execution schedule for these tanks, SSO 
is applying for a further postponement.’892
Regulation 11 of the MES entitles a person to apply for a postponement from 
compliance with the MES. Regulation 12 indicates that an application must include an air 
                                               
889 See 6.6 Auditing the Public Participation Strategy.
890 ‘List of activities which result in Atmospheric Emissions which have or may have a significant detrimental
impact on the environment, including health, social conditions, economic conditions, ecological conditions or
cultural heritage’ GNR 893 GG 37504 22 November 2013.
891 Sasol South Africa ‘Final Motivation for Postponement of Compliance Timeframes in Terms of Regulation
11 of Section 21 NEM:AQA Minimum Emissions Standards’ at ii available at
http://www.srk.co.za/sites/default/files/File/South-
Africa/publicDocuments/Tar/SYNFUELS_FINAL_MOTIVATION_POSTPONEMENT_Tar_Value_ Chain.pdf  
accessed on 8 August 2016.
892 Ibid.
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pollution impact assessment, reasons for the application and a public participation process in 
terms of the EIA Regulations.893
7.5.2.2 Identifying Interested and Affected Parties
The Stakeholder Engagement Report states that the IAP's were identified based on the 
previous environmental authorisation process that the EAP conducted on behalf of SSO, 
those stakeholders who had registered for the previous postponement application, the parties 
registered for bi-annual SSO environmental consultation sessions dealing with air quality 
issues and those who registered as IAP's during Sasol’s Offset Implementation Plan public 
participation process.894 The report sets out an extensive list of IAP's registered.895 896
While this list may be comprehensive, Chapter 5 indicates that the proponent needs to 
determine whether there are any stakeholders who may contribute situated knowledge to the 
public participation process.897 Where such stakeholders exist, the proponent should seek to 
interact directly with these individuals and not via a representative, agency group, union. as 
these bodies may not necessarily express the views of the individuals and may not be able to 
contribute such knowledge which the members of these groups have.898
There is nothing in the Stakeholder Engagement Report which indicates that the 
proponent has undertaken this exercise. Aside from Sasol employees and adjacent 
surrounding landowners, there is no indication that members of the surrounding communities 
had been contacted or consulted.899 These individuals may have situated knowledge which
would have impacted on the authorities’ decision on whether or not to grant a further 
postponement. For example, poor ambient air quality in the region may have impacts on
health or agriculture which the decision makers have not contemplated. 
                                               
893 6.3.4 Empowering legislation relating to the public participation process.
894 ‘Annexure F: Stakeholder Engagement Report’ at 3 available at
http://www.srk.co.za/sites/default/files/File/South-
Africa/publicDocuments/Tar/ANNEXURE_F_Stakeholder_Engagement_Report_0.pdf accessed on 8 August
2016.
895 Ibid.
896 6.3.1 Identifying the Interested And affected Parties to the public participation process.
897 Ibid.
898 6.4.3 Notifying Interested And Affected Parties.
899 Ibid. 
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The EAP should have identified these missing stakeholders and taken measures to 
engage with these parties.900 Alternately, the EAP should have indicated that such outsiders 
to the process were not pursued because none was identified or that it was unreasonable or 
unnecessary to pursue these IAP's as they were unlikely to provide additional situated 
knowledge which would justify the significant costs (bearing in mind that cost cannot be an 
inhibiting factor to participation). If this exercise was conducted by the EAP, it has not been 
set out in the Final Motivation or the Stakeholder Engagement Report.   
7.5.2.3 Notification to Interested and Affected Parties and identifying and 
sharing critical issues
The reasons and justification for the application are set out in a manner that is generally
understandable. However, to the lay person, there are certain aspects which are phrased and 
described in a manner that outsiders may find difficult to understand particularly in respect of 
those aspects which impact outsiders such as health effects and the ecology. These impacts 
were set out in the atmospheric impact report ('AIR').901
The purpose of the AIR is ‘to provide an assessment of the implication for ambient air 
quality and associated potential impacts.’902 903 Baseline emissions were modelled on the 
existing operations and on the predicted emissions following implementation of the 
technology. These results were then compared against the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards ('NAAQS') which contained acceptable emissions levels from a health risk 
perspective. The predicted emissions were compared against the NAAQS at 15 sensitive 
receptor sites within a 50km radius of the operations. The sensitive sites included residential 
areas.904 As set out in more detail below, despite the fact that residential areas are in close 
proximity to the project, there did not appear to be any representatives from these 
communities attending the public participation meetings. This may be, in part, because a 
portion of the AIR and the summary in the Final Motivation were too technical to be 
understood by many.905 For example, on page 17 of the Final Motivation in respect of which 
sources of emissions were included within the dispersion modelling, the report states:
‘The dispersion modelling only considered these tanks, which does not include all VOC [Volatile 
Organic Compounds] sources on the site. Of the VOC sources that were not modelled, the majority are 
                                               
900 See 6.3.1 Identifying the Interested And affected Parties to the public participation process.
901 6.4.4 Identifying and sharing critical issues.
902 Ibid at 14.
903 6.3.3 The reason for the public participation process.
904 Ibid at 15.
905 6.4.4 Identifying and sharing critical issues.
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considered fugitive emissions…While concentrations of these emissions can be measured, in the 
majority of cases it is not possible to conduct flow measurements that comply with the prescribed 
Method (EPA Method 1/2). In most instances, flow measurements could not be conducted due to 
limited access to vent outlet, and where sampling ports / vents are available, they often do not meet the 
requirements (location or measuring ports, pipe configurations, size of port being smaller than 4” 
diameter to insert pilot tube, etc.) to measure stack gas velocity and volumetric flow rate. Therefore, 
insufficient information exists to quantify the mass emission rates from many sources for dispersion 
modelling purposes. It is estimated that approximately 5% of the total VOC emissions from the second 
site can be attributed to tank emissions. Of the total of 36 tanks containing products emitting VOCs, 3 
of these are included in this postponement application (although, as described above, VOC emissions 
from 7 tanks are modelled). The VOCs modelled is therefore a relatively small percentage of the total 
VOCs from the site. In terms of the remaining sources, the majority of which are fugitive emissions, 
projects such as the Tar Value Chain Phase 1 project are currently underway to reduce emissions. On 
completion of this project, the VOC emissions from the newly installed RTOs will be measurable to 
confirm compliance with the MES.’906
SSO indicate that measuring VOC's is difficult and unreliable. As a result, they 
suggest that ‘the most reliable measures of VOC ambient concentrations…remains the 
measured benzene values obtained from the monitoring stations in close proximity to the 
residential areas.’907 This notwithstanding, the AIR concludes that the purpose of the MES is 
to ensure that the ambient air quality does not impact on the health and well-being of people. 
This means that the air quality must comply with the NAAQS. According to the report, the 
Benzene measures fell below the NAAQS requirements. 
The impacts on health and ecological effects are afforded a page and a half of the 
Final Motivation and are also phrased technically. In respect of health effects it states
‘The AIR Regulations prescribe an assessment of the health effects of the emissions for which relief is 
sought from the MES based on the degree to which there is compliance with the NAAQS. The 
NAAQS governs air quality improvement, however, based on a permissible or tolerable level of risk to 
mitigate potential negative health impacts. The overall findings of the AIR are that the baseline 
emissions, as would apply during the period of postponement, will result [in] ambient concentrations 
within the tolerable or permissible risk levels…The results indicate that both the modelled and 
measured benzene concentrations are below the benzene NAAQS.’908
The ecological impacts are explained even more technically:
‘Benzene (together with other VOCs) is a precursor pollutant involved in the formation of secondary 
atmospheric pollutants, such as smog (generally) and ozone (specifically). As a secondary pollutant, 
Ozone (O3) is formed in the lower part of the atmosphere, from complex photochemical reactions 
following emissions of precursor gases such as NOx and VOCs. O3 is produced during the oxidation of 
carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrocarbons by hydroxyls (OH) in the presence of NOx and sunlight. The 
rate of ozone production can therefore be limited by CO, VOCs or NOx. Due to atmospheric transport, 
contributions or precursors from the surrounding region can also be important. The transport of O3 is 
determined by meteorological and chemical processes which typically extend over spatial scales of 
several hundred kilometres. Thus, for the purposes of studying O3 concentrations in a local area, it 
would be required to include regional emissions and transport. This would imply a significantly larger 
                                               
906 Ibid at 17.
907 Ibid.
908 Ibid at 21.
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study area with the inclusion of a slightly more comprehensive emissions inventory of NOx and VOCs 
sources (eg vehicle emissions in gauging). Such a study was outside the scope of this report.
Benzene is also a primary pollutant (slightly soluble in water (1.79g/L at 15oC)) that is toxic to aquatic 
systems, primarily altering redox potentials which in turn limits the biological communities which can 
function under the altered redox potentials. The toxicity for aquatic organisms is considered to be low 
to moderate, but this is only likely to be apparent when high concentrations arise from significant 
spills. Benzene quickly reacts with other chemicals in the air and is thus removed within a few days of 
release. In soils and water bodies it breaks down more slowly and can pass into groundwater where it 
can persist for weeks. Benzene does not accumulate in animals or plants and is unlikely to have any 
environmental effects at a global level…’909
Based purely on a notice-and-comment type public participation process, outsiders to 
the process would be unable to review the above (without some assistance) to understand 
what these paragraphs mean but also to assess what the impact would be on them.910 For 
example, what would the impact of benzene / VOCs be on a subsistence farmer within the 
50km radius of the operations or a community that relies on the water for washing, cooking 
and drinking. The information could have been presented in a manner that would have been 
easier to grasp with the more technical descriptions being made available for more 
sophisticated participants. In this way, the Final Motivation fails to present information in a 
manner that is important for the IAP's to understand in order to participate effectively
(Principle 18: The Issue Posts Principle). 
The Final Motivation could have been structured differently so as to create issue posts 
setting out the key issue headings which would have directed the IAP's to issues which 
directly impact on them. For example:
• Impacts of the postponement on community health;
• Impacts of the postponement on water resources;
• Impacts of the postponement on farmers in the community;
• SSO’s reasons for making the application.
An online mechanism would not have been needed for such an approach. All that is 
required is for the document which is made available to the public to be structured in a 
manner that is more focused on communicating information to the IAP's and not only the 
decision-maker. The Final Motivation may (in its current format) be a suitable submission to 
the decision-maker but it is not a suitable document for outsiders to comprehend the 
                                               
909 Ibid at 21 - 22.
910 6.4.4 Identifying and sharing critical issues and 6.4.5 Selecting the modes of participation.
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information and so that they can participate effectively.911 This discrepancy may be mitigated 
depending on the method in which the public participation process is conducted. 
7.5.2.4 Modes of participation and Public Participation Strategy
A public participation process was not presented or agreed upon with the various 
stakeholders.912 This is another aspect that is contrary to the CFPP. The public participation 
process was selected by the EAP. The process included making relevant information 
available for comment and holding public meetings at which this information was presented 
to IAP's. ‘Thereafter time was allowed for comment and queries’.913 The Stakeholder 
Engagement Report notes that the
‘primary objective of the public meetings was to:
• Foster robust engagement and build relationships with Sasol’s host communities;
• Share information on Sasol, their activities and Air Quality impacts relating to the pitch tanks, 
management and commitments.
• Provide an opportunity for the community to raise issues regarding the postponement 
application process.
• Facilitate comments on the Second Tar Value Chain Phase 2 Tanks Motivation Report and 
AIR.’914
The comments from the meeting were captured in a Comments and Response Table which 
was submitted to the authorities for consideration as part of the application. 
The problems with the above approach are twofold: firstly, the procedure followed is 
reminiscent of the notice and comment proceedings that Harter objected to during rulemaking 
processes in the United States as it enticed parties to take extreme positions, rather than to
collaborate to find amicable solutions.915 Secondly, as the information was technically stated, 
it would be impossible for less sophisticated participants to participate without assistance 
(such as moderation). It could be suggested that the public meeting is the EAP’s attempt to 
facilitate discussions, deliberation and problem-solving to find these solutions.916 This would 
seem evident from the objectives of the public meetings. However, the structure of the 
meeting indicates otherwise.
                                               
911 6.4.4 Identifying and sharing critical issues.
912 6.4 Designing the Public Participation Strategy.
913 Ibid at 5.
914 Ibid.
915 6.4.5 Selecting the modes of participation.
916 6.5 Implementing the Public Participation Strategy.
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According to the Stakeholder Engagement Report, the public meeting involved the 
EAP presenting to the attendees. This was followed by an opportunity for the parties to ask 
questions or make comments. As set out in Chapter 2, when considering Principle 1: The 
Educative Effect, the conclusion reached was that active involvement of participants was far 
more effective in 'educating' participants than passive learning would be.917 The Powerpoint 
presentation attached to the Stakeholder Engagement Report was largely drawn from the 
Final Motivation and was technically worded and focused.918 There does not appear to have 
been any attempt (despite the objectives of the public participation process) to facilitate 
public participation and for the EAP to assume a role of moderator and encourage more 
active participation by those present at the meeting. In addition, there did not appear to be any 
attempts to simplify the information for outsiders. 
Following this public meeting, no further attempts were made by the EAP to confirm 
that all IAP's were satisfied that their own views have been heard.919 Given that certain IAP's 
were not present at the meetings and there does not appear to have been any attempt to elicit 
situated knowledge, it is unlikely that these missing participants would feel that they exercise 
any control920 over the process or be satisfied if a further postponement were granted. The 
views of the participants would need to be determined as the above statements are merely 
speculative, based on their absence from the process. If an assessor had been appointed to 
monitor the implementation of the public participation process, this information would have 
been made available and compliance with the CFPP would be evident. 
7.6 Conclusion
The CFPP was established as a baseline framework for public participation. This thesis 
suggests that a public participation process implemented in terms of the CFPP (regardless of 
the mode of participation) is likely to satisfy the standard of participatory democracy 
contemplated in the Constitution. It has been emphasised throughout this thesis that it does 
not matter which mode of participation is implemented (be it online participation or more 
traditional formats). What matters is that the CFPP must be used to guide the development 
and implementation of the entire public participation process which includes (but is not 
limited to) the selection of the mode(s) of participation. 
                                               
917 Ibid.
918 6.4.4 Identifying and sharing critical issues.
919 6.6 Auditing the Public Participation Strategy.
920 Principle 2: The Principle of Control. 
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In this chapter, the public participation process required in terms of the EIA Regulations 
was analysed against the CFPP to determine whether it meets the standard. In doing this, the 
EIA Regulations were found to be deficient in a number of respects:
 Firstly, the EIA Regulations do not expressly require that the EAP consider if there 
are outsiders or missing persons who may contribute situated knowledge and who 
should be specifically engaged. This contravenes Principle 5: The Principle of 
Inclusivity and Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's;
 Secondly, there is no obligation for the EAP to develop a PPS, setting out the entire 
public participation process and agree with the IAP's in breach of Principle 10: The 
Public Participation Strategy and does not allow for on-going participation 
throughout the process (Principle 15: The Principle of Continuity); 
 Thirdly, the EAP is only obliged to ensure that all relevant information is made 
available to the IAP's. There is no obligation that this information is provided to IAP's 
in such a way that they can easily understand the information or, at least, the material 
issues arising from the information (Principle 19: The Issue Posts Principle). This is a 
barrier to effective participation and prevents the sharing of all forms of knowledge 
(Principle 14: The Principle of Integration); and
 Finally, there is no requirement that the public participation process is audited to 
ensure that it is effectively achieving the democratic participatory principles. 
While the EIA Regulations may not expressly make provision for the above, the language 
of the EIA Regulations is sufficiently vague that, in spite of, the lack of specific regulation, 
the EAP may (in practice) implement a public participation process that meets the democratic 
participatory principles of the CFPP. The two examples reviewed above (which reflect the 
approach generally adopted in EIA public participation processes) revealed that EAP's
complied with the letter of the law when notifying IAP's about the public participation 
process but did not to take specific measures to seek out outsiders or missing persons that 
could provide situated knowledge (Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity and Principle 8: 
The Identity of the IAP's). 
These notices informed the IAP's about the public participation process, the fact that 
they could submit comments and that there would be a public meeting. This public 
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participation process was determined by the EAP and was not negotiated with the IAP's to
assess what they believe to be the best method of consultation (Principle 10: The Public 
Participation Strategy).
Notice and comment proceedings followed by a public meeting are common practice 
in EIA. The EAP's in these instances, however, do not appear to have considered whether 
there are alternate or better mode(s) of participation that could have been adopted to engage 
with members of the community (such as online mechanisms) but have, in fact, defaulted to 
this process. This is in breach of Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity.
What is more serious is that there appears to have been no attempt to present the 
information (particularly the technical information) so that it could be easily understood by 
the IAP's (Principle 19: The Issue Posts Principle). In this way, it is extremely likely that less 
sophisticated IAP's would be able to meaningfully engage in the public participation process. 
If IAP's cannot meaningfully engage and submit comments, they will not have collaborated 
in the creation of information (Principle 1: The Educative Effect), they will not have been 
able to influence the ultimate decision (Principle 2: The Principle of Control) and are 
unlikely to be satisfied with the ultimate result of the process (Principle 3: The Social 
Licence to Operate). 
Whether these substantive principles were achieved or not can only be surmised as the 
public participation process was not audited to determine whether they were achieved 
(Principle 17: The Principle of Monitoring and Evaluation). It is thought that had this 
assessment been done, the public participation process would have been found to be 
inadequate and would have required amendment to ensure that the substantive principles 
were achieved. However, further investigation would need to have been conducted to 
determine this with any certainty as these presumptions are founded on the EAP's failure to 
give effect to the democratic participatory principles. 
These examples highlight that the current manner in which EIA public participation 
processes are conducted in South Africa fails to meet the requirements of participatory 
democracy contemplated in the Constitution. However, achieving constitutionally acceptable 
public participation process does not (in respect of EIA public participation processes, at 
least) require legislative amendment. All that is required is for EAP's to rely on the CFPP 
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when exercising their discretion to implement a public participation process in terms of the 
EIA Regulations. 
223
Chapter 8
Summary, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations on the 
Constitutional Framework of Public Participation in South Africa
8.1 Broader and better participation
Social media and online portals ('Web 2.0') which allow for conversational interaction 
between government and citizens and among citizens has resuscitated the debate about
whether the Internet can foster broader and better public participation or not.921 Initial 
attempts at online participation (which merely involved making information available 
online)922 failed to entice more IAP's to participate or to create better comments. Web 2.0 
differs from these initial attempts in that it creates a platform in which participants can not 
only receive information but also share it, create their own information and interact with 
other IAP's and authorities.923 In addition, it has the benefit of allowing persons to participate 
remotely and in their own time. Therefore, theoretically, Web 2.0 has the potential to 
facilitate broader and better participation.924
This thesis, however, suggests that the debate around Web 2.0 is a red herring. The 
real question needing to be considered is not which mode of participation must be 
implemented but rather, when implementing a public participation process, to ask whether the 
process gives effect to the requirements of participatory democracy contemplated by the 
Constitution.
The starting point for such an investigation was to identify the defining factors of 
participatory democracy as contemplated by the Constitution. This required an analysis of the 
theories of participatory democracy.925 From these theories, this thesis identifies three 
principles: Principle 1: The Educative Effect, Principle 2: The Principle of Control and 
Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate. These principles are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2 and are summarised in the next section. Suffice to state that these principles are 
referred to (along with Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity) as the substantive principles in 
                                               
921 Responsive and Accountable Public Governance 2015 World Public Sector Report op cit note 10.
922 Schulman op cit note 3 at 137.
923 Agnihotri et al op cit note 7.
924 Responsive and Accountable Public Governance 2015 World Public Sector Report op cit note 10.
925 Pateman op cit note 22, MacPherson op cit note 76 and Barber op cit note 76.
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that they focus on the IAP's subjective views of the public participation process in which they 
are involved. 
8.2 Substantive Principles
When the South Africa Constitution was enacted, it introduced a unique conception of 
democracy which included participatory democracy.926 Its express inclusion meant that the 
drafters of the Constitution intended certain objectives of participatory democracy to be 
incorporated into the legal system. These objectives are that IAP's actively participate in 
decisions and processes which affect them by collaborating with other IAP's to develop 
solutions. In doing this, the gap between the IAPs' personal interests and the common interest 
will be diminished. This is referred to as Principle 1: The Educative Effect.
By actively participating and collaboratively reaching an acceptable outcome, IAP's 
will exercise a degree of control927 over the public participation process and develop a sense 
of control over their lives. Determining their own destiny will enhance their sense of freedom 
(Principle 2: The Principle of Control). Furthermore by expressing their opinion in the 
decision-making processes, the IAP's sense of worth is enhanced as they believe that they are 
making a difference to the outcome (Principle 4: The Principle of Dignity). Where these 
characteristics exist, IAP's are more likely to accept the final outcome of the process even if it 
does not accord with their own personal views because they believe that the process was 
conducted in a fair manner (Principle 3: The Social Licence to Operate). These four 
principles are referred to as the substantive principles. 
Whether a public participation process achieves these substantive principles is 
subjective which means that the IAP's need to be interviewed to confirm whether they feel 
that the substantive principles were achieved during the public participation process. 
However, it is suggested that there are certain procedural principles which (if implemented 
during the public participation process) may improve the likelihood of the substantive 
principles being achieved. These procedural principles are explored below.   
8.3 Procedural principles
The substantive principles were considered in light of public participation processes 
conducted in South Africa since the introduction of the Constitution. Although it was not 
                                               
926 Roux op cit note 15 at 10-4.
927 As highlighted in this thesis, 'control' cannot be interpreted to mean that the participants have complete 
decision-making control but rather that they must feel that if they participate, they will have the chance to 
influence the ultimate decision.
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possible to consider all public participatory processes, the law, policy and practice of 
participation in political parties and voting,928 the creation of legislation,929 local 
government,930 administrative processes and online public participation processes931 has been 
considered in detail. This evaluation generated a number of additional principles ('the 
procedural principles') which are relevant to the implementation of constitutionally compliant 
participatory processes. Unlike the substantive principles which focus on the IAP's subjective 
mindset, the procedural principles focus on the manner in which the participatory process 
should be implemented so as to reasonably achieve the substantive principles. These 
principles include:
 Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity: this principle requires that proponents should 
remove all barriers to the public participation process and only exclude IAP's where 
there is a legitimate government purpose or reason for doing so;
 Principle 6: Finality in Decision-making: this principle requires that at some point in 
the participatory process the proponent may conclude that additional participation 
may not further promote the substantive principles. In such cases, the proponent may 
'downgrade' the level of participation from partnership or delegated power to lesser 
forms of participation in order to move the public participation process along;
 Principle 7: The Principle of Deference: this principle requires that, although the 
proponent needs to take into consideration the views of the IAP's, he or she does not 
need to defer to the views of the IAP's in all instances;
 Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's: this principle requires that the proponent 
identify all IAP's that may be interested in the public participation process, including 
outsiders to the process (i.e. those parties that are missing from the process or may not 
ordinarily participate but which may contribute valuable situated knowledge to the 
decision making process);
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3.3 Participating through Voting: Political Parties and 3.4 Participating by Voting.
929 Section 3.5 Participating in creating legislation.
930 Section 3.6 Participating in local government.
931 Chapter 5
RegulationRoom - Online participation.
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 Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility: this principle requires that the proponent 
amend the mode(s) of participation in situations where the substantive principles are 
not being achieved;
 Principle 10: The Public Participation Strategy: this principle requires that the 
proponent develop a strategy for the public participation process from its inception 
until completion. This strategy must be negotiated and agreed with the IAP's (or in 
respect of large groups of IAP's, they must be permitted to comment on the draft PPS
before it is finalised);
 Principle 11: The Principle of Context: this principle requires that the proponent take 
into consideration the circumstances in which the public participation process will be 
conducted. For example, implementing an online public participation process would 
be inappropriate in an area where most the IAP's do not have access to technology;
 Principle 12: The Principle of Reasonableness: this principle requires that the 
proponent implement a process taking into consideration factors such the cost of the 
process, the time available, the importance of the matter etc.;
 Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity: this principle encourages the proponent to 
select more than one mode of participation in order to ensure the substantive 
principles are achieved in respect of all the IAP's;
 Principle 14: The Principle of Integration: this principle recognises that both 
technical and situated knowledge must be incorporated into the public participation 
and decision-making processes;
 Principle 15: The Principle of Continuity: this principle recognises that public 
participation is an on-going activity that must continue throughout the lifecycle of the 
process;
 Principle 16: The Principle of Efficiency: this principle requires that the public 
participation process must be conducted quickly without compromising on the quality 
of that process;
 Principle 17: The Principle of Evaluation and Monitoring: this principle requires that 
the public participation process must be continually monitored to ensure that the 
democratic participatory principles are being achieved;
 Principle 18: The Narrative Principle: this principle recognises that outsiders do not 
express themselves in a way that is familiar to the administrators of the community of 
practice but rather by way of stories and personal experience. Although this may be 
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untraditional, this form of information includes valuable situated knowledge that 
impacts on the outcome of the process;
 Principle 19: The Issue Posts Principle: this principle requires that the information 
disclosed to the IAP's is presented in a manner that can be easily understood by the 
IAP's (particularly outsiders) so that they can meaningfully participate in the public 
participation process; and
 Principle 20: The Principle of Moderation: this principle requires that the proponent 
moderate the public participation process to direct IAP's to relevant information, 
initiate debate on critical issues and where necessary intervene where participants 
move off-point or become aggressive towards one another.
To guide administrators, lawyers, legislatures, government and other parties in developing 
public participation processes which give effect to the substantive principles, these principles,
along with the substantive principles, have been incorporated into the CFPP which, if 
followed, will ensure that any administrative or policymaking public participation process 
complies with the conception of participatory democracy required by the Constitution.
8.4 The Constitutional Framework for Public Participation
Based on these principles, this thesis proposes the Constitutional Framework for Public 
Participation ('CFPP'). It is suggested (although this will need to be the subject of further 
empirical investigation) that if a proponent implements a public participation process in 
accordance with the CFPP, the process will give effect to the substantive and participatory 
principles and thus the conception of participatory democracy contemplated in the 
Constitution. . The CFPP requires (as a starting point) that the person responsible for 
implementing the public participation process develop a PPS which includes identifying 
IAP's, selecting appropriate modes of participation, implementing these modes and 
monitoring the effects of this participation to ensure that the substantive principles are 
achieved. 
There are various factors which inform the PPS. Before the mode(s) of participation
can be selected, the proponent will need to consider the provisions of the empowering 
legislation, the time available, the costs of implementing the process and the identity of the 
IAP's taking into consideration the insiders, outsiders, 'missing' persons, excluded persons 
and the discrete and identifiable groups (Principle 5: The Principle of Inclusivity and 
Principle 8: The Identity of the IAP's). Based on these factors the proponent must develop a 
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PPS setting out the structure of the public participation process. (Principle 10: The Public 
Participation Strategy). 
The PPS must use the terminology of 'inform', 'consult' and 'involve' so that the IAP's 
know and expect the degree of participation expected from them at each phase of the process
(Principle 16: The Principle of Efficiency). There can be various modes of participation,
based on the context (Principle 11: Principle of Context). If appropriate online tools can be 
used (either alone or in conjunction with traditional modes of participation) to engage with 
IAP's (Principle 5: Principle of Inclusivity and Principle 13: The Principle of Multiplicity). 
Electronic consultation is not, however, a quick solution which solves all of the problems that 
are currently experienced in public participation principles. In fact, using social media and 
online tools may require additional resources and time. However, in the correct circumstances 
it can be a useful tool to encourage debate and comments associated with particular issue 
topics. Before implementing the PPS, it must be agreed with IAP's or (in respect of bigger 
groups) made available for public comment and input to ensure that the IAP's are satisfied 
that it will be an effective method of engagement. 
The proponent needs to consider these comments and take some of them into 
consideration. However, the proponent does not need to defer to these comments in all 
instances (Principle 7: The Principle of Deference) and needs to strike a balance between 
what is practical and feasible (Principle 12: Principle of Reasonableness), bearing in mind 
that if the proponent does not take the IAP's comments into consideration, he or she may be 
opposed to the process and may not grant the social licence to operate (Principle 3: The 
Social Licence to Operate). The proponent will need to publish the final PPS prior to 
implementation (Principle 6: Finality in Decision-making). 
In implementing the PPS, the proponent must present the information in a manner 
which can easily be understood by the IAP's (such as issue posts932) and provide them with a 
way in which they can express their concerns, bearing in mind that outsiders may comment 
on the information in ways that do not subscribe to the community to practice.933  Online 
forms of presenting information and allowing participants to comment can be useful in this 
context. Information can be simplistically set out with layering operations allowing more 
                                               
932 Principle 19: The Issue Posts Principle.
933 Principle 18: The Narrative Principle and Principle 14: The Principle of Integration.
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sophisticated users the opportunity to read the underlying, more technical information while 
not denying the superficial user an understanding of the issues at hand (Principle 19: The 
Issue Posts Principles). Where conflicts arise, the proponent will need to implement problem-
solving mechanisms to resolve these conflicts and reach some form of consensus or 
compromise. In doing so, the proponent will need to act as a moderator to ensure that the 
views of both parties are properly conveyed and adequate solutions are found (Principle 20: 
The Principle of Moderation). 
Whichever modes of participation are adopted must be audited by an independent 
third party ('the assessor') to confirm that the substantive principles934 are achieved (Principle 
17: The Principle of Evaluation and Monitoring). To the extent that the assessor is of the 
view that the principles are not being achieved, the PPS can be modified accordingly 
(Principle 9: The Principle of Flexibility). The assessment needs to be an ongoing activity 
throughout the life of the public participation process (Principle 15: The Principle of 
Continuity). It needs to determine quickly and easily whether the democratic participatory 
principles are being achieved and to modify or supplement the PPS if they are not (Principle 
16: The Principle of Efficiency). 
If the PPS is suitably implemented in accordance with the CFPP, the IAP's subjective 
assessment of the substantive principles should be confirmed and the objectives of the 
Constitution achieved. The EIA public participation process was examined in accordance 
with the CFPP (as an example) to determine whether processes conducted in terms of the EIA 
Regulations give effect to the democratic participatory principles and the conception of 
participatory democracy required by the Constitution. 
8.5 The Constitutional Framework for Public Participation and the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Public Participation Process
The EIA public participation process set out in the EIA Regulations failed to comply with the 
CFPP in the following respects:
• There is no specific obligation to seek out missing IAP's who may offer valuable 
situated knowledge to the decision-making process as required by Principle 8: The 
Identity of the IAP's;
                                               
934 Principle 1: The Educative Effect, Principle 2: The Principle of Control, Principle 3: The Social Licence to 
Operate and Principle 4: The Dignity Principle. 
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• There is no obligation on the proponent to develop and negotiate a PPS with the IAP's 
that sets out the entire public participation process and informs IAP's as to when they 
can be involved and the nature and extent of that involvement;935
• While all relevant information must be made available to IAP's, there is no obligation 
on the proponent to present this information in a way that IAP's (particularly 
outsiders) can easily understand.936 This is a barrier to participation as it prevents 
IAP's from being able to raise informed matters during the process937 and
• There is no requirement that the public participation process be audited to ensure that 
the IAP's are actively engaged in the process and the substantive principles 
achieved.938
While the EIA Regulations may not expressly make provision for the above, the wording of 
the EIA Regulations was sufficiently vague that the proponent (EAP) may have given effect 
to these democratic participatory principles when implementing the public participation 
process. 
Unfortunately, in the two EIA public participation processes examined (which were 
generally representative of EIA public participation processes), it was found that the above 
weaknesses in the public participation process were not rectified in practice. Given that these 
problems with the public participation process are significant, it is unlikely that the 
substantive participation principles would be achieved, highlighting that public participation 
processes are not being conducted in a manner required by the Constitution. That being said, 
the evaluation of the EIA process was conducted strictly on a desktop basis after the public 
participation process was complete. It is hoped that future empirical investigations will be
conducted in which the CFPP is applied to both online and offline public participation 
processes, and to processes in which cultural practices may suggest the need for a nuanced 
approach, to assess its effectiveness in achieving public participation processes that are more 
acceptable to the IAPs.
                                               
935 Principle 10: The Public Participation Strategy.
936 Section 19: The Issue Posts Principle.
937 Principle 14: The Principle of Integration.
938 Principle 17: The Principle of Monitoring and Evaluation. 
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8.6 Conclusion
This thesis proposes a universal framework which administrative and policy-making public 
participation processes should follow to ensure that it meets constitutional standards. As is 
evident from the two examples cited in the last chapter, the legislation requiring public 
participation is generally not prescriptive regarding the manner in which it must be 
conducted. While this may be unfortunate, it is also necessary as the circumstances and the 
identity of the IAP's will dictate which mode or modes of participation may be appropriate 
under differing circumstances. This is not something that can be pre-determined by the 
legislature. However, if laws cannot specify what kind of participation is acceptable, what 
must legislatures, administrators, lawyers, EAP's do to ensure that the public participation 
process is constitutional? The CFPP is designed to assist in this process by guiding all parties 
through a participatory process. It is hoped that by following the CFPP, a more consistent 
approach to public participation processes will result and, with it, create a series of 
precedents. 
What this thesis also shows is that lawyers, administrators and legislatures must focus 
on the effects of the implementation of the modes of participation and not the modes 
themselves. Online participation is not the panacea for the current inadequacies in public 
participation. It is only a tool used to engage IAP's. Whether it is an effective tool depends on 
whether it is used in accordance with the CFPP and gives effect to the democratic 
participatory principles. This, however, will need to be the subject of future research.
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